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Welcome
Brazil is honoured to chair the G20 in 2008 and 
to welcome all members to the debates it will host 
on the major financial and economic issues facing 
the international community 
stability, job creation, rising incomes and an expanding 
consumer market are the ingredients of this virtuous 
cycle of long-term growth.
These achievements in Brazil and elsewhere in the 
developing world have lifted millions out of poverty 
and opened the doors to prosperity for countless others. 
In the face of the unfolding financial turmoil, it behoves 
international institutions to act swiftly and decisively to 
help preserve these historic gains.
More broadly, the Bretton Woods institutions require 
a major overhaul in order to respond meaningfully to 
the profound transformations underway in the global 
economy. New engines of growth and technological 
innovation among emerging economies now play an 
increasingly prominent role in worldwide financial 
flows and investments. The International Monetary 
Fund and the World Bank must adapt to these new 
realities or risk redundancy. Brazil sets great store on 
multilateral action. Therefore, it is actively engaged in 
discussions on how best to infuse both organisations 
with renewed legitimacy and efficiency.
The present financial upheavals are part of a 
wider set of globalising trends that are fundamentally 
reshaping our world. The challenges we face on the 
environment, climate change, energy security, poverty 
reduction, trade – as well as on financial issues – 
can no longer be addressed without engaging major 
emerging economies.
The creation and strengthening of diverse and 
representative forums such as the G20 constitute an 
essential step in moulding an international decision-
making system that responds to present-day needs 
and expectations. There is thus a silver lining to the 
dark clouds on the global economic and financial 
horizon. We have before us an opportunity to refashion 
international institutions in a manner that ensures that 
all countries are on board, as we seek to rise to the 
global challenges of the 21st century. ◆
By Luiz Inácio Lula 
da Silva, president 
of Brazil W e are living in times of changing paradigms and unexpected threats. The prolonged expansion that the international economy has enjoyed over recent 
years – thanks to low interest rates and reduced risk 
aversion – has given way to financial turmoil and 
uncertainty in the wake of the market upheavals in the 
United States.
Brazil has never been better placed to absorb these 
shockwaves. Since January 2006 our vulnerability 
has fallen sharply. Our foreign currency reserves 
exceed $205 billion. The country has become a net 
international creditor. The economy’s enhanced 
competitiveness and its diversified export base explain 
our growing share of international trade and attraction 
for foreign domestic investment. Domestic inflation 
has been reined in and public deficits are under 
control. No wonder Brazil has finally been granted its 
long overdue investment-grade status.
Previously, emerging economies were both the 
origin and victims of international financial crises. 
They are now a source of global stability and growth, 
helping to balance falling output in the industrialised 
nations. Brazil’s gross domestic product grew 5.4 per 
cent in 2007 and has grown 6 per cent over the last 
four quarters. The Programme for Accelerated Growth, 
which provides for increased public and private 
investment, especially in infrastructure, is a guarantee 
that this pace is sustainable. As a result, two million 
new jobs have been created over the last 12 months, 
and social and regional disparities have diminished. 
Brazil’s Gini index of income inequality now stands 
at 0.505 – its lowest recorded level. Macroeconomic 
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real economy and puts at risk the fundamentals of 
national and international economic growth.
In the last decade, emerging economies were 
normally regarded with suspicion and doubt. Today, 
they are active investors and important suppliers of 
credit, as well as global traders with enviable economic 
dynamism. Emerging economies are therefore regarded 
as a buffer against the further spread of the current 
crisis. They are playing a key role in mitigating the 
risks of an excessive economic downturn in developed 
B razil has taken up the chair of the G20 during a period of significant change in the world. On the one hand, new economic players and new centres of dynamism are emerging; on the other, we are seeing a correction of global imbalances originating 
in advanced economies. In the Brazilian context, our 
presidency takes place as the economic stabilisation 
cycle launched in the 1990s is being consolidated, 
enabling the country to restart a vigorous and 
sustained cycle of economic growth.
The G20 was created in 1999 to discuss key issues 
related to international economic stability. At the 
time, emerging economies were undergoing severe 
financial difficulties. After a long period of world 
economic growth and low inflation, last year’s G20 
discussions were already pointing to a worsening of 
global economic imbalances. The expected reversal of 
fortune of the international economy took the form of 
two shocks: the crisis in the real-estate market in the 
United States, with severe financial consequences, and 
inflationary pressures driven by high commodity prices. 
The worsening of the financial crisis is now casting 
doubts on the short-term global economic prospects.
What has changed in the world since the crises of the 
late 1990s? Even though today’s crisis also has financial 
origins, its transmission mechanisms and dynamics 
are different. In the late 1990s the crises hit emerging 
markets and took the form of abrupt capital outflows, 
with increasing loss of confidence, risk aversion and 
international contagion. The quick and excessive 
responses by private financial agents were based on the 
perception that the macroeconomic fundamentals of 
these countries were unsustainable.
The current financial turmoil, in contrast, is the 
result of turbulence at the centre of the global economy. 
This is a strikingly new development. One important 
question is the extent to which the institutions of 
advanced economies will be able to respond adequately 
to the dynamics of globalised financial capital. The 
excessive liberty granted to private financial players, the 
growing complexity of financial markets in a context of 
insufficient regulation, and overly indulgent supervision, 
are certainly key elements to take into account when 
considering the causes of the market disruptions 
underway. The financial turmoil has an impact on the 
Brazil takes 
the chair  
Brazil’s presidency is committed to achieving a 
greater impact on the global economy 
By Guido Mantega, 
minister of finance, 
Brazil
 The G20 will be put 
to the test in this new global 
environment 
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1) sustainable growth, which is underpinned by 
increased investment – especially in infrastructure – 
real productive capacity, education and innovation, 
and thus does not generate inflation, debt or multiple 
deficits, as in the past; 2) the creation of a new market of 
consumers, fostered by job creation, income distribution, 
greater access to credit, and a fall in poverty and income 
disparities. This policy includes the use of conditional 
cash transfer programmes such as the Bolsa Família; and 
3) the increased participation of Brazil in international 
markets, through the diversification of our exports 
and trade partners and higher levels of foreign direct 
investment to stimulate aggregate supply, as well as 
growing Brazilian investment abroad.
The results have been very positive. We have 
increased our average growth from 1.6 per cent 
(1998–2003) to 4.5 per cent (2004–2007). Brazil’s 
international reserves (under the liquidity concept) 
in January 2003 were $23.3 billion, while today they 
exceed $205 billion. Public sector consolidated debt 
dropped from 55.04 per cent of gross domestic product 
in July 2002 to 40.59 per cent in July 2008. By 2010 
we expect to achieve a nominal surplus. This year, 
after a long period of falling inflation, Brazil has been 
the only country among those with inflation targeting 
that has kept inflation inside the target band. In 
1999, Brazilian foreign trade (imports plus exports) 
amounted to $97.2 billion. From January 2008 until 
August 2008 this figure increased to $244.7 billion. We 
have created, between January 2003 and August 2008, 
8 million formal jobs – 1.8 million alone in the first 
eight months of 2008. Unemployment has dropped in 
the metropolitan regions from 13 per cent in August 
2003 to 7.6 per cent in August 2007. The poverty rate, 
in turn, fell from 44.9 per cent in 1990 to 28 per cent 
in 2007, while last year’s figures point out that a new 
middle class in Brazil represents more than 51 per cent 
of the total population.
For most of Brazilian history, the country struggled 
to cope with financial problems. More recently, Brazil 
overcame the foreign debt crisis, the long-lasting 
inflationary imbalances and faced three foreign 
financial crises (1999, 2001 and 2002). In recent 
years, we successfully stabilised our economy and 
reduced its foreign vulnerability. Recently, during the 
current financial turbulence, the international financial 
community recognised this new reality. Brazil was 
finally granted investment-grade status by two of the 
most important rating agencies.
We are seeing a new period in the economic history 
of Brazil, in which our country is increasingly called 
upon to participate in international decision making. 
We are prepared to take part in all relevant forums at 
the highest level, and contribute to discussions on the 
global financial agenda. For the G20 we are making an 
effort to raise its effectiveness and also the impact of 
its deliberations in global decisions on economic and 
financial governance. The G20 can count on Brazil’s 
commitment to achieve this objective. Our fellow G20 
members can be certain that we will continue to be 
engaged in working for the establishment of a more 
balanced, equal and fair economic order, focused on 
growth and, above all, on the improvement of living 
standards, especially for the poorest. ◆
countries. The players are different, their roles have 
changed, but some topics are still at the top of the 
agenda: the adaptation of institutions and the merits 
of national economic policies, as well as international 
economic governance. In this context, the G20 has a 
fundamental role to play, and its effectiveness will be 
put to the test in this new global environment.
Brazil today is very different from the country it was during the late 1990s. Success in tackling 
inflation and the resulting macroeconomic stability 
have enabled us to launch an economic development 
agenda with a particular focus on income distribution 
and social inclusion. We are seeing the culmination 
of at least a decade of internal reforms, many of them 
harsh, which have made Brazil more resistant to 
external economic shocks.
The economic model successfully applied by the 
government of President Lula has three main pillars:  
???????????????????
?????????????? ????
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I n 1999, the Asian-turned-global financial crisis catalysed the creation of the G20 finance ministers’ and central bankers’ forum to provide stability to a rapidly globalising world.Almost a decade later, in 2008, the American-turned-global financial crisis made a strengthened G20 a crisis manager for a truly globalised world. The decisive move 
came on Saturday 11 October 2008 at the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) in Washington DC, when Brazilian 
finance minister Guido Mantega hosted the first-ever 
emergency meeting of the G20 forum.
The first cause of this extraordinary gathering was 
the cascading financial crisis that had begun with the US 
subprime mortgage problem in the summer of 2007 and, a 
year later, had proliferated into failing financial institutions, 
frozen credit markets and economic recession in the 
leading economies of the world. Proving inadequate to cope 
with the crisis were the unilateral measures of the United 
States, with its $700 billion rescue package approved by 
Congress, and even the concerted efforts of the G7 and its 
partners with their co-ordinated interest-rate reduction on 
8 October. As stock markets took historic plunges and were 
closed in several countries in the week ending 10 October, 
the world needed a clear, comprehensive, co-ordinated 
response with a speed and on a scale never seen before.
The G7 finance ministers offered their bold five-point 
programme on 10 October, following their meeting at the 
US Treasury that afternoon. But far more than in 1999, the 
world needed more than the political will and formidable 
power of these seven leaders of old. Now caught up in the 
crisis within the G7 were rapidly emerging economies such 
as Russia, Indonesia and Brazil. More importantly, such 
G20 partners had the resources to convince panicking 
market players that the necessary liquidity and capital 
would come. Asian countries controlled $4 trillion in 
exchange reserves, with G20 member China holding more 
than twice as much as G7 member Japan. From the Middle 
East, oil- and reserve-rich Saudi Arabia similarly stood as a 
producer of financial security for a crisis-afflicted G7. More 
broadly, the IMF forecast that the G7 economies would 
The G20 
takes centre 
stage
At an emergency meeting, finance ministers and 
central bank governers addressed the immediate 
concern of the global financial crisis 
By John Kirton, 
director, G20 
Research Group
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grow by only 0.14 per cent in 2009, while the emerging 
economies would expand by 6 per cent. 
US President George W Bush paid a surprise visit 
to IMF headquarters to participate in the G20 meeting. 
Acknowledging that the problem had been born in the 
US, Bush said he had come because the crisis had spread 
globally and was so serious that he planned to expand 
the discussions to solve the crisis beyond the G7 to the 
G20. As the president recognised, whether the G20 
would back, with one voice, the programme produced by 
the G7 alone was critically important if the global crisis 
was to be contained.
This the G20 did. Its communiqué issued on the 
evening of Saturday 11 October boldly declared the 
G20’s resolve “to deepen co-operation to improve the 
regulation, supervision and the overall functioning of 
the world’s financial markets” and to collaborate on 
“macroeconomic policy, liquidity provision, strengthening 
financial institutions and protecting retail depositors”. 
The G20 members further committed to “using all the 
economic and financial tools to assure the stability and 
well functioning of financial markets” and to avoid harm 
to other countries and to the stability of the system. 
They pledged to remain in close contact through to their 
meeting in São Paolo in November.
With these words, the G20 gave its full support to 
the actions the G7 had announced in its communiqué 
the evening before. In doing so, the G20 recorded 
its recognition of the new reality that it was equally 
responsible for systemic stability, equally harmed by its 
absence and willing to play its full part in the common 
cause. The G20’s first-decade dialogue had aimed at 
consensus over longer-term reforms. It now advanced to 
a common commitment to act immediately to save the 
global financial system itself.
While the G20’s first extraordinary meeting had taken 
place in Washington, it was symbolic that it was chaired 
by Brazil, held at the IMF and attended by Bush. The 
first element showed that capability and leadership were 
passing to a new generation of emerging powers beyond 
the G7 of old. The second and third suggested a return 
to multilateralism, reflecting the new, broader balance of 
power in a now tightly wired world. But under the new 
leadership of Brazil, with its emerging economy partners, 
it would be a new multilateralism to generate a much-
changed global financial architecture for the new age.
With the ongoing need to combat the current crisis, 
to create the new global governance architecture and to 
strengthen the G20 to perform both tasks, the world will 
watch with even greater interest the next G20 meeting 
Brazil will host, in São Paolo on 8–9 November. ◆
 The G20 recorded  
that it was willing to  
play its full part in the  
common cause 
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plummeting housing markets, and exchange rate 
volatility and misalignment.  
A second challenge is global credit market disruptions 
and their impact on financial sector competition. The 
global financial contagion that created the G20 and its 
core concern with financial stability has now returned. 
The credit crisis ignited by the US subprime mortgage 
problem in the summer of 2007 has now gone global 
rather than gone away: G20 governors will examine what 
is new about its causes and transmission mechanisms, 
what regulatory and supervisory responses are required, 
and what the respective responsibilities of governments, 
business and other actors are, at the national and 
international levels. All parts of the financial industry, 
including its workers and its customers, will be affected by 
what the G20 concludes. 
The current credit contraction is shrinking 
competition among not only commercial banks, but also 
investment banks, insurance companies and other vital 
components, right down to those that give mortgages to 
families to buy or keep their homes. With governments 
in the US, Britain and elsewhere becoming the lenders 
and owners of last resort, concern grows about the 
competitive implications for consumers and the fiscal 
burden for the governments themselves.  
This concern embraces sovereign wealth funds (SWF) 
from oil- and export-rich countries, now rushing in to 
provide capital and acquire ownership in many struggling 
firms. If foreign SWFs are needed to increase liquidity, 
capital and competition in national markets, what 
regulatory and supervisory policies will encourage best 
practices on their part? Can SWFs provide the investment 
O n 8–9 November 2008, the G20 finance ministers and central bank governors will assemble in São Paulo, Brazil, for the most important meeting of this central forum for global economic governance since its start in 1999. 
The G20 combines, as equals, the established G8 powers 
of the United States, Japan, Germany, Britain, France, 
Italy, Canada, Russia and the European Union; the rapidly 
emerging economies of China, India, Brazil, Mexico and 
South Africa; the other systemically significant countries of 
Argentina, Australia, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, South Korea 
and Turkey; and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
and the World Bank. This unique group, representing 
much of the world’s population, territory, economy, finance 
and trade, brings great diversity in regional perspective, 
level of development, economic structure, political system, 
language and religion to its search for consensus on how to 
guide today’s troubled world. 
This year, the G20 is hosted for the first time by Brazil, whose booming economy, finances and credit 
ratings, as well as vast forests, fresh water, food, biofuels, 
minerals, oil and gas, make it a major power and an 
attractive destination and source for investors around the 
world. Brazil’s meeting is the tenth meeting of this club, 
created by Canada’s Paul Martin, America’s Lawrence 
Summers and their fellow farsighted finance ministers, in 
response to the devastating Asian-turned-global financial 
crisis from 1997 to 1999. The official history, The Group 
of Twenty: A History (www.g20.org), describes well how 
the G20 has helped foster agreement on several key 
issues, most recently the reform of the IMF and the 
World Bank to give better “voice and vote” to the rising 
powers that matter more today. 
Brazil’s G20 can make a critical contribution to 
governing the global economy at this challenging, 
crisis-ridden time. Taking as its theme: ‘Fostering 
Growth, Innovation and Social Inclusion’ the 
meeting will focus first on global economic 
prospects and risks to domestic policies. These 
include slowing growth, rising inflation, high 
and volatile commodity prices, the credit crisis, 
Planning for 
the future
Under Brazil’s leadership, the G20 is tasked 
with addressing the challenges of the current 
economic crisis 
By John Kirton, 
director, G20 
Research Group
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Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva’s global leadership on food 
security will inspire the discussions here.
These issues affect G20 members’ fiscal policies and 
their ability to stimulate economic growth, encourage 
public sector spending efficiency, foster social inclusion and 
afford strong social programmes for education and health. 
In Africa, the links between fiscal policy, social inclusion 
and infectious disease are direct and deadly indeed. 
All these issues relate to the Bretton Woods institutions, where the G20 will consider the second 
stage of reform and the very mission and mandate of 
these bodies in today’s world. Also under scrutiny is the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) and its long-overdue 
Doha negotiations, where Brazil is a leader and the G20 
finance ministers play a key role. They are also key in 
aid-for-trade and in trade and project finance – the micro-
level foundations for sustainable global growth and 
development that are now affected by the credit crisis, 
the commodity boom and volatility, the need for clean 
water and energy, and changes at the IMF and the  
World Bank.
The G20 will also consider enhancing its own role 
in addressing global economic and financial risks, 
strengthening the stability and effectiveness of domestic 
finance sectors and improving stewardship of the global 
financial architecture in the public and private sectors. 
Coming to consensus and actionable conclusions on 
such a comprehensive, complex agenda constitutes one 
of the greatest challenges the G20 has ever faced. But its 
past success suggests that under Brazil’s leadership, the 
G20 is up to the task. ◆
that developing countries need but are now less able 
to attract from indebted mature economies, their own 
investors or their own tax revenues?
A third issue is clean energy, global markets and 
climate change. Clean energy is essential for all economies 
to sustain their economic and social development, and 
cope with the compounding challenge of climate change. 
Brazil is well positioned to lead G20 discussions on 
how alternative and renewable energy can contribute 
to a cleaner future and the role of markets, government 
regulation and subsidies.
Climate change will be considered in light of the 
work of the G20’s study group chaired by Britain, the 
G20’s host in 2009. It will focus on the financial aspects 
of climate change for governments and for private 
sector players. Biofuels are due for special attention 
regarding their heavy government subsidies and strains 
on affordable food and the environment. With food 
crises sweeping several countries, Brazilian President 
 Brazil’s G20 can 
make a critical contribution 
to governing the global 
economy 
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Amid international crises in the late 1990s, especially in developing countries, the G7  – led by Canada – proposed a new forum to gather their ministers of economy and finance informally with their counterparts in the 13 more important states. The result 
was the G20. The first meeting took place in Berlin 
in December 1999, with the aim of establishing a 
dialogue on economic growth and stability. Unlike 
most other international forums, the G20 has 
no permanent staff or headquarters. Its annual 
presidency, and all related responsibilities (including 
the nomination of a provisional secretariat), rotate 
among its members.
The G20 represents 90 per cent of the world’s 
economy, two-thirds of the global population and a 
broad geographic distribution. Hence, co-ordination 
can be very effective in strengthening the international 
financial architecture and fostering economic growth.
Considering that the G20 was created in reaction 
to the global financial crisis of the late 1990s, Brazil 
entered the group in a very weak position. From the 
beginning of 1999 until the end of 2001, Brazil faced 
financial turbulence that caused monetary devaluation 
and resulted in a currency crisis. Nevertheless, the 
Brazilian situation was not as dramatic as that which 
occurred in Asia during the same period, since Brazil 
managed to maintain an invulnerable financial system, 
guaranteeing the minimum stability necessary to avoid 
a collapse of its markets.
Since 2002, Brazil has tried to preserve a pathway 
of adjustments, which include inflation targeting, 
export promotion, reserve accumulation and a 
permanent tax policy. These have stabilised its 
financial records and promoted Brazil’s integration 
into the global economy. Brazil has now reached 
investment-grade status; its primary fiscal surplus has 
remained above 4 per cent of gross domestic product; 
exchange reserves stand at $200 billion and equal 
the total foreign debt; and foreign direct investment 
in 2007 almost doubled. The country is experiencing 
an export boom, growing at almost 17 per cent on 
average annually. Brazilian firms – mainly private 
– are quickly internationalising their activities and 
investments, investing $27 billion abroad in 2006. 
For the first time, Brazil is a net exporter of capital. 
Brazil’s current growth process combines favourable 
international engagement with commodities cycles.
Brazil has been an active member of the G20 
since its foundation and this year holds the chair. 
The annual meetings are organised by a committee 
composed of the previous chair (South Africa, 2007), 
the current one (Brazil, 2008) and the next one 
(United Kingdom, 2009). This troika has organised 
six events for 2008: three technical workshops, two 
meetings of deputy finance ministers and central bank 
governors, and the final meeting with the ministers 
and governors themselves.
Although the G20 focuses on financial and 
monetary issues, in 2004 it produced the G20 Accord 
for Sustained Growth, which committed members 
Brazil and the 
G20: leading 
the way
With a broadened scope and agenda, the 
G20 can help its members achieve consensus   
By Denise Gregory, executive 
director, and Mariana Luz, academic 
co-ordinator, Brazilian Cenre for 
International Relations (CEBRI)
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to responsible fiscal governance and transparent, 
internationally adopted standards to avoid abuse of 
the financial system, tax evasion, money laundering 
and terrorist financing. This thematic shift broadened 
the G20’s scope to include issues such as co-operation 
policies, reform of the international financial institutions 
and global markets. The agenda for this year addresses 
competition in the international financial system, clean 
energy and biofuels, economic development, growth and 
social policy, fiscal policy to stimulate economic growth, 
reform of the Bretton Woods institutions and risks to 
domestic policies.
The G20’s role has evolved over the past decade. 
But there remains a problem of vocation. It seems 
to be searching for a new purpose now that the old 
international economic crises have been controlled 
– partly due to a favourable international climate of 
credit abundance and economic growth. Furthermore, 
the increasing role of emerging countries in global 
governance has diminished the G20’s central focus, 
moving the group toward the structural matters of 
macroeconomics and economic policy.
It is a different world today. The financial crisis of the 
1990s became a milestone in globalisation and financial 
diversification. Some emerging countries are now more 
prominent in international economic affairs.
Emerging countries have traditionally received 
aid from the international community, but today’s 
circumstances represent a striking role reversal. 
Countries such as Brazil, Chile, China, India and 
Russia will soon have established themselves as 
permanent sources of financial aid. Their currencies 
affect international financial flows; some have created 
sovereign wealth funds. The most dramatic symbol is 
the explosive growth of China’s reserves, accounting 
today for 25 per cent of international reserves. Sovereign 
wealth funds have jumped from $500 billion to more 
than $3 trillion.
Not only have markets changed but emerging 
countries are also capable of offering loans without 
demanding the same conditions required by advanced 
countries. This is a positive development that brings new 
players into the game. But it can also generate conflict 
with those who used to control the process.
The main challenge now is to define adequate and 
representative institutional arrangements to deal with 
these new global concerns. Among the many possible 
options, one is to transform the G20 into a high-level 
forum with heads of state and government in a format 
similar to the G8. With a broadened scope and agenda, 
such a group could achieve consensus and guide 
members’ positions in multilateral organisations.
Brazil considers the G20 to be a privileged and 
institutionalised channel for exchanging experiences 
with key players and creating consensus and proposals, 
although the G20 is criticised for becoming a forum 
that suits the interests of only the bigger players. But 
issues such as climate change and development should 
be discussed by the more appropriate and representative 
organisations of the United Nations system. Furthermore, 
Brazil demands more effective G20 decisions and 
recommendations.
Brazil believes the G20 should remain a financial 
forum that deals with the ongoing international financial 
imbalances and the necessary adjustments to correct 
them. Brazil took the initiative of including in the agenda 
the theme of financial mechanisms to make social 
policies feasible.
The consensus is that this year represents a turning 
point for the G20: either it will continue at a low 
temperature and tempo, or it will adapt to the new 
times and consolidate into a representative group with a 
proactive agenda and real finance action.
Confident, however, that the G20 will indeed 
evolve as such a forum, Brazil should adapt its own 
governmental and bureaucratic structures, both domestic 
and external, accordingly. ◆
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A s the Second World War neared its end, an extraordinary group of world leaders, heavily influenced by the demise of the League of Nations in the late 1930s, brought forth the idea that gave birth to the United Nations and the creation 
of the Bretton Woods institutions: the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank and the 
multilateral development banks.
In the 1970s, recognising that the world required 
a smaller steering committee composed of the globe’s 
most powerful economies, the G7 Summit came into 
being and was later expanded at the leaders’ level to  
the G8. This was part of the continuing evolution of the 
architecture required to sustain post-war globalisation – 
as was the creation some 25 years later of the G20 finance 
ministers, central bank governors and their deputies. 
The G20 meetings are now a fixture on the global 
governance landscape. They came into being as a result 
of the series of financial shocks that occurred in the 
latter half of the 1990s: the Asian financial crisis, the 
Russian default, the Brazilian devaluation and, with 
these, the fear of a global meltdown as contagion spread 
from economy to economy, from continent to continent.
The causes of these shocks were, in many cases, 
a lack of financial transparency by governments and 
inadequate regulation of financial institutions. As a 
result, the G7 finance ministers, of whom I was one, 
sought to convince the emerging economies to adopt 
the framework of financial rules and regulations that 
existed within the G7 countries themselves. We did not 
succeed. This was not because the emerging economies 
disagreed. The problem was that they simply ignored us.
They did so for two reasons. First, they felt we 
talked a better game than we played. Second, and most 
important, they were not at the table at the time we 
came up with our solutions. Their criticisms were dead 
on. Thus, belatedly, realising that the world’s financial 
system had attained a degree of seamlessness that 
Time for the G20 
to take the mantle 
from the G8 
The G7 finance ministers took the initiative 
in 1999. It is time their leaders followed suit   
By The Right 
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Martin, former 
prime minister  
of Canada
 I believe that most 
objective observers would 
say that the G20 has made an 
important contribution to the 
constant challenge of global 
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From founding to future
23??? ?????????????????? ?????????????
could not be ignored, we came to the conclusion that 
the emerging economies had to be at the table with us 
on an ongoing basis, if we were to deal with today’s 
financial crises and to prevent tomorrow’s.
The precedent was a series of three meetings of 
officials from 22 countries, held at the initiative of the 
United States and known as the Willard Group. These 
meetings were very successful. Because of this,  
I approached Larry Summers, the US Treasury secretary, 
and proposed the creation of the G20. He agreed. We 
sat down and worked out a proposed membership list. 
It was then that we brought our fellow G7 ministers 
onside with the concept. Following that, I approached 
the non-G8 countries about joining in.
Canada was made the initial chair. The first meeting 
was held in Berlin, the next two in Montreal and 
Ottawa. I then stepped down and proposed that the 
chair alternate annually between the G8 and non-
G8 countries. The rest is history, a history now to 
be chronicled by the newly-formed G20 Research 
Group at the University of Toronto. While I am not 
impartial, I believe that at this, its tenth meeting, most 
objective observers would say that the G20 has made 
an important contribution to the constant challenge of 
global economic governance.
The second meeting in Canada is but one example 
of this. Following September 11, 2001, it was virtually 
impossible to hold an international ministerial meeting 
for security reasons. While this may have been 
understandable for the first few weeks after the tragedy, 
as time went on the paralysis this engendered risked 
giving the terrorists a victory.
After much pressure we succeeded in convening a 
G20 meeting in Ottawa, which was considered one of 
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the world’s safest venues. This was the first international 
meeting of any kind held after September 11, essentially 
opening the door for the others to meet. Moreover, it 
dealt with an issue that demonstrated clearly the need 
for the wider grouping of finance ministers. At this 
meeting the structure was arrived at for tracing terrorist 
financing. I can assure you this G20 decision would 
not have been possible at a G7 meeting because of 
narrowness of the latter’s representation.
Against this background, when I became prime minister in 2004, I proposed an L20 or a G20 at 
the leaders’ level. The first question was why is this 
necessary? The answer was simply that the world had 
changed. When the G7/8 was formed in the 1970s, its 
members were the world’s most powerful economies, 
and the problems they sought to address were within 
their purview. They genuinely saw themselves as a 
global steering committee. Indeed, for much of their 
history, they had the capacity to be just that. Not any 
more. The world that flowed from a recovering Europe 
and Japan in the 1950s and 1960s no longer exists; 
nor does the unipolar world that followed the demise 
of the Soviet Union in the 1990s. Clearly, China and 
India are making their mark.
However, it is not only the rise of China and India 
as major powers that challenges the G8. It is also the 
nature of the problems we face – global terrorism, 
nuclear proliferation, endemic poverty, the situation 
in Darfur, energy security, climate change, the threat 
Today’s global 
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of global pandemics, the travails of the Doha round of 
trade negotiations, to name only a few. These are all 
issues that surpass the capacity of the G8 to deal  
with them.
The simple fact is that today’s global concerns 
require a level of international co-ordination that is 
fundamentally different from any earlier period of 
history. And while successful international global 
institutions are essential if the world is to work, 
national governments are the masters of those 
institutions – not the other way around. Thus, the 
system of global governance must build on national 
governments as the ultimate source of authority. When 
one looks at the number of critical issues that are 
gridlocked today because of the differences in starting 
points among key players, it becomes clear that those 
players, those countries, must themselves come to the 
table, accept their responsibilities and deal with their 
differences. And what would the L20 be? It would 
be exactly that. It would be national governments 
accepting their responsibilities and acting at the highest 
level: chancellors, presidents and prime ministers.
The second question is what should the size of its 
membership be, and who should be its participants? I 
suggested the size be in the range of 15 to 20 countries. 
This is not an arbitrary estimate. At the upper end, 
the limit is established by the number of people who 
can reasonably engage in give and take around a table. 
The problem is that too many of today’s international 
meetings are not designed to facilitate informal debate 
– they are designed to accommodate staged, low-risk 
interventions, pre-cooked well in advance. Thus, what 
the L15–20 must do, and what most international 
meetings cannot do, is to allow leaders to break free 
from the briefing book syndrome, allowing them to 
think outside the box. Officials can bridge gaps, but 
only leaders can jump gaps. Only leaders can take 
the leap of faith – the kinds of risks, the breaking of 
precedent – that can lead to real progress. Only leaders 
can exercise the kinds of peer pressure on one another 
that will lead to ‘yes’.
The smaller number – a minimum of 15 countries 
– is governed by the following criteria: first, the 
countries chosen must include the G8 and other 
leading economies; second, the countries must possess 
a requisite social and political stability; and, finally, if 
any consensus is to hold in the rest of the world, the 
major regional powers, regardless of economic ranking, 
must make the cut. For all these reasons, clearly what 
has become known as the Outreach Five (China, India, 
Brazil, Mexico and South Africa) and at least one 
Muslim nation must be included or the whole exercise 
becomes a nullity. This brings us to 14. Where we go 
from there makes the issue even more interesting. But 
whatever the debate over final membership, in the end 
the final decision will, of necessity, be arbitrary and 
must not be allowed to hold up the need for reform.
The next question is whither the G8? Should it fade 
away by simply expanding its membership, or should 
a new parallel organisation be created? On this, I am 
agnostic. Clearly, expansion makes the most sense. 
However, if there are members of the G8 who are 
adamant that they would not accept it or major non-G8 
powers that refuse to join the G8, then clearly a new 
parallel organisation is preferable to an increasingly 
ineffectual G8.
 The world that flowed 
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The reason for this is quite simple. The G8 is no 
longer capable of breaking global logjams. Too many 
issues have been left hanging for too long and too many 
of the world’s key players are not at the table. 
Another option for the G8 that has been put forward 
is the so-called ‘outreach alternative’. This arises out 
of the precedent established at recent summits, where 
selected countries were invited to participate in part, 
but not all, of a G8 summit (usually a lunch).
I don’t believe this works. Inviting leaders only 
for part of a meeting or, as others have suggested, on 
a rotating basis, may work in other forums or it may 
make for a good show. But it clearly will not work when 
countries are stymied and global action is paralysed. 
What is needed for successful international dialogue is 
time for discussion and the kind of familiarity that only 
comes from people who have met often as a group, who 
know they will continue to meet in the future and who 
know the dynamics of the room.
There is another reason why the outreach option 
does not work. Inviting major powers to a meeting 
and treating them like second-class citizens is simply 
wrong-headed.
I attended the US summit at Sea Island, Georgia, and 
the UK summit at Gleneagles as prime minister. At both 
meetings, Canada questioned the advisability of inviting 
major powers for only part of a summit, in effect 
telling them to ‘cool their heels’ outside the meeting 
room while waiting to be called in. But, unfortunately, 
the same procedure was followed at the summits at 
Heiligendamm in Germany in 2007 and Hokkaido in 
Japan in 2008. The reaction was entirely predictable.
Let me simply quote from the statement of India’s 
prime minister following the Heiligendamm Summit:
I came to take part in the meeting of the G8 countries 
and the five outreach countries, Brazil, Mexico, 
China, South Africa and India. We were not active 
participants. In fact, the G8 communiqué was issued 
even before our meeting. We have come here not as 
petitioners but as partners in an equitable, just and 
fair management of the global comity of nations, 
which we accept as a reality of the globalised world. I 
hope that next year’s meeting, if we are invited, will be 
in a form in which we have a chance to interact with 
the G8 nations before they interact among themselves. 
This is a new reality. There can be no meaningful 
management of the global issues in which India, 
China and other emerging countries like Brazil, South 
Africa and Mexico, are not involved.
The fourth question is, what is the chance of an L20 or an L of some number greater than eight 
occurring? The answer is, I believe, very good. What 
gives me confidence is that when I was prime minister, 
in a series of one-on-one meetings, I raised the idea 
of a parallel grouping with all the G8 leaders and the 
vast majority of the other G20 leaders. The response 
among the G20 countries was unanimously positive; 
indeed, China showed an interest in co-hosting the 
first meeting with Canada. Of the G8 countries, only 
the United States and Japan were hesitant. But Japan 
did agree to a first meeting to test the concept.
With that as background, it is interesting that 
French President Nicolas Sarkozy, since supported by 
British Prime Minister Gordon Brown, has suggested 
that the G8 should be expanded permanently. Clearly, 
the idea is gaining ground.
I believe an enlarged leaders’ meeting in one form or 
another is inevitable. The thought that the G8 without 
the world’s regional powers can continue to deal in 
splendid isolation from the world’s reality is simply too 
absurd to be credible.
There is one other proposal that has been put 
forward that also indicates that change is in the wind. 
That is the idea of a concert or league of democracies, 
that is, countries that share a common concept of 
democracy. There certainly should be no problem with 
countries of any persuasion or region meeting together. 
Indeed, the global agenda would be bereft without such 
encounters. That said, this is not an alternative to the 
global steering committee the world needs. One cannot 
 An enlarged leaders’ 
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how the G8 worked at its best. However, it is now up to 
its leaders to recognise that it is no longer sufficiently 
representative to provide the consensus such global 
direction requires.
The issue of representativeness is crucial. The 
G8 is a self-selected group of countries. The L15–20 
would be no different. That is the way it has to be. 
The interminable debate over the membership of the 
United Nations Security Council is proof of this. Thus 
representativeness will be key to the L20’s legitimacy. 
This, in turn, is directly related to two inescapable 
factors: the economic and strategic clout of its 
member countries; and the cleavage between North 
and South. This begins not with the arid projections 
of economists, but with the assessment of a political 
leader’s immediate priorities – priorities that in the 
case of the North and the South are rooted in the very 
different needs of their respective populations, and 
which must be represented at the table if globalisation 
is to be made to work. Time is running out. 
If the G8 is to continue to play an important role, 
it must be reformed. If it is not, the danger obviously 
lies in that the luncheon invitees – the Outreach Five 
– tired of waiting in the corridor, will give increasing 
substance to the G5, and the G8 will not only have 
become the architect of its own decreasing relevance, 
but global co-operation will have lost out once again 
to global competition. The international system will 
fall even further behind the ever-evolving reality of the 
global landscape.
The unipolar world no longer exists. There is only 
a very short period of time ahead to put in place the 
kind of forum that will allow power to be shared 
among the largest economies of the 21st century. 
Unless reform in the way of a new grouping takes 
place, I do not believe that China and India, to name 
only two countries sitting out in the corridor, will wait 
to be asked to join in. They will create new groupings. 
In fact, they already have.
In short, the creation of the structures that will 
govern the world of the 21st century has been delayed 
too long. We have less than a decade to create the 
components of a new multilateralism. The longer we 
wait, the more set in their ways others will become and 
the more difficult and elusive sound global governance 
will become. The time to share power is when you have 
it to share, not when others are in a position to wrest it 
from your grip. ◆
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resolve gridlocked issues unless the world’s global and 
regional powers, irrespective of their differences, are 
at one table – indeed, it is because those differences 
have not been bridged that gridlock occurs and it is 
impossible to build a bridge unless both ends meet.
In summary then, let me conclude with two points. First, despite the fears of those who worry about 
international conspiracy, global governance does not 
mean global government – quite the opposite. In fact, 
global governance is the reaffirmation of national 
sovereignty in that it puts in place the institutions that 
enable national governments to solve problems that 
surpass national borders.
However, as important as international institutions 
are, the final responsibility of global governance 
cannot be delegated to them. It must be exercised by 
national governments that are accountable to their 
respective populations. In turn, the multiplicity of the 
world’s governments requires from among themselves 
a steering committee that can provide a consensus that 
the rest of the world can either accept or reject, but that 
at least provides a strong sense of direction. This was 
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The birth of the G20 
The inclusion of emerging markets has been the G20’s strength. It can build on that 
in the future 
I learned many things during my years at Treasury that I have not had to think about as a professor of economics. One of the most valuable was the importance of process to satisfactory outcomes in the formulation of international economic policy. On one level, process is the right way to resolve conflict – as Churchill said, better jaw-jaw than war-war. On another level, the nature of the 
decision-making process profoundly affects outcomes, 
for at any point in time, one can affect decisions on only 
a few issues. But the processes that one helps to put in 
place shape the decisions that will be made for a very 
long time after that. That is why I look back with great 
pride on the work I did supporting Paul Martin in the 
establishment of the G20.
An important theme of President Bill Clinton’s 
administration, from its inception, was the growing 
role of emerging markets. We did not then call them 
BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India and China). But we were 
starting to recognise their importance. At Treasury, 
we established an economic dialogue with China. 
The Commerce Department focused on big emerging 
markets and, of course, the whole administration was 
preoccupied with the challenge of integrating the 
countries of Central Europe and the former Soviet 
Union into the global economy. The North American 
Free Trade Agreement, connecting the United States, 
Mexico and Canada, was one of the administration’s 
most important early accomplishments.
The first recollection I have of the thought process 
that led to strong US support for the G20 came on 
what may have been the most dramatic night that I 
spent at the Treasury. In early January 2005, Secretary 
Robert Rubin and I presented to President Clinton 
our recommendation for a large-scale bailout of 
Mexico. After a momentous meeting, at which the 
president committed himself to what would be the 
largest US international assistance programme since 
the Marshall Plan, I was asked to remain in the Oval 
Office to provide support as the president called the 
Congressional leaders. Between calls, the president 
By Lawrence 
Summers, former 
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mused that the US was able to provide support because 
we shared a 2,000-mile border with Mexico, but what 
would happen if it were some different country? We 
briefly discussed the strengths and weaknesses of 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) as a vehicle 
for providing support. We concluded that a more 
political body was required to craft an architecture for 
responding to such crises.
Fast forward five years. The Mexican peso crisis 
had been resolved. The New Arrangement to Borrow 
had been formed with emerging market contributors. 
The various financial groups with a broader range of 
stakeholders in the global financial system had met – 
the finance ministers of the Asia Pacific Economic Co-
operation forum, the Latin American finance ministers, 
as well as a G22 and a G33. It was Paul Martin and 
the Canadian government’s conviction that these all 
needed to be regularised and made less ad hoc. Of 
course, there would be difficult issues of inclusion and 
exclusion. Yes, there was the complicated question 
of the IMF and what had been called for 25 years its 
Interim Committee. The patient diplomacy of Martin 
and his colleagues recognised that there was no 
perfection in a flawed world. But they worked very 
hard to establish an enduring grouping of finance 
ministers and central bank governors that could 
assure political-level discussion of international 
problems, with an agenda set by political leaders 
rather than any particular international organisation.
How prescient Paul Martin and the Canadians 
were. None of us knew in 1999 just how rapidly those 
emerging markets would rise. We certainly had no idea 
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of the way their reserves would mushroom, nor could 
we foresee the kind of financial instability that the world 
faces now. While the G20 meeting that I attended felt 
novel, the G20 is now an established and important part 
of official calendars and the international architecture.
It has come a long way in a decade. Certainly, 
policy and co-operation have not been all that we 
might have wanted them to be in recent years. And 
there are certainly those who seek to hold on to 
their power by focusing their attention on smaller 
groupings of countries. Unlike the G7, the G20 has 
not been reinforced by regular meetings at the level 
of head of state. Inevitably change is evolutionary, 
but I expect the G20 will play an increasing role in 
the international financial system. As the current 
financial crisis in the United States and Europe has 
impacts that spread to emerging markets, I suspect 
the G20 will come into its own. It is already the case 
– but will be even more so – that co-operation has 
been better and policy has been wiser because of the 
existence of the G20. ◆
 Unlike the G7, the G20 
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When I attended the inaugural G20 meeting in Berlin in 1999, I had the feeling of being  part of an important event. I was representing France as minister of the economy, finance and 
industry. Our host was a friend, Hans Eichel, my German 
counterpart, who effectively and discreetly turned his 
country’s finances around. I also recall the energy of Paul 
Martin, our Canadian colleague, who put together this 
groundbreaking meeting.
 Who were we, gathered on the evening of 15 
December 1999, beneath the glass ceiling of the 
Bundestag? We were 20 countries from the world’s five 
continents. The United States and Canada – members 
of the G7 – and Mexico, Brazil and Argentina; Japan 
– a member of the G7 – as well as China, India, South 
Korea and Indonesia. And further away, Australia. 
Europeans, of course: the members of the G7, Germany, 
France, Italy, the United Kingdom, as well as Turkey and 
Russia. Even Africa, which is often mentioned but rarely 
listened to, was represented by South Africa. Saudi 
Arabia was also there. The European Union rounded 
out the table at 20. The International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) and the World Bank had a discreet place.
Each country had sent its minister of finance and 
central bank governor. We could thus discuss the 
world’s key economic and financial issues at length. 
No less than 90 per cent of the world’s wealth, 80 per 
cent of global trade and two-thirds of the population 
were represented at the table. This first meeting carried 
a lot of weight. Its size, smaller than any meeting of the 
United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) or the World 
Trade Organization (WTO), made real debate possible, 
resulting in collective conclusions for the common good 
of this planet’s inhabitants, whether rich or poor.
On rereading the statement published nine years ago, we can only praise the great boldness, a 
stark contrast to the conventional dreariness of G7 
communiqués. It states the goal of co-operation in 
order to “achieve stable and sustainable world economic 
growth that benefits all”. In these days of extreme market 
volatility, the words “stable” and “sustainable” are but a 
dream. And would “that benefits all” have been written 
if India, South Africa, Brazil and China had been absent? 
Twenty countries, and not the smallest, agreed to write 
that co-operation was necessary to achieve this goal; 
in other words, simply trusting in the invisible hand of 
the market would not be enough to achieve, if not the 
best of both worlds, at least a better, stable, sustainable 
and fair world.
In one paragraph, the word “vulnerability” appears 
three times. It has a particular meaning this autumn of 
2008, as the near-bankruptcy of top-level US financial 
institutions makes headlines. The vulnerability of the 
world financial system was already an issue in 1999. 
We were emerging from the Asian and Russian financial 
crises, caused by typhoons of short-term speculative 
capital passing over ill-managed economies, using this 
precarious resource for long-term investments. After the 
first scare, the funds fled, causing a chain reaction of 
bankruptcies. Has this speculative capital settled down 
since? The headlines prove otherwise.
Another sentence emphasised that “unsustainable 
exchange-rate regimes are a critical source of 
vulnerability”. At the time, the issue was inflexible rates 
in troubled economies or abusive pegging of fragile 
currencies against the US dollar. Today, considering the 
colossal American foreign trade deficit and Chinese 
surplus, questions abound on the currency parity that 
binds them.
Fundamental 
principles for global 
financial governance 
The boldness of the first G20 statement seems prescient in light of current economic 
concerns – and its warnings were clear 
By Christian 
Sautter, former 
finance minister, 
Republic of France
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Finally, the ministers and governors “exchanged views 
on the role of the international community in helping to 
reduce vulnerability to crises”. This important sentence 
acknowledges that, contrary to the sermons of the 
defenders of economic liberalism, crises are inevitable 
and, if they cannot be averted, all we can do is mitigate 
their impact through intelligent co-operation.
One passage was prescient when read in light 
of current events: “They welcomed the important 
work that has been done… toward the establishment 
of international codes and standards in key areas, 
including transparency, data dissemination and financial 
sector policy. They agreed that the more widespread 
implementation of such codes and standards would 
contribute to more prosperous domestic economies and 
a more stable international financial system.” Given that 
the financial crisis of the summer of 2007 was made 
worse because bankers and authorities were unaware of 
each other’s exposure to the rotten subprime securities 
(although well noted by the relevant agencies), the 
absence of progress in this area is obvious.
Also significant was the encouraging statement for 
future negotiations toward “multilateral liberalisation 
of trade in goods and services that would bring broad-
based benefits to the global economy”. A decade 
later, G20 members India and China have agreed to 
block the WTO negotiations in order to maintain 
complete control over their food imports. This most 
certainly pleased the United States and Europe, 
which outrageously subsidise their major agricultural 
holdings and, in the event of an agreement, would have 
considerably reduced their direct or indirect support of 
exports. It is not known what South Africa, representing 
the African continent, thought of this selfishness.
The G20 made good progress before meeting again 
in Berlin in November 2004. It was at that sixth meeting 
that the G20 Accord for Sustained Growth was reached. 
According to public opinion, sustainable development 
means leaving our grandchildren with a world that is 
liveable, in which natural resources are used sparingly, 
where the air is breathable and where the climate is not 
overly disturbed. However, the G20’s main concern was 
not ecological but financial. It spoke of what it knew and 
of its constant concern: the stability of global finance.
The G20 was pleased that the forecast was a good 
one; the financial sky was somewhat blue in 2004. Today, 
the clouds are gathering. But it was concerned because 
“downside risks [had] increased due to oil price volatility, 
 The G20 made good 
progress before meeting 
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persisting external imbalances and geo-political concerns”. 
And it highlighted “the importance of medium-term fiscal 
consolidation in the United States, continued structural 
reforms to boost growth in Europe and Japan, and, in 
emerging Asia, steps towards greater exchange rate 
flexibility, supported by continued financial sector reform”.
This complex sentence is doubly bold. First, it 
suggests that the United States needs to put its public 
finances in order. The IMF long ago gave up trying to 
lecture the main source of the world’s financial woes: the 
United States. The IMF has no trouble penalising Asian 
or Latin American countries and preaching austerity 
to African countries. But when it needs to confront its 
principal shareholder, it blushes like a schoolgirl.
The second bold statement tells China that it is 
perhaps not normal to accumulate massive trade 
surpluses while experiencing 10 per cent growth a year. 
Japan itself, during the high-growth 1950s and 1960s, 
periodically bowed to outside pressure: exports, albeit 
dynamic, were not enough to cover imports, which 
were even more dynamic. That lasted until the yen 
became obviously undervalued against the dollar in the 
late 1960s and until surpluses began to accumulate, 
without ever reaching the dizzying figures in China 
today. Between 1971 and 1973, yen-dollar parity was 
quickly corrected. In 2004, the G20 had the nerve to ask 
the yuan-dollar parity question and also to mention the 
fragility of China’s financial system.
In the same 2004 communiqué, the G20 reiterated 
its appeal for financial transparency and added the 
interesting idea of exchanging information in order 
to improve taxation, following the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development, which 
was fighting tax havens at that time. Two out of three 
American companies paid no federal taxes between 
1998 and 2005, according to a study conducted by the 
US Congress, using every possible tax evasion trick 
offered by tax havens and by manipulating the prices of 
the international transactions of multinational firms.
The G20 also drew attention to money laundering 
and terrorism financing. More information is needed on 
tax havens. The difficulty lies in the fact that terrorist 
organisations often work in the same way as honest 
companies, whose competitiveness ought not be reduced.
Despite all the G20’s praiseworthy achievements, virtuous and general recommendations are not 
enough. Each member needs a work programme. For 
example, as the 2004 G20 Reform Agenda sets out: 
“The United States is determined to reduce its public 
budget deficit, to continue reforming health insurance 
and the pension system and to raise private savings.” 
As for France, it “will continue labour and product 
market reforms and restore fiscal sustainability by 
implementing recent pension and healthcare reforms 
and further public expenditure restraint”.
Thus, the G20 shows lucidity by emphasising the 
risks of inaction both nationally and globally. In light 
of the current financial crisis unfolding before our eyes, 
it is impossible to claim ignorance. The G20, the voice 
of the globalisation of good will, warned us clearly. 
Everyone knew they had to make an effort for reform 
and discipline, especially the United States, which is at 
the heart of the world’s capitalist system.
Courage requires lucidity, but unfortunately it is 
not enough. Whether the reason was ideology, short-
sightedness or lobby group pressure, the US authorities 
did not put their financial house in order. We are 
all paying the price today. This pneumonia of world 
finance could have been prevented and curing it will 
take time and suffering. Let us hope that ‘Dr G20’ will 
continue its group therapy. The worst risk would be for 
each to seek a cure alone and take unilateral measures. 
It was the ‘save yourself’ attitude that transformed the 
1929 financial crisis into a major economic and social 
crisis. The excellent co-operation among G20 central 
banks prevents us from being completely pessimistic in 
this time of financial panic. ◆
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A remarkable 
group of 
emerging 
economies has 
reduced the 
hegemonic role 
of the US and 
Europe
F ifty years ago, the German philosopher Herbert Marcuse proclaimed that the time of utopias was over, for humanity had acquired the knowledge and the means to achieve its most utopian goal, namely feeding all human beings on Earth. Marcuse was right in principle, but not 
in reality. Actually, we had the knowledge and the 
means, but our defective multinational institutions, 
our unequal sovereignties, our diverging interests, our 
market rules, our trade rules and practices  – in other 
words – our overall organisation did not allow that 
not-unimaginable utopia to come true.
Since then, the need for better global governance 
has become an increasingly crucial issue. Several 
improvements have been proposed – and some of them 
have been adopted. But they appear to be difficult and 
only limited steps along the demanding route marked 
by the trends and events taking place in the meantime. 
The relatively higher weight of a remarkable group of 
emerging economies has reduced the hegemonic role of 
the United States and Europe in the world. The repeated 
turbulence, mostly in the financial sector, has more than 
once deeply damaged industries, jobs and households in 
both the new and the old economies. The outgrowth of 
wide-ranging issues such as energy and climate change 
urgently calls for worldwide action.
The G20 is just one of these limited steps. It has not changed the world, but it has been a useful step. It 
will be even more useful if its members are bolder than 
they have been thus far. When the G20 had its birth, in 
December 1999, the G7/8 members were already aware 
of the growing uncertainty both of their legitimacy 
and of the effectiveness of their actions. That group 
(which initially was a G5, with France, Germany, Japan, 
the United Kingdom and the United States) had been 
conceived with the purpose of counteracting the waves 
of monetary instability that followed the breakdown 
of the Bretton Woods agreements in 1971. Its initial 
members were qualified for the job, not just by their 
respective wealth, but mostly because their co-ordinated 
interventions in the monetary market could effectively 
achieve the goal of greater stability. In the course of 
time, the agenda has been widened to other economic 
issues, in relation to which recognising an exclusive 
legitimacy for the G7/8 was not an easy task. Moreover, 
stability has come to depend on variables that equally 
involve other countries.
Therefore, the G7/8 remained, but its own members 
decided it had to be accompanied by a wider group, the 
G20, including other countries by which the interests 
and expectations of the continents of the world could 
be more directly represented. The G20 was established 
as a forum of dialogue to promote co-operation and to 
broaden the discussions on key economic and fiscal 
issues “among systematically significant economies” 
(as its first statement reported). By these words we 
understand that the initial legitimacy of the G7/8 was 
somehow extended to the other members of the new 
group. This explains the satisfaction of the newcomers 
that was tangible during our first meeting in Berlin. It 
does not explain the overall performance of the G20 
throughout the years, which has certainly been below 
the expectations of that time.
No-one ever expected the G20 to reach the same standing and to exercise the same influence as the 
smaller and more settled G7/8 group. But when it was 
created, we were all still affected by the far-reaching 
effects of the Asian financial crisis of the late 1990s, 
during which, as Joseph Stiglitz repeatedly wrote in 
the following years, the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) found $160 billion to save the banks at risk, 
but not even $1 billion for those who were losing their 
jobs. Saving banks certainly helps financial stability 
more than helping the unemployed does. But there was 
something unacceptably wrong in such an imbalance, 
and this was one of the main reasons behind the 
request for a deep reform of the Bretton Woods 
institutions.
Born in this context, the G20 undoubtedly had 
the genetic mission to promote the reform of what 
we called the international financial architecture, in 
search of monetary and financial stability and more 
balanced attention to the victims of instability. It has 
worked on it: it has produced documents. But it has 
not performed the task of promoting and gathering the 
necessary consensus on the needed innovations both of 
the IMF and of the World Bank. I cannot forget that the 
G20 was established “in the framework of the Bretton 
Woods system” (as we wrote at that first meeting). In 
this framework, accomplishing that task would have 
been desirable, to say the least.
From Bretton  
Woods to the G20 
The stability of the global financial architecture depends on the co-ordination of all 
the world’s economies. But the G20 has failed to facilitate this 
By Giuliano Amato, 
former finance 
minister and former 
prime minister  
of Italy
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 Financial crises 
find their origins not in 
the new economies but 
in the old ones 
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Why has it not happened while new financial crises have taken place, new ‘global tigers’ have entered 
the scene, and managing financial instability remains 
an unsolved issue? Solving this issue means introducing 
changes that are not at all easy and that go far beyond 
the longstanding demand (in part already answered) 
of a vote rebalancing inside the Bretton Woods 
institutions. At a time when, first, the United States has 
become the main debtor of the international community 
and is no longer its main creditor and, second, financial 
crises find their origins not in the new economies, but 
in the old ones, the missions of vigilance must change 
their targets. 
New interactions are needed between the national 
and supranational authorities responsible for them. 
Can the level of co-operation among our numerous 
and uneven sovereignties reach the intensity required 
with reforms of this calibre? Among scholars (and not 
only among them) the opinion prevails that only under 
the influence of a leading power is international co-
operation high. To the contrary, our problem is how to 
enhance it for the sake of farsighted reforms in a world 
that “the rise of the rest” has made multipolar, and do 
so among the major countries that tend to operate on 
the basis of short-term perspectives. How else could 
we explain the undisturbed development of speculative 
bubbles that have not passed unnoticed?
Certainly this is the main explanation of the 
unsatisfactory performance of the G20 as an agent of 
reform. Yet, I do think that a bolder role is not at all out 
of its reach. Finance ministers, who have remained the 
core of the group (recently extended to other sectoral 
ministers), have always paid special attention to the long-
term consequences of ongoing policies. I am sure that all 
of them are well aware that protectionism would – and 
perhaps will – be the only alternative to a more stable and 
fairer international financial system. Nor is rescuing banks 
a satisfactory solution, for today an unknown share of the 
losses is transferred outside, and households and other 
final investors will claim protection above all.
Finance ministers are also well aware that 
protectionism and growth do not go together, with the 
consequence that the problems of the world (and their 
own problems as responsible for public budgets) would 
become worse and worse. If they do not want this to 
happen, it is time for change – and change requires 
courage. They should feel committed to advancing in 
the G20 the bold proposals on the basis of which the 
Bretton Woods system may effectively play its role 
in a better governance of the world economy. It will 
be costly for the West and mostly for Europe, whose 
weight and influence will necessarily diminish. But it is 
a price to be paid in our own interest.
Fifty years after Marcuse, it would be quite sad for 
us to conclude that even the feasible utopias must 
return to the realm of the imaginary, for we lack not the 
resources, but the will to make them real. ◆
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Ten years on 
At its inception, the G20 opened up the post-
1945 financial architecture to previously 
excluded emerging powers. Just how far has it 
come since then? 
Scholars tend to analyse the G20 forum by looking backwards, especially to the motivations for its establishment and its policy ramifications, with a concentration on the relationship with the East Asian financial crisis at the end of the 1990s. But they also focus on the key issue of legitimacy. Scholars, 
however, have largely missed the forward-looking vision 
driving the G20 finance initiative, a vision shaped by 
both a legitimising function and a problem-solving 
mentality. With symbolism came a deep concern 
with efficiency that went well beyond ‘managing’ the 
immediate fallout from the financial crisis to an interest 
in policy entrepreneurship.
The G20’s core innovative quality was its 
institutional design. Up to that point, the post-1945 
financial architecture had been almost exclusively 
the preserve of industrialised countries. The G20 set 
a precedent by opening up membership to the global 
South. Several countries from the South – from all 
quadrants of the globe – entered the G20 and gained 
significant forms of ownership of the forum. The 
informal culture of the G20 provided them with a 
sense of identity. The order and distribution by which 
southern countries took on the hosting function (India 
2002, Mexico 2003, China 2005, South Africa 2007 and 
Brazil 2008) showed that G8 countries were willing to 
share this instrument of power. This signalled that the 
G20 was not only about improving the global financial 
system, but also about bringing the emerging big 
powers into a rearranged system.
Showing that the G20 was more than a narrow, 
technical forum, the 2000 meeting in Montreal focused 
on the opportunities and challenges of globalisation, 
which needed to be ‘shaped’ more effectively on both 
its financial/economic and social sides. The equity 
rationale was compelling. Acting on the wider purview 
of the Montreal consensus from the 2000 meeting, the 
G20 expanded its interests to encompass the United 
Nations Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). 
But the main argument, which prompted calls for the 
extension of this forum to the leaders’ level, was based 
on instrumental necessity. As the Secretary General 
of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD), Angel Gurría, bluntly put it in 
2005: “The different fora that deal with globalisation 
are not working.”
Some see the G20 as a forum for de-legitimisation. 
While the status of countries such as China, India, 
Brazil, South Africa and Mexico are enhanced, other 
countries are increasingly marginalised, notably the 
small, poorest countries (represented in such groups as 
the G24) and the traditional middle states in western 
Europe, such as the Nordics and the Dutch, which often 
act as voices for the poor.
In this hierarchy, China stands out. With its 
ascendance in the global economy, there was no question 
that China deserved to be at the top of the list for entry 
into the G20 in 1999 – and even today, into the G8. 
But on grounds of legitimacy, China continues to be 
By Andrew F 
Cooper, associate 
director, Centre 
for International 
Governance 
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an awkward fit. Along with highlighting its democratic 
deficiencies, the rise of China showcases the new 
modes of diplomatic inequities between big and small 
countries of the global South.
Reinforcing the visionary aspect of the G20 was the appreciation that these rising states had other 
options. Paul Martin in particular understood that this 
was not simply a case of the G7/8 allowing a country 
in – China needed to want membership. However, 
China had invested in its reputation as a universalistic-
orientated actor consistent with its privileged role as a 
Permanent Five member of the United Nations Security 
Council and as a country that valued the Bretton 
Woods institutions. Therefore, entering more restrictive 
clubs, especially those offered by the G7/8, involved 
considerable problems. Externally there were abundant 
reputational sensitivities about China eroding its 
solidarity with the global South. Internally there were 
concerns that China – by joining forums such as the 
G20 – was making itself susceptible to criticism about 
its domestic policies.
The establishment of the G20 demonstrated how 
much progress had been made on both sides. A 
prominent policy entrepreneur, such as Paul Martin, 
had the professional and political acumen to know how 
much, and by what means, China could be persuaded 
to enter. And with the Asian crisis – and alternative 
initiatives such as Japan’s proposed Asian Monetary 
Fund (which China opposed) – the incentives for China 
being brought into the G20 ‘big tent’ gained momentum.
The G20 has succeeded in building trust and 
connections between the G7/8 countries and China, 
along with the other big emerging countries of 
the global South. Since 1999, China has actively 
participated in all G20 meetings – including a 
successful hosting of the 2005 meeting in Hebei.
The details of the G20 meetings deserve attention 
because of their own merit in crisis prevention, often 
by technical means, with attention to such matters 
as codes and standards in transparency and financial 
sector policy. But the forum was also crucial at the 
putative stage for an extension of the G20 into a L20, 
or leader-level summit.
The experience of the G20 was crucial for 
pushing Martin into his firm advocacy of ambitious 
summit reform. He recognised that the mandate of 
forums – whether the G20 or the G7/8 – required 
constant reconceptualisation. The prime task of the 
initial G20 was inevitably that of seeking solutions 
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to vulnerabilities in the financial system. Yet, in the 
aftermath of September 11, 2001, the agenda shifted 
toward security priorities: fighting the financing of 
terrorism in 2002, and addressing global poverty 
as a root cause of terrorism in 2003. The G20 also 
recognised that the financial issues it sought to address 
were global in nature. So too were many issues on the 
G8 agenda – terrorism, climate change, energy security 
and health governance – that could not be effectively 
addressed by the G8 alone. 
Martin highlighted instrumental legitimacy as 
the motor for reform. Infectious diseases, an issue 
that made it onto the G20 agenda in 2000, stood out 
because the risk of a global pandemic this issue could 
‘tip the balance’ in terms of a reformed G8.
The G20 experience also shaped the style that 
Martin wanted for an L20. As opposed to the popular 
impression (and stigma) of the G7/8 as talking 
shop, he and other finance ministers saw the G20 
as a credible vehicle for action. Choosing the right 
members – with individual as well as collective 
leverage – was crucial, as was building a culture 
of policy delivery. As long as the countries are big 
and powerful enough, deliberations can lead to real 
decisions. The G20 could achieve this. 
However, the idea of an L20 has not yet been 
realised, due in part to the fundamental differences 
between it and the G20. One such difference is the 
leadership of the main policy entrepreneurs. The 
Clinton administration responded to the Asian crisis by 
embracing institutional reform. US Treasury secretary 
Larry Summers adopted a hands-on role in the G20, 
picking along with Martin the members for the new 
forum. While fully behind the initiative, the United 
States did not try to control all the machinery of the 
G20. The first meeting was held in Germany. The first 
chair was Paul Martin, beating the United Kingdom’s 
Gordon Brown in an informal poll of G8 countries.
The Bush administration has been far more resistant 
to institutional reform. George W Bush shared some of 
the same concerns, notably about avian influenza, but 
this did not translate into support for an L20. When 
Martin tried to call an informal meeting of the L20 
leaders on the margins of the 2005 UN World Summit 
in New York, Bush declined. This sucked much of 
the momentum from the initiative, notwithstanding 
 The Clinton 
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Martin’s enthusiastic campaign among key leaders.
A second obstacle was the difference in the policy 
context between the G20 and the proposed L20. 
There were obvious rivalries among the countries and 
ministers on the G20, as seen in the jockeying between 
Canada and Germany before and during its first meeting 
in Berlin. Yet the strong consensus among the key 
policy entrepreneurs was striking. Although there was 
some disagreement over membership – such as the 
inclusion of Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Korea and Australia 
– this did not impede institution building. There was a 
firm consensus on which countries to involve because 
of their possession of economic capacity. China and 
India were obvious. Saudi Arabia, with its massive oil 
and financial reserves, was too. There was agreement 
on those countries – notably Argentina and Turkey – 
that needed to be brought in, preventively, because of 
vulnerability to future financial shocks.
Signs of the club nature of the G20 forum soon 
emerged. An important subgroup of finance ministers, 
including Canada’s Martin, Britain’s Brown and South 
Africa’s Trevor Manuel, worked closely together. 
When other colleagues faced adversity, this group 
rallied to their cause. In this context, Malaysia was 
excluded from the G20 because it had imprisoned its 
finance minister, Anwar Ibrahim, and Indonesia was 
nominated to take its place.
Building consensus on the L20 has proven far more 
difficult. Whereas the G20 has a policy-driven agenda, 
the G8, as with any leaders’ meeting, is as much 
about style as performance. Photo-ops are far more 
important for leaders than for ministers of finance. So 
are unrehearsed, informal exchanges, often related to 
domestic politics. While lonely at the top, leaders can 
share confidences as a peer group during G8 summits.
Over time, an air of opportunism has begun to hover over proposals to expand the G8, while 
more recent reform proposals are disconnected from 
the G20 experience. Politically, this is not surprising, 
in that these calls have come from leaders who have 
not been ministers of finance or, in the case of the UK, 
where the Minister of Finance has been a challenger 
for power. Diplomatically, though, it means that calls 
for G8 reform often go hand-in-hand either with trips 
to the invited countries or as ‘carrots’ to enhance 
bilateral relationships. French President Nicolas 
Sarkozy has tended to support a country (India and 
South Africa, for instance) when he has been on 
official tours there. He has also included specific 
countries (Egypt) to coincide with other initiatives, as 
on the Mediterranean community. Such actions open 
up the issue of membership well beyond the G20.
Finally, timing is a factor. The G20 was created 
because of a crisis, as most new institutions are. The 
L20 initiative lacked such a triggering moment to 
mobilise political and diplomatic support. A major 
pandemic might have been a catalyst. But, to the 
credit of lower level bureaucrats and experts (who 
are responsible for handling these health governance 
issues), this threat did not escalate to the point where 
leaders took control.
The direct line between the G20 and G8 reform 
has thus eroded. There is little current perceived 
opportunity for a ‘big bang’ reform of the G8 with 
the inclusion of the G20 roster of countries. Instead, 
suggestions of countries to include in an enlarged 
G8 came à la carte. Nevertheless, some elements of 
the L20 reform drive remain. Akin to the G20, the 
Heiligendamm Process (HP) – initiated by German 
chancellor Angela Merkel at the 2007 Heiligendamm 
G8 Summit – was based on the functional notion that 
co-operation in specific areas (innovation, investment, 
development assistance and energy policy) would 
develop into further forms of trust and co-operation (an 
exercise that is explored in Emerging Powers in Global 
Governance: Lessons from the Heiligendamm Process, 
edited by Andrew F Cooper and Agata Antkiewicz).
Policy entrepreneurs can surprise scholars, who find 
it hard to identify when and where initiatives can be 
launched and gain traction in the global architecture.  
The G20 came into being suddenly, in response 
to a distinctive set of problems. The L20 proved a 
fascinating diplomatic laboratory for taking this spirit 
of reform to the apex of power. Although the initiative 
is transformed and stalled at the moment, prospects for 
another burst of activity remain. It will just take the 
right champion(s), support network and galvanising 
conditions to make it a reality. ◆
 The rise of China 
showcases the new modes of 
diplomatic inequities between 
big and small countries of the 
global South 
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The OECD: an active 
player in building global 
governance 
The OECD provides a link between G8 and G5 countries and endeavours to meet the 
challenges of global governance 
G lobal governance is changing. As we have seen in recent years, through the emergence of different innovative schemes like the G8+, the Major Economies Meeting (MEM) at Heiligendamm Process at the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD), there is a growing 
realisation that we cannot build a stable global 
economy without including developing countries in 
the decision-making process.
The launch of the G20, a pioneering initiative by 
Canada’s Paul Martin, has proven to be truly visionary. 
During the past ten years, economic power has shifted. 
Emerging economies now account for more than half 
of world gross domestic product (GDP) in terms of 
purchasing power parity, nearly 45 per cent of global 
exports and 75 per cent of global foreign exchange 
reserves. We are living in a much more plural global 
economy. Multipolarity, as Richard Haass argued recently 
in Foreign Affairs, has given way to ‘nonpolarity’.
Global interconnectivity has intensified, reaching unprecedented levels. The international 
dimension of national challenges has never been 
so clear. The links between sectors, and therefore 
between policies, have also increased significantly. 
Today, we face multidimensional challenges that 
demand multidisciplinary attention and collective 
responses. How else can we have a serious debate 
on trade without China? How can we make progress 
in addressing climate change, poverty reduction or 
international migration without representatives from 
at least the emerging economies?
It is time for more inclusive, more representative and 
more agile international economic governance. We also 
need better follow-up mechanisms to turn decisions 
and more commitments into real change. 
By Angel Gurría, 
secretary general, 
Organisation  
for Economic 
Co-operation and 
Development
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3.1 billion people – roughly half the world’s population 
– were living on less than $2.50 a day in 2005. These 
are not only numbers; these are shattered families, 
broken dreams, global shame.
The Guidelines on Poverty Reduction produced by 
the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC) 
argue that rapid and sustained poverty reduction requires 
multidisciplinary responses and pro-poor growth. 
But it also requires that the Millennium Development 
Goals be met, that the development aid commitments 
be fulfilled to lift aid from $80 billion in 2004 to the 
equivalent of $130 billion in 2010 (at constant 2004 
prices and exchange rates) and that the predictability 
and effectiveness of these flows be improved, as agreed 
recently in the Accra Agenda for Action. The Doha 
Development Agenda must also be revived, as the G20 
Statement on Global Development Issues so clearly 
demands. The challenge is how to turn these words into 
action. Inclusive organisations such as the G20 and the 
OECD, working together, can do the job.
The OECD is an active player in building a new and more inclusive global governance. In recent 
years, it has been increasingly present in broadening 
efforts such as the G8+ and the MEM. It is the link 
between the G8 and the G5 countries of Brazil, China, 
India, South Africa and Mexico. It is strengthening its 
ties with the developing world through an ambitious 
process of enlargement, through the growing 
engagement of its DAC as well as its Development 
Centre in Africa, Latin America and East Asia, and 
through specific initiatives in collaboration with 
other international organisations: the Partnership 
for Democratic Governance with the United Nations 
Development Programme, aid for trade with the 
World Trade Organization and prospective work 
on agriculture and food prices with the Food and 
Agriculture Organization.
The OECD stands ready to increase its co-operation 
with the G20. It is time to put aside our many 
differences in favour of a more balanced and inclusive 
global economy. ◆
The name of the group (G8+, G8+5, G8+5+3, G33, 
etc) is irrelevant, as long as it is representative enough 
to address the challenges on the agenda effectively. The 
G20 can help to build a more stable and balanced global 
economy. It gathers the main economic and financial 
players, representing 90 per cent of global GDP, 80 per 
cent of world trade flows and two-thirds of the world’s 
population. The later proposal by Paul Martin to turn 
the G20 into a leaders’ group, the so-called L20, seemed 
a natural progression. Some decisions – no matter 
how technical and complex – can only be made at the 
highest political level.
The OECD has identified a group of challenges for which crucial decisions are required, in 
order to produce a more balanced and harmonious 
globalisation. These include building a more 
stable global financial architecture, addressing the 
peril of climate change and reducing poverty and 
socioeconomic disparities. Once the tailwinds from 
the shocks hitting our economies have subsided, it 
will be necessary to draw lessons from the economic 
downturn and put in place policies that strengthen 
the resilience of the global economy. That will involve 
revisiting the prudential and supervisory framework 
for financial markets. 
Climate change is the defining issue of our era. 
Our health, our security and our economies are being 
threatened by climate change. Although uncertain, 
the damage is likely to be unevenly distributed, with 
poorer economies and households incurring greater 
losses. Moving forward will not be easy. Nor will it be 
inexpensive. The OECD has long advocated a least-
cost strategy as the key to success. It is working to help 
countries establish cost-effective, national climate change 
policies through rigorous economic analysis. I celebrate 
the fact that climate change will be discussed in this year’s 
G20 meetings in Brazil.
Poverty is the ultimate systemic threat. In spite of 
recent progress, world poverty still kills one person 
every three seconds, most of them children. According 
to the World Bank’s new poverty estimates, more than 
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Finance ministers and central bankers around the world are currently confronted with some of the most difficult macroeconomic problems of the past 20 years. Policy choices over the next two years or so will involve difficult trade-offs between fighting largely externally 
generated inflation pressures and trying to rekindle 
economic expansion and employment growth. In 
the industrial world, virtually all countries face 
this dilemma. In the developing world, the non-oil 
exporters will experience similar difficulties, with the 
exception that their problem will be to keep growth 
going (rather than rekindle it) despite significant 
slowdowns in their primary export markets. In the 
oil exporting countries, inflation comes largely from 
their own domestic investment and development 
programmes that have run into capacity constraints. 
No policy makers will face simple or straightforward 
decisions. Unco-ordinated policy actions are likely 
to exacerbate the problems and add to exchange-rate 
instability in the industrial world. This could further 
complicate the adjustment of external imbalances.
The world economy faces the most troubling and intractable problems that it has witnessed since 
the first round of oil price shocks in 1973–74. The 
major industrial economies are in a synchronised 
slowdown, coupled with rising inflation and 
substantial external imbalances. Developing countries 
face higher energy costs, rising commodity prices, 
slowing export growth and significant infrastructure 
shortages or bottlenecks in electricity, highways, 
railroads and sanitation.
One of the most difficult components is the balance 
of supply and demand in energy markets. China’s rapid 
transition from a small energy exporter ten years ago 
to a very significant oil importer now has eliminated 
potential excess capacity in global crude oil markets. 
India is rapidly following the Chinese path. Further 
complications come from political instability in the 
Middle East. Iraq is only now beginning to produce 
crude oil at rates comparable to those of pre-war 
days. Iran’s outspoken political leadership has added 
tensions to an already shaky regional environment. 
Russia’s recent activities in Georgia and the ‘near 
abroad’ have added to uncertainty about future oil 
supplies. In tightly balanced markets, small changes  
in confidence or expectations can result in large  
price swings.
Moreover, there are no short-term solutions to 
increasing supply or reducing demand for crude oil. 
Energy policy will dominate economic issues over 
the medium term for most of the industrial world 
and the major developing countries. Developing 
alternative energy supplies and cleaner fuels will 
require significant investment and time before 
noticeable results come. 
Perhaps most importantly, inflation is rising sharply in all countries – both developed and 
developing. Higher energy and commodity prices 
are leading to cost-push inflationary pressures 
around the world. Even the major oil producers 
are witnessing much higher prices as they have 
undertaken huge development programmes in the 
wake of dramatically higher oil export revenues. 
At the same time, real growth in the developed 
world has been weak for several years. And for the first 
time in decades, all the major industrial economies are 
experiencing weak growth at the same time. For much 
of the last 20 years the US economy has provided a 
global growth stimulus during periods of slowdown 
A co-ordinated effort  
to resuscitate growth 
Balancing the pressures of inflation with the desire to kick-start economic 
growth will not be straightforward. Decisions taken now will have far-reaching 
implications 
By Robert Fauver, 
former US under 
secretary of state 
for economic affairs 
and former  
G7 sherpa
 Energy policy will 
dominate economic issues  
for most of the industrial 
world and the major 
developing countries 
On the agenda
49??? ?????????????????? ?????????????
and provided the necessary export growth for weak 
economies. At present, however, the US real growth 
outlook is weak at best. 
Synchronised cyclical downturns tend to be longer 
and slower to recover from than the non-synchronised 
downturns that the world witnessed during the 1980s 
and 1990s. In broad terms, the world economy will 
expand at a rate of less than 4 per cent in 2008 and 
somewhat slower still in 2009. This is the slowest 
global rate of real growth in ten years.
Most analysts believe that the real growth in the 
major industrial economies will centre on 1.5 per 
cent in 2008 and roughly 1 per cent in 2009. This is 
the weakest performance in more than two decades. 
Slowing growth in Europe and the US will be the major 
factor in the slowdown, while Japan continues with its 
very weak growth. Unemployment will rise.
The current account deficit in the US continues to represent a major imbalance in the system. At 
roughly 6 per cent of gross national product, the deficit 
adds to the uncertainty in foreign exchange markets 
and the instability of capital flows. While significant 
improvements in US exports have been recorded 
recently, these gains have been more than offset by the 
significant rise in oil import costs.
This overall outlook for the world economy 
presents complicated choices for policy makers. 
Within the developed world, central bankers will 
need to focus primarily on restraining inflation for the 
next year at least. Despite slower growth, the cost-
push inflationary pressures coming from the energy 
and commodities sectors will complicate efforts to 
stimulate growth in the industrial world. Moreover, 
the maintenance of relatively high interest rates in 
Europe will hinder the decline of the somewhat 
overvalued euro in foreign exchange markets.
The US Federal Reserve has signalled that interest-rate softening is finished and that its 
next move will likely be to tighten interest rates 
(current mortgage problems aside). Rising interest 
rates aimed at restraining domestic inflation will 
benefit the dollar in foreign exchange markets while 
complicating the recovery efforts at least on the part 
of consumer spending. 
When the new president takes office in January 
2009, domestic economic problems will require his 
primary focus right away. His choices for key economic 
cabinet and White House positions will be critical to the 
development of anti-inflation policies, expanding energy 
supply policies, promoting domestic expansion without 
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hurting inflation pressures and strengthening domestic 
retraining programmes for displaced workers (whether 
from economic slowdown or globalisation pressures).
While the current worries about credit markets 
(housing and consumer loans) will continue into 
2009, it is not likely to pose a major problem for the 
new administration once the markets settle down. 
The longer-term problems of reducing the national 
debt and strengthening the financial situation of 
the social security system will dominate the new 
administration’s strategic planning for macroeconomic 
issues. Unfortunately, the weakness of the US fiscal 
position will tend to weaken the hands of the new 
administration’s efforts to undertake significant new 
spending or investment programmes without offsetting 
revenue-enhancing plans.
During the past two presidencies in the US, working with other G7/8 members to strengthen 
the global economy has not received much attention. 
The concept of co-ordination and co-operation 
among the major industrial countries has fallen by 
the wayside of macroeconomic policy formulation. It 
will be important to revive the original spirit of the 
G7 among key industrial countries. Exchange markets 
will likely continue to be unstable. Rates are not likely 
to reflect underlying economic conditions without 
the active support of G7 policy co-operation and 
co-ordination. In recent years, exchange rates have 
moved away from underlying economic conditions in 
the absence of an active G7. Overshooting exchange 
rates has seemed to become the norm. And exchange 
rate conditions in major developing countries have 
been settled outside of the consultative process of 
the International Monetary Fund and outside G20 
discussions as well. They have seemingly been based 
on national perceptions rather than global needs. This 
must change. ◆
Current 
worries about 
credit markets 
will continue 
into 2009
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The Japanese crisis:  
a valuable lesson 
From Japan’s own period of financial instability through to its recovery, lessons can be 
learned that may be applied to the global economy as a whole 
W hile the financial turmoil that erupted in the wake of the subprime mortgage crisis has been dealt with by policies taken by the authorities and central banks 
in affected countries, serious strains still exist in 
international financial markets. 
The situation is reminiscent of the Japanese 
experience during the so-called ‘lost decade’. During 
this period, Japan experienced similar disorders in its 
financial markets. Consideration of this period may 
therefore be instructive.
After the bubble economy collapsed in the early 
1990s, the Japanese economy suffered from financial 
market insecurity. Recovery took a significant amount 
of time. Although Japan eventually succeeded in 
overcoming the crisis through the implementation 
of financial market reforms, these countermeasures 
did not necessarily represent the best solution to the 
problem. Two reasons support this assertion.
First, throughout the process of overcoming the 
financial market insecurity, decisions in choosing 
effective policy tended to be taken late. The stability of 
the Japanese political system that had been maintained 
since the end of the Second World War wavered upon 
the collapse of the bubble economy. People’s confidence 
in the monetary and financial authorities was shaken. 
This situation became an obstacle to building a quick 
By Toshiro Mutoh, 
former deputy 
governor, Bank  
of Japan
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and orderly process of reform. These changes in people’s 
attitudes and the political decision-making process 
marked a turning point in Japanese post-War history. 
Indeed, it could be called a paradigm shift in politics.
In the middle of the 1990s, as the deterioration in the balance sheets of financial institutions was revealed, 
the government started to consider ways to relieve 
fears of a credit crunch and recession by bailing out 
struggling financial institutions with public funds. To 
maintain the soundness of the markets and provide 
security for depositors, the government introduced a 
law in 1996 that allowed it to finance home mortgage 
loan institutions to pay off their bad debt.
However, prior to approval of this law by the Diet, 
there were prolonged and divisive discussions that led 
to a delay in the final decision. On the one hand, those 
opposed to the law alleged it would create a moral 
hazard because it would use tax revenue to rescue 
private financial institutions that had been managed 
irresponsibly. On the other hand, supporters insisted 
that the government should make the recovery of the 
financial system the priority.
After that, the Japanese engaged in an intense 
discussion about the appropriate volume of public funds 
to be disbursed to the troubled deposit-taking financial 
institutions. Between 1997 and 1998, the government tried 
to prop up struggling financial majors in order to raise their 
capital ratio after the bankruptcy of several of them. During 
that period the dominant view among the public was that 
minimal public funds should be used. As a result, the initial 
amount disbursed was not enough to completely relieve 
fears of a credit crunch.
Second, because Japan had two economic recovery 
cycles during the lost decade, the settlement of 
these problems was postponed. In other words, the 
determination to reform was undermined by the 
complacency caused by the economic recoveries. 
Ironically, this delayed real economic recovery. At that 
time, Japan suffered from three major excesses: debt, 
equipment and employment. And while these issues 
remained unresolved, Japan experienced an additional 
financial shock from 1997 to 1998, symbolised by 
the bankruptcy of some major banks. However, the 
Japanese economy unnecessarily lost time in resolving 
these financial disruptions because of the cyclical 
economic recovery. This led to unnecessary sacrifices in 
people’s welfare.
Furthermore, the financial institutions themselves 
were not necessarily positive in their approach to dealing 
with the problem. They were late in revealing their 
financial woes, which further delayed the settlement of 
their losses. As a result, it took the Japanese economy ten 
years – the lost decade – finally to overcome the crisis.
As a result of the structural reforms brought in by 
Junichiro Koizumi, Japan’s economy succeeded in 
making a real recovery. Japan learned two lessons from 
this long and chaotic period of financial insecurity, 
which are most relevant for the present world economy, 
especially for the United States. First, people’s confidence 
in the monetary and financial authorities is vital to the 
orderly resolution of financial disorder through what 
may be a lengthy process. Second, vigorous political 
leadership is necessary to convince the public and the 
It took the 
Japanese 
economy ten 
years – the lost 
decade – finally 
to overcome  
the crisis
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markets that economic reform will not be delayed.
Finally, the world may experience a structural change in 
the global economic system as a result of developments 
in the current global economic situation. The world 
is witnessing a slowdown in the US economy. In this 
context, the collapse of the housing bubble there has 
caused serious damage to household balance sheets, 
rather than those of private enterprises, as was the case 
in Japan. Historically, American households have had 
low savings rates, which has led to high consumption 
rates. The world economy has thus enjoyed the benefits 
of a system where the United States has acted as the 
consumer of last resort, providing a stimulus to the 
global economy.
However, given the current financial insecurity, 
this system may change. Because America’s economic 
doldrums will cause a reduction in household 
consumption, the leading role in supporting global 
consumption is already shifting to emerging economies. 
Of course, excessive consumption should be corrected. 
In terms of improving global imbalances, the world 
should welcome this change as a sound measure in the 
medium term. But there is the real possibility that it will 
be a great shock to the global economy in the short term.
In light of the possible change in American 
consumption patterns and the resulting global impact, it 
is risky to maintain an optimistic outlook for both this 
year and the next. The G20 should, therefore,  
closely monitor this crucial structural change to the 
world economy. ◆
 The leading role 
in supporting global 
consumption is already 
shifting to emerging 
economies 
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Limiting the 
economic 
fallout   
A year on from the subprime crisis, there is a 
continuing risk of systemic failure. The question 
must be asked: how bad can it get? 
By Paola Subacchi, 
research director, 
Chatham House O ver a year has gone by since the subprime crisis erupted in the United States, triggering a widespread financial crisis. Many were expecting a rapid economic impact. Yet there has been a more drawn-out process, with the world’s 
major economies only now teetering on the brink 
of recession. Over recent months, the crisis has 
moved from the financial and housing sector to the 
real economy, threatening jobs, consumption and 
investment – with the surge in commodity prices and 
inflation in early 2008 adding to the pain. And just as 
oil prices fell back, news of a sharply weaker eurozone 
economy, rising US unemployment and further crises 
in the banks turned hope to pessimism. How bad is it 
going to be?
Nobody can give a clear answer. Some economic 
indicators and forecasts point to a less dramatic picture 
than the one the more ebullient commentators and the 
media tend to portray. Despite high energy and food 
prices, inflation is still low by historical standards, 
and growth in the emerging market economies is still 
robust. In other words, even if a technical recession – 
two consecutive terms of negative growth – is in the 
future for many economies, the seeds of a prolonged 
global stagnation do not seem to be there. On the other 
hand – and this is the problem with the current crisis – 
it is not clear how the world economy, and in particular 
the most developed economies, can be pushed up again. 
Policy makers seem to be short of appropriate tools in 
their tool box. Monetary policy has little leeway given 
the resurgence of inflation: how low can real interest 
rates go before risking Japanese-style stagnation? 
Similarly, fiscal policy does not offer much room for 
manoeuvre. Unlike in 2001–02, when the United States 
could use its fiscal surplus to support economic growth, 
these days the fiscal deficit is already too large for 
comfort. The fact that the US also runs a large current 
account deficit further reduces the space for action.
The recourse to government-backed rescues of financial institutions is thus perhaps not 
surprising. If the September 2008 collapse of the US 
investment bank Lehman Brothers could be dismissed 
as the exception that confirmed the norm, then the 
‘nationalisation’ of the two huge US mortgage finance 
companies ‘Freddie Mac’ and ‘Fannie Mae’ and the 
‘concerted’ rescue of AIG, the world’s largest insurer, 
leave little doubt about the policy of intervention that 
is pursued as a way to stabilise markets and avoid 
further turmoil and spillovers in the real economy. 
These interventions occurred just a few months 
after the emergency loan provided by the Federal 
Reserve Bank in New York in March 2008 to the 
investment bank Bear Stearns and the rescue by the 
British government of the troubled bank Northern 
Rock; they open the debate on the risk of moral hazard 
or the risk that banks and other investors could make 
irresponsible commitments based on the knowledge 
that the government will bail them out. Indeed, the 
The crisis has 
moved to the 
real economy, 
threatening jobs, 
consumption 
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rescue of Fannie and Freddie immediately provoked a 
global investor rush toward more risk taking and the 
return of state capitalism. 
Such concerns, however, seem of little importance 
when the stability of the international financial system 
is at stake and the alternative is a higher risk of systemic 
failure. So far, these measures have proved effective in 
keeping the situation under control and avoiding further 
deterioration in market conditions. With governments 
having shown the ability and willingness to act as final 
rescuers, the case for moral hazard has become deeply 
rooted within the system. Whether this would make 
crisis prevention and crisis resolution even more difficult 
in future, it is, however, too soon to say.
It is noticeable, and perhaps not surprising, that in 
the crisis narrative the US plays a critical role. It is where 
the crisis started, and it is where all eyes turn to detect 
signs of a recovery that would pull the rest of the world 
economy back on track. In particular, since the Asian 
financial crisis of 1997, the US has kept up its traditional 
role of economic and monetary hegemon and served 
as the main engine of global economic growth. US 
imports have helped the development and expansion 
of the manufacturing sector in many developing 
countries, especially China. So, despite much talk about 
decoupling, expectations are for the US to remain in the 
driver’s seat.
 The case for moral 
hazard has become  
deeply rooted within  
the system 
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There are some structural problems, however, in the 
way the US has played and may continue to play the role 
of economic hegemon. Its main contribution to global 
growth has come from consumption, with consumption 
increasingly more a function of indebtedness – fuelled by 
high house prices – than of disposable income. The result 
has been a large trade deficit and a household savings rate 
now at a record low. The crashing of the property market, 
the unsound growth of which fed the US consumption 
binge for almost a decade, has left American households 
loaded with unsustainable debt. This came as no surprise, 
though. As early as 2004 it had become clear where the 
imbalances were and where adjustments, sooner or later, 
needed to come from. 
Unlike the post-Second World War years, when the US exported capital and high-value manufactured 
goods to the fast-growing economies of western Europe 
and Japan, and sustained their expansion through a 
relatively open market for imports of foreign goods, 
emerging market economies are now an important 
source of finance for the US deficit. The capacity for 
capital accumulation in these economies – thanks 
to their much larger share of world manufacturing 
capacity – is indeed the distinctive feature of today’s 
world economy. Together with this comes their capacity 
to deploy such capital beyond national borders. All 
this, combined with the size of their economies and 
the extent of their activities, is what makes developing 
countries key players.
The globalisation of financial markets and the 
integration of the world economy mean that national 
economies are now much more interdependent than 
in the past, as well as more vulnerable to spillovers 
and externalities. As a result, policies need to be much 
broader based and take the international dimension into 
account as they tend to have a far-reaching impact. More 
specifically, there should be a concerted effort to debate 
global economic issues in international forums where 
the main developed and developing economies are fairly 
represented. In other words, the emerging economic 
powers should be engaged in the dialogue on issues 
such as crisis prevention, crisis resolution and, more 
broadly, the management of an increasingly interrelated 
world economy, in which they are playing a much more 
significant role. The G20 offers such a forum. ◆
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T oday, more than ever, global financial stability requires the active engagement of the G20. The tenth meeting of the G20 is an opportune time to renew its financial stability mandate with an explicit focus on addressing financial market vulnerabilities among systemically important 
countries. It is also an opportune time to consider the 
G20’s role in facilitating policy responses due to the 
recent market disruption and its effects, the reports of 
the Financial Stability Forum (FSF) and the Institute of 
International Finance (IIF), and the many calls for reform 
and recommendations that need to be implemented.
The timing is right – as the G20 looks ahead to 
where it can deliver its greatest value – to recall the 
origins of its financial stability mandate and the strength 
of its membership, which includes systemically 
important countries beyond the G7 from the emerging 
markets. These elements make it an ideal forum 
for facilitating policy action, which is so important 
in addressing the effects of market disruption and 
preventing future crises. Although the G20 appears 
to have focused in the past on policy co-operation, 
as described in The Group of Twenty: A History, there 
is a strong case that it should elevate its role beyond 
shared diagnoses to actively encourage best practices, 
standards and harmonised approaches to reform.
The G20, a forum of finance ministers and central 
bank governors, was born out of a series of financial 
crises in 1995, 1997 and 1998. Its mandate – to promote 
discussion between industrial and emerging market 
countries on key issues related to global economic stability 
– is aimed squarely at the market disruption we continue 
to experience today. Organised to promote open and 
Reducing risk through 
policy co-ordination
As crises spread across markets, emerging economy members of the G20 are well 
placed to help re-establish stability 
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informal discussion among the key members of the global 
financial system, the G20 has promoted international 
standards to address vulnerabilities, including, in its 2000 
communiqués, the statement:
We considered the role that weaknesses in financial 
sector regulation and supervision, in corporate 
governance, in the disclosure of economic 
and financial data and in the transparency of 
macroeconomic policies have played in contributing to 
recent financial crises. We agreed on the importance 
of international codes and standards to address these 
weaknesses, endorsed the Financial Stability Forum’s 
recommendations, and encouraged continued work 
on incentives to foster implementation. The G20, as 
part of its mandate to promote co-operation to achieve 
stable and sustainable world economic growth, should 
play an important leadership role in supporting the 
continuing implementation of international standards 
and codes in a manner and at a pace that reflects each 
country’s unique development and reform priorities, 
and institutional characteristics.
The challenge to ensure global systemic stability 
is more pressing than ever. As co-chair of the IIF’s 
Committee on Market Best Practices, trustee for the 
IIF’s Principles for Stable Capital Flows and Fair Debt 
Restructuring in Emerging Markets, and member 
of the Advisory Committee for the Capital Markets 
Consultative Group of the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), I have been involved in discussions about how 
to address stability issues. A major theme is that policy 
co-ordination must become an integral part of any 
jurisdiction’s effort to mitigate systemic risk. Crises can 
spread rapidly across market segments via counter-party 
exposure, credit and liquidity risk. The speed of market 
developments has accelerated significantly.
As a result, without cross-border co-ordination, 
effective market supervision can be beyond the reach 
of national regulatory authorities. This is particularly 
true during periods of financial stress. Some of the key 
principles identified in the work of the IIF are that first, 
financial institutions, financial markets and the global 
regulatory community must deliberately embrace the 
goal of fully adapting to the globalisation of financial 
activities. Second, different approaches across and 
within jurisdictions make it difficult for regulators 
to rely on each other’s work. This impedes shared 
oversight among jurisdictions. There are still substantial 
differences of supervisory style and approach, and the 
industry and regulators should work to reduce these 
differences over time. Third, regulatory co-ordination 
needs to become an ongoing process to ensure that 
international consistency is built into domestic 
regulation and legislation. Considerable work has been 
done by both the IIF and the FSF – by both the official 
and private sectors – to restore the health of financial 
markets following this liquidity crisis. Implementation 
of these recommendations will require an integrated 
effort by both sectors and across boundaries. 
The diverse membership of the G20, designed to include the systemically important countries of 
the financial system, is an important asset. The G7 was 
deemed too narrow to deal fully with global financial 
stability issues. The FSF has a similar membership 
constraint. With the G20 spanning the IMF and the 
World Bank and working closely with the FSF and 
G7, it is best placed to assess and respond to systemic 
issues. Equally important, it has a broader perspective 
and better insight into emerging financial market 
risks, given its emerging market membership.
As the head of a bank with extensive operations 
throughout Central and South America and the 
Caribbean, as well as offices in India, China, Japan, 
South Korea, Russia and Turkey, I am well aware of 
the importance of this diversification and the broader 
perspective it brings. We have seen first hand how 
quickly financial markets in these key countries are 
developing and how well they have fared through this 
recent market disturbance.
The current crisis has been driven by certain 
elements of the financial markets, notably securitised 
mortgage markets. These markets are not a significant 
factor in the emerging economies. Many emerging 
markets deserve credit for the strides they have taken 
to remedy their vulnerability to such financial system 
disturbances. In the case of Latin America, the financial 
systems of Brazil, Mexico, Chile, Peru and others 
have matured in terms of liquidity, access to capital, 
consumer and capital market innovation, and financial 
sector governance. As a result, they and other equally 
well-positioned emerging markets can focus on growth 
and their comparative strength while financial systems 
in developed countries continue to work through the 
repercussions of the crisis.
Nonetheless, emerging markets are not immune 
to the effects of global market volatility, nor are the 
lessons and reforms irrelevant. The credit crisis, while 
stemming from mortgage securities, was the result of 
excessive risk-taking. The reasons that led to lax risk 
management should be studied carefully and avoided 
by all participants and stakeholders in the global 
financial system. In its final report, the IIF identified 
best practices across a range of financial sector issues 
beyond risk management, including compensation 
policies, liquidity risk, valuation, credit underwriting, 
ratings, investor due diligence, transparency and 
disclosure. The emerging market perspective on this 
reform agenda and on measures to prevent future crises 
must be taken into account.
The IIF has taken one step that the G20 may wish 
to consider. The Market Monitoring Group has been 
created as a forum for member firms to monitor global 
financial markets for early detection of vulnerabilities 
that have systemic implications, to examine market 
dynamics that could lead to financial market strains and 
discuss ways to address such risks.
With Brazil’s presidency of the G20 in 2008, this perspective is well represented and is already 
being established. Brazil’s work programme states that 
the Brazilian chair will establish the Study Group on 
Global Credit Market Disruptions, which was proposed 
by Australia, who offered to chair it.
I fully support this initiative and encourage the G20, 
on this, its tenth meeting, to consider an active role in co-
ordinating reform and policy responses going forward. ◆
The G20 
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A process of stabilisation 
Restoring confidence in international financial markets will require strong medicine 
if a persistent global depression is to be averted 
The present international financial market is characterised by remarkably high financial volatility, which reflects a substantial loss of confidence, drying up inter-bank credit and spiking short-term interest rates. Inflationary pressures combined with financial risks, both originating in the energy 
sector, further complicate the transmission mechanism 
of impulses in the global economy. This financial 
disruption must be tackled at its root. Securitisation and 
deregulation created unbalanced and unfunded risks and 
harmed the shaky fundamentals of the financial system. 
But a lack of international economic co-ordination 
produced disorder, which weakens the responsibility of 
market players.
Abundant liquidity provided by G7 central banks 
between 2000 and 2006 has contributed to mispriced 
risks and assets prices, and induced excessive risk-
taking. The other substantial policy mistake has been 
deregulation. The possibility of separating the risk from 
its originating credit, allowed by financial innovation 
such as credit derivatives, and the possibility of trading 
such unfunded risks under different domestic regulations 
and monitoring regimes, have fuelled global moral 
hazard. The lack of proper valuation by credit rating 
agencies contributes to the stress. In the absence of 
any mitigating factors, losses can reach up to 3 per 
cent of the world’s gross domestic product, according 
to recent International Monetary Fund estimates. The 
transmission mechanism has changed, but the tools 
available to restore confidence are not effective.
The first step in attacking the roots of global instability is to institute a co-ordinated system of risk 
funding. The credit-rating agencies and the ‘originate to 
distribute’ model, which allowed banks to expand their 
lending business without violating the limits placed by 
regulations intended to prevent excessive risk, failed to 
value the effective risks embedded in most securities. 
Balance sheets do not reflect the value of financial 
operators and confidence needs to be restored. The 
rescue of non-banking institutions such as Bear Stearns 
has encouraged moral hazard. Deregulated operators 
and practices such as subprime mortgages should be 
By Chiara Oldani, 
University of Viterbo 
‘La Tuscia’
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responsible for the losses they originated, together with 
the authorities that allowed such practices. The medicine 
is very bitter, and the crisis experienced by Japan, whose 
persistence has to be attributed to the weak banking 
system, should inspire strong action to avoid a persistent 
global depression.
The second step is to institute a new currency regime. 
G7 exchange rates are determined by the market, while 
emerging economies adopt the peg. This unbalanced 
currency market drives the accumulation of excessive 
foreign exchange reserves far above the sustainable level, 
especially in Asia. Most of these resources are invested in 
deregulated sovereign wealth funds (SWFs). The liquidity 
generated via exchange-rate misalignments is not 
absorbed via trade. Financial account imbalances reverse 
trade-related currency flows, but refer to transactions 
taking place in a weak financial environment. Risks 
accumulate in a non-linear fashion. The reaction to the 
negative effects of financial globalisation will be a degree 
of protectionism in the next few years.
SWFs are government investment funds, funded by 
foreign currency reserves, but managed separately. Their 
overall holdings are expected to reach $15 trillion in the 
next few years. Potential risks associated with them are 
mismanagement, resulting in further financial disruption; 
increased economic protectionism; negative political 
agendas; and worsening conflicts of interest. Hostility to 
them is fuelled by the fact that SWFs, with the exception 
of those in Norway and Singapore, do not publish their 
balance sheet or investment strategies, and are not 
publicly accountable. The United States and Europe have 
already demanded legal protection for sensitive industries 
 The crisis 
experienced by Japan 
should inspire strong 
action to avoid a persistent 
global depression 
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against takeovers by foreign state-run investment funds, 
but have to accept less freedom on private funds as well. 
The regulation and monitoring of private funds (whether 
hedge or sovereign wealth) must be dealt with in a 
comprehensive way by the G20. It should not be left to the 
market, which has proven unable to handle such risks.
The third relevant change in the global transmission 
mechanism is the effect of energy prices on global 
inflationary pressures. The energy sector is characterised 
by a physical gap of infrastructure and production, 
negatively influencing prices. Financial securities try to 
fill the gap and hedge related risks. The energy sector 
exhibits high excess returns and most international 
banks build and sell securities to their customers to 
hedge. In most cases, international banks also started 
over-the-counter (OTC) trading platforms to ensure 
sufficient liquidity. However, there can be a lack of 
liquidity, similar to what happened to the US mortgage 
industry, with a domino effect in the industrial and 
financial sectors. 
The pricing of energy contracts follows the standard 
pricing rules of derivatives, corrected for their special 
features, such as storage and transport costs, or 
environmental risks. There are thus two dangers in 
handling energy derivatives: mispricing and illiquidity. 
Exchange-traded futures prices on oil, traded since the 
1980s, have proved to be poor predictors of spot prices. 
Mispricing changes the risk-return profile of portfolios, 
altering the effectiveness of hedging and generating 
unknown non-linear correlations. Most energy contracts 
follow the oil price, but the underlying asset is not 
always a substitute for oil, nor is it traded under similar 
rules (see, for example, natural gas). This fact diminishes 
the ability to price derivatives efficiently, but, at the same 
time, increases the need for hedging tools from market 
participants. If the structural lack of investments  
does not reverse, through research and development  
in technology, increasing energy efficiency and 
productivity, and tax incentives toward renewables,  
then the inflationary pressures will continue to afflict the 
global economy, forcing central banks to increase interest 
rates, to the detriment of market liquidity.
The freedom that was allowed to deregulated 
financial operators (including sovereign wealth and 
hedge funds), to OTC markets, and to central and 
local public authorities that were not compelled to 
adopt fair value principles and accounting practices, 
induced excessive risk-taking behaviour that is 
unbalanced and unfunded. The G20 should co-
ordinate a global response to the turmoil to create a 
sound environment and support the introduction of 
homogenous practices and transparent accounting 
principles for all market players and for all financial 
transactions. The Bank of International Settlements’ 
Basel II Capital Accord has amplified the effects of the 
economic downturn in Europe. The Italian situation 
is even worse for domestic structural reasons. Italian 
private wealth is invested basically in government 
bonds, and only to a relatively small extent in private-
issued securities. Banks finance small and medium-
sized firms, which represent more than 80 per cent of 
the entire population, but such investment becomes 
expensive in periods of economic downturn.
Still, the risk-weighted approach represents a feasible 
approach to creating a sounder environment. The 
stabilisation of the financial system goes along with 
the creation of a common exchange rate regime, where 
the Chinese yuan would move toward more flexible 
management with respect to the US dollar, the euro and 
the Japanese yen. Such strong actions would smooth 
the financial and pricing frictions, help the adjustment 
process and reverse the negative trend of growth. ◆
 The G20 should 
support the introduction 
of transparent accounting 
principles for all market 
players 
Tropical Forests – An Essential Tool for Addressing Climate Change
How much money is a tropical forest 
worth? Until now, the only way to 
find out was to burn or log it and 
use the land for other purposes. 
A standing forest had no tangible 
economic value for simply existing.
That is changing. Increased under-
standing of how and why the planet 
is warming has raised awareness 
of the vital role of tropical forests in 
regulating the climate and benefiting 
people. The result is a new focus 
on creating economic value for the 
services that tropical forests have 
always provided for free. 
Tropical forests contain more than 
half of all species on Earth, provide 
essential ecosystem services such as 
flood control and soil protection, and 
are the foundation for the livelihoods 
and culture of many of the world’s 
indigenous and forest-dependent 
peoples.
These rainforests also absorb and 
store huge amounts of carbon dioxide 
– the most prevalent greenhouse gas 
in the atmosphere. Current deforesta-
tion, at a rate equal to an area the 
size of England each year, emits 20 
percent of total greenhouse gases - 
more than all the world’s cars, trucks, 
airplanes and ships combined.
By conserving tropical forests we 
can minimize the effects of climate 
change and maintain the essen-
tial resources and services that 
the forests provide to hundreds of 
millions of people. To do so, we need 
to provide incentives for forest-rich 
developing nations to preserve their 
existing jungles.
U.N.-led negotiations on a new global 
climate change treaty recognize the 
importance of curtailing emissions 
from deforestation. What we need 
now is leadership by G20 govern-
ments and others to adopt a system 
of incentives to reward countries for 
protecting standing forests.
Tropical forest countries understand 
this strategy and have taken lauda-
tory steps to conserve their valuable 
resources in the long-term interest 
of their people. However, they must 
balance such crucial conservation 
with development needs for poor and 
vulnerable populations.
Organizations such as Conservation 
International (CI) and Duke Energy 
are part of a broader set of partners 
committed to helping developing 
countries earn revenue from 
protecting such important resources.  
We want to help the G20 govern-
ments make such conservation-based 
income part of climate policy.
If done right, protecting tropical 
forests will provide multiple benefits – 
lowering carbon emissions now while 
the world works on transforming to 
low-carbon economies; bolstering 
sustainable development opportuni-
ties for the millions of people who 
rely on the forests for their liveli-
hoods, and providing ecological 
benefits such as protecting biodiver-
sity and water quality.
We need new mechanisms in a 
global climate change treaty that 
provide a powerful financial incentive 
to save tropical forests, substantially 
reduce carbon dioxide emissions and 
maintain essential natural resources 
for vulnerable people. Protecting 
tropical forests is essential for 
addressing climate change.
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A collaborative approach 
to global energy issues
The demand for a revolution in global energy policy will increase dramatically in the 
coming decade – and the world’s economies will need to co-operate 
and deployment of new energy technologies in global 
markets must play a key role. Long-term ambitions for 
cleaner energy must be buttressed by concrete short- 
and medium-term targets and implementation.
Energy Technology Perspectives 2008 (ETP), the recent 
study produced by the International Energy Agency 
(IEA), provides an analysis of the status and future 
prospects of key energy technologies, and shows how 
they can contribute to a more sustainable, secure and 
least-cost energy system. The goal of the analysis is to 
provide a technology perspective on the feasibility and 
By Nobuo Tanaka, 
executive director, 
International 
Energy Agency S ecure, clean and affordable energy resources are fundamental to future economic stability and growth. The G8 showed far-sightedness when it launched its programme to achieve a “clean, clever and competitive energy future” at its Gleneagles Summit in 2005, with a strong follow-
up at the July 2008 G8 Summit in Hokkaido. Much 
more effort is needed, however, and the development 
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costs of deep emissions reductions, including various 
scenarios. One scenario is an extremely ambitious one, 
showing how carbon dioxide emissions could be reduced 
to 50 per cent below current levels by 2050 – to limit 
temperature increases to 2°C–2.4°C. The results make 
clear that all countries need to act in the next few years if 
the goal of halving emissions is to remain affordable.
ETP is built on three sets of global energy technology scenarios. These are a baseline (business-as-usual) 
scenario, a range of ACT (accelerated technology) 
scenarios showing how CO
2
 emissions could be brought 
back to current levels by 2050, and a set of BLUE 
scenarios outlining how they could be reduced to 50 per 
cent below current levels.
In the BLUE Map scenario, end-use efficiency accounts 
for 36 per cent of all savings, renewables for 21 per cent, 
and CO
2
 capture and storage 19 per cent. The remaining  
24 per cent is accounted for by nuclear, fossil fuel switching 
and efficiency in power generation (see figure 1).
First, the world must harvest the huge efficiency 
potential in all economies. Energy efficiency has the 
greatest potential for CO
2
 savings at lowest cost and 
is in many cases even paying off. And results can be 
delivered soon. The IEA submitted 25 energy efficiency 
recommendations to the G8 Hokkaido Summit. These 
covered seven priority areas: buildings, appliances, 
lighting, transport, industry, power utilities and cross-
sectoral activity. The IEA estimates that if implemented 
globally without delay, the proposed actions could save 
around 8.2 gigatonnes (Gt) CO
2
 per year by 2030. This 
is equivalent to around one fifth of global reference case 
CO
2
 emissions from the energy sector in 2030.
Second, the world must decarbonise its power sector. 
Given the growing demand for electricity, this would 
mean that 35 coal- and 20 gas-fired power plants would 
have to be fitted with carbon capture and storage (CCS) 
technology on average per year between now and 
2050 (see figure 2). The price tag is high – a single 500 
megawatt (MW) coal-fired power plant with CCS costs 
of around $1.5 billion today and costs are escalating. In 
addition, the world would have to build 32 new nuclear 
plants each year. Numerous issues would need to be 
overcome, such as the questions of public acceptance 
and the availability of geologically stable sites for nuclear 
reactors or waste storage. Wind capacity would have to 
increase by approximately 17,500 turbines annually.
To meet the BLUE scenarios, the world must quickly 
develop and implement new far-reaching policies to a 
degree unknown in the energy sector and substantially 
decarbonise power generation. A significant discrepancy 
exists between current trends and the BLUE scenario 
targets. In the coming decade, the world will need 
to launch a global revolution in the way it produces 
and uses energy, with a dramatic shift in government 
policies and unprecedented co-operation among all 
major economies. The IEA’s World Energy Outlook 2008 
provides further in-depth analysis on policy pathways to 
achieve significant emissions reductions.
The ACT Map scenario requires options with a marginal cost up to $50/t CO
2
 while the BLUE 
Map scenario requires up to $200/t CO
2
 ($200/t CO
2
 
translates into an additional cost of $80 per barrel of oil). 
These marginal cost estimates are based on reasonably 
optimistic assumptions about significant technology cost 
reductions. With less optimistic cost reductions, notably 
in the transport sector, the marginal cost for BLUE would 
rise to up to $500/t CO
2
. The cost uncertainty increases 
for more ambitious targets, as technologies are needed 
All countries 
need to act in 
the next few 
years if the 
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Figure 1: Contribution of emissions reductions options in the BLUE Map Scenario, between 2005 and 2050
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Figure 2: Annual investment in the electricity sector in the ACT Map and BLUE Map Scenarios, 2010–2050
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
Solar CSP
Solar PV
Geothermal
Wind offshore
Wind onshore
Biomass plants
Hydro
Nuclear
Gas-fired with CCS
Coal-fired with CCS
GW per year
Present rate ACT Map BLUE Map
30 – 35 CCS coal-fired plants (500 MW)
1 – 20 CCS gas-fired plants (500 MW)
24 – 32 nuclear plants (1000 MW)
 of Canada's hydropower capacity
30 – 100 biomass plants (50 MW)
2 900 – 14,000 wind turbines (4 MW)
775 – 3,750 wind turbines (4 MW)
50 – 130 Geothermal units (100 MW)
115 – 215 million m2 solar panels
45 – 80 CSP plants (250 MW)
Historical high
ACT Map – BLUE Map
1/5
that are not yet mature and whose future cost is therefore 
highly uncertain. The average emissions reduction costs 
in BLUE Map are about a fifth of the marginal cost, 
ranging from $38/t CO
2
 to $117/t CO
2
.
The future energy system will be determined by 
decisions taken in the coming years. Not acting now 
with policies to achieve the ambitious long-term goal 
implied by the BLUE scenario will impose higher costs 
in the future. Clear, long-term targets are needed to 
convince decision makers in industry to make the capital 
investments needed to dramatically change the energy 
system. Energy research and development levels must 
be raised and restructured in order to accelerate the 
development of new energy technologies with superior 
characteristics.
The IEA has more than 40 international technology co-operation programmes. Most welcome participation 
of member and non-member countries. The goals 
are primarily sharing information, developing a joint 
strategic view and developing research agendas. The 
IEA is actively trying to broaden the outreach of its 
technology programmes and welcomes more participation 
from developing countries. For example, it works on 
technology scenarios and roadmaps for developed and 
developing countries alike, working closely with experts 
from  these countries.
Many developing countries demand technology transfer and consider this a condition for 
future climate change commitments. At the same 
time, equipment suppliers in developed countries 
worry about intellectual property rights and are 
often reluctant to provide technology for fear of copy 
piracy. Technologies are generally not owned by 
governments. Patents belong to institutions, companies 
or individuals. Companies have know-how that is 
not shared with others. In many cases, advanced 
technologies will require advanced knowledge. 
Joint ventures could be a way to share knowledge, 
while also providing an incentive for current technology 
owners. Such co-operation is already happening. 
A good engineering education system, sufficient 
research, development and demonstration efforts, and 
international co-operation will be preconditions for a 
successful industrial transformation. The IEA looks 
forward to working with the G20 countries on such a 
global transformation in the coming decades. ◆
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The price of climate change 
Climate change has a major impact on global economic stability. This will increase 
in Latin America and the Caribbean as their vulnerability to extreme weather 
events grows  
Economic growth in Latin America and the Caribbean has been positive during the last few years. The region’s gross domestic product (GDP) for 2007 was 5.7 per cent despite worsening conditions in the global economy. This growth has reduced unemployment and 
created better-quality jobs. The increase in non-wage 
income (remittances and conditional cash transfer 
programmes) has also played a significant role in the 
nine-point reduction in poverty levels since 2002. Still, 
more than 35 per cent of the region’s population –  
190 million people – live in poverty.
However, the current situation may be threatened 
by three factors. First, the volatility of financial markets 
since the middle of 2007 and increasing international 
uncertainty will have negative impacts on economic 
growth worldwide. Latin America and the Caribbean 
will be no exception, although it is expected that the 
region will be less affected than in previous crises, 
thanks to its increased economic strength and greater 
fiscal solvency. Even with the deterioration of external 
conditions, the region’s GDP will continue to grow by 
4.7 per cent. The second factor is the rising price of 
food and energy. The third factor is the economic cost 
the region will have to bear to cope with the effects of 
climate change.
The scientific evidence provided by the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has 
helped build an emerging consensus on the manageable 
or safe concentrations of greenhouse gases of around 
450 to 500 parts per million to avert global mean 
temperature increases above 2.4oC, as well as agreement 
on where emissions should peak in the next ten to 15 
years. The European Union has been key to this political 
convergence. The economic cost of this effort has been 
estimated at approximately 1 per cent of global GDP, 
provided it begins as soon as possible.
By Alicia Bárcena, 
executive secretary, 
Economic 
Commission for 
Latin America and 
the Caribbean
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Yet, GDP and population are expected to continue 
growing in the long run, with China, India and other 
developing countries leading this growth. All these 
factors are at work in a world where, according to 
projections, fossil fuels will dominate in the global 
energy mix beyond the first half of this century, due 
to technological and economic constraints on the 
production of possible substitutes.
Industrialised countries will have to achieve a 
reduction of 60 to 80 per cent in their current level 
of emissions by 2050, while developing countries 
are expected to stabilise their emissions level before 
2030 and reduce emissions from that point on. 
Meeting this challenge involves bringing about 
a rapid transformation of energy production and 
consumption in developed countries, while finding 
a way to achieve full economic development under a 
limited emissions budget.
Apparently, the only pragmatic way to resolve this 
distributional dilemma is for industrialised countries, 
in addition to assuming the cost of drastic reductions in 
their own emissions, to finance or subsidise reductions 
in developing regions, as well as furnish technology to 
facilitate those decreases.
 Industrialised countries 
will have to achieve a 
reduction of 60 to 80 per cent 
in emissions by 2050 
The costs 
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Latin America 
and the 
Caribbean must 
expand the 
scope of  
carbon markets
tensions is emerging as one of the priorities on the 
agenda for multilateral negotiations on climate change. 
This effort will include mechanisms to strengthen the 
international carbon market and to create the necessary 
funds to finance emission mitigation and adaptation in 
developing countries.
In addition to the reforms required to realise the full 
potential of the Clean Development Mechanism – which 
allows a country to implement emission reduction 
projects in developing countries in order to earn credits 
toward meeting its Kyoto commitment – Latin America 
and the Caribbean must expand the scope of carbon 
markets to capture all the environmental services that the 
region’s agricultural and forestry sector can provide to 
mitigate climate change.
The region must also join its voice with others in 
calling upon industrialised countries to honour their 
international financial commitments, both to help the 
developing world deal with the impact of climate change 
and to be part of the effort to keep it under control. 
The global yearly costs of adaptation in developing 
countries is estimated to be between $4 billion and $166 
billion, according to sources such as the World Bank, 
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC) and the United Nations Development 
Programme (see Economic Aspects of Adaptation to Climate 
Change: Costs, Benefits and Policy Instruments, Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2008).
Latin America and the Caribbean are highly 
vulnerable to extreme weather events such as flooding, 
storms, hurricanes, drought and forest fires. These events 
frequently turn into human and economic disasters due 
to insufficient prevention, inadequate investments and 
unsuitable areas for settlements. The estimated loss for 
the region, mostly in infrastructure, was $84 billion 
between 1970 and 2008. Extreme weather events are 
on the rise. There is some progress in terms of damage 
mitigation, but climate change is expected to increase the 
economic impacts, as well as the cost, of adaptation.
In spite of these challenges, the current global trends in 
development investment flows are neither as expected nor 
as needed. Between 2000 and 2006, Latin America and the 
Caribbean received approximately 9 per cent ($34.2 billon) 
of global ODA ($407.5 billion). Less than 1 per cent of this 
amount ($913 million) was directed to the Rio markers, 
which are designated by donors to identify activities that 
target the objectives of the three Rio conventions – the 
UNFCCC, the United Nations Convention on Biological 
Diversity and the United Nations Convention to Combat 
Desertification. From 2000 to 2006, only $121 million was 
allocated to climate change.
In addition, since its creation, the Global environment 
Facility has provided $7.4 billion in grants and generated 
more than $28 billion in co-financing. Yet Latin America 
and the Caribbean have received only about 7 per cent for 
national and regional projects on climate change (figure 2).
These statistics indicate that international financing 
sources, including carbon markets, still do not provide 
enough funding to accomplish what needs to be done. 
While today, flows to Latin America and the Caribbean 
barely exceed $100 million, estimated needs are expected 
to be much greater. It is time for the international 
community and international institutions such as the G20 
to help close the gap. ◆
Latin America and the Caribbean cannot escape this 
dilemma. The region plays a minor role in greenhouse 
gas emissions (around 10 per cent of the world total) 
(see figure 1). Nonetheless, it will be affected directly by 
climate change and indirectly by the regulatory changes, 
policies and instruments that industrialised countries are 
expected to introduce in response to the strengthened 
international regime on climate change likely to emerge 
for subsequent compliance periods.
The costs of global mitigation and adaptation impose 
serious burdens on the region. On mitigation, it will 
have to significantly increase its energy efficiency and 
expand the proportion of renewable sources in its energy 
mix. With regard to adaptation, countries will urgently 
have to improve their institutional capacity to be in 
a position to cope with the consequences of extreme 
hydrometeorological events and increase the resilience of 
the sectors of their production and society that could be 
most seriously affected.
The region will also need to protect the competitive-
ness of its products in international markets from protec-
tionist measures that are likely to be imposed unilaterally 
by developed nations, with reduction targets on imports 
originating in developing nations that have not made 
similar commitments.
Thus, the construction of mechanisms to achieve 
long-term stabilisation in the context of these economic 
Figure 1: Non-annex I greenhouse gas emissions by region  
(according to their 1994 inventories) 
Figure 2: Global Environmental Facility funds, 1991–2007
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Sponsored feature
Climate change: the role of energy 
matrix diversification and sustainable
development
Over the past several years global power supply has facedunprecedented challenges: a surge in global power demandsignificantly ahead of any increase in capacity, soaringcommodity prices, and substantiated fears of climate
change being caused in part by emissions from fossil fuelled power
generating plant. During this same period, various political pressures
have undermined existing international trade flows, further
threatening the sustainability and reliability of energy supply across
the globe and have prompted countries to redouble their efforts at
developing power production capacities and diversifying energy
matrices. The challenge moving forward is for policymakers to
find a way of securing power supply that effectively responds to
the economic, environmental, and security challenges of today. 
In South America, as in the rest of the world, policymakers are
prioritizing diversification of their energy matrix to secure sustainable
and reliable power supplies. For example, Chile built its power
supply infrastructure around hydrological flows from the Andes and
natural gas imports from Argentina. So when Argentina curtailed
natural gas exports in recent years, Chile was forced to switch to
more costly and more polluting fuel alternatives such as diesel and
fuel oil for power generation during the dry season and peak demand
periods. Chile has aggressively responded with a new energy policy
that aims to diversify its energy matrix by promoting the development
and construction of two liquefied natural gas terminals to enable
imports from the global marketplace at international commodity
price levels. In addition, recognizing the paradigm shift of its
energy matrix and the resulting cost increase, the system regulator
proactively adjusted its end-user tariffs. Through its efforts at
diversification and regulatory reform, Chile is now working
towards a more sustainable secure and reliable energy supply.  
In the case of Brazil, the signals are clear and Brazil must act
decisively and quickly to address the looming risk of increasing power
shortages due to its over-reliance on hydroelectric power and
thermal power from either precarious natural gas supply from its
neighboring countries or from other expensive and polluting
hydrocarbons. In 2001, Brazil suffered a significant power
shortage due to poor hydrological conditions and insufficient
thermal capacity to fill the gap. Moreover, the fact that seventy
www.contourglobal.com
percent of Brazil’s hydroelectric potential is located in the
tropical Amazonia and Cerrado biomes raises environmental
concerns, as Brazil endeavors to satisfy its growing energy
demand in an environmentally friendly, sustainable manner. 
Importantly, Brazil has proactively addressed the
diversification of its energy matrix by implementing programs
such as PROINFA (Incentive Program for Alternative Sources of
Power Supply) to promote the development and construction of
sustainable sources of power generation that would improve the
reliability of the overall system. Furthermore, earlier this year,
through its first-ever reserve auction, power plants running on
sugar-cane bagasse became an integral component of the energy
matrix. The challenge for Brazil now is to transform its wind,
biomass, and biogas potential into a reality. The regulatory
framework is therefore going to be very important to provide
the proper incentives required for long term success, including
such issues as clarity on all aspects of the permitting process
and creating a tariff structure that properly reflects the
generation economics of these particular energy sources.  
The experiences of Chile and Brazil demonstrate why a diverse
and wide-ranging approach to energy generation is a crucial
component of energy security. Recognizing the benefits of energy
diversity, ContourGlobal is making use of a variety of Brazil’s
natural resources to generate power, including poultry waste,
swine waste, wind, and water. We are currently developing a
poultry waste-fired power plant complex that would burn
approximately 900,000 tons per year of poultry waste in Santa
Catarina. Similarly, the State of Santa Catarina provides a
unique opportunity in biogas where approximately 10 million
liters of biogas could be produced daily from swine waste and
are currently evaluating the development of this technology in
Brazil. Lastly, we are developing and constructing wind parks in
Rio Grande do Sul and run-of-river hydroelectric power plants
in four different states. All of our projects will provide a true
“win-win” strategy for all stakeholders – reliable, cost effective
and sustainable power generation.       
by Joseph C. Brandt, President and CEO, ContourGlobal
Achieving energy diversity: one of ContourGlobal’s poultry waste-
fired plants
ContourGlobal uses this renewable resource to help address
Brazil’s power shortfall
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Clean energy: prevarication 
is not an option 
Governments should be at the heart of building a low-carbon economy but practice 
must triumph over rhetoric 
E nergy makes the world go round, though it is often largely invisible. Yet the choices made about energy – its form, scale and technology – will have powerful visible consequences for climate change, and for the distribution of benefits and costs now and in the future. Governments 
have a highly strategic role to play in setting the 
parameters for investment in energy to follow the most 
productive pathway, taking into account not only its 
carbon footprint, but also broader environmental, 
distributional and economic dimensions.
The world economy has been whipped by a series 
of powerful forces over the last 12 months, combining 
highly volatile oil prices with huge increases in those 
of many commodities, including basic foodstuffs. The 
credit crunch is bringing about the collapse of many of 
the most prestigious financial institutions, and the shift 
of global economic and political power from Wall Street 
and the City of London to Dubai, Mumbai and Shanghai. 
The past year has demonstrated very clearly the highly 
globalised nature of the world economy, with decisions 
being taken in Brussels, Beijing and Washington about 
biofuel targets bringing about big shifts in demand 
for land in Cambodia, Tanzania and Colombia. 
The interconnected nature of global environmental 
By Camilla 
Toulmin, director, 
International 
Institute for 
Environment and 
Development
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systems is also evident in the rapid rise in greenhouse 
gas emissions over the last five years, as economic 
growth and opportunities ripple through many parts 
of the developing world. Global warming seems 
to be happening considerably faster than had been 
thought, even in the fourth assessment report of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).
As Lord Stern has forcefully argued recently, any hope for a global deal at the 15th Conference 
of the Parties to the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in 
Copenhagen, at the end of 2009, relies on the rich, 
industrial countries demonstrating that they are ready 
to take the lead on cutting greenhouse gas emissions 
and to invest in building a low-carbon economy. So far, 
this commitment has been more evident in rhetoric 
than in practice. Yet delivering this shift in investment, 
technology and behaviour change is not rocket science. 
Much of it depends on known technology and can be 
delivered at prices that are competitive with current 
prices of carbon and fossil fuels. As with so many 
public policy questions, government inertia and vested 
interests drag the impetus for change. Yet, never has 
change been more needed, if the world is to avoid the 
potential for catastrophic shifts in the global climate. 
Recent research on implementation of the Montreal 
Protocol on eliminating ozone-depleting substances 
shows that, once the construction of a low-carbon 
economy gets started, it may well be much easier, 
cheaper and quicker than anticipated.
Clean energy is key to generating growth with a 
lower carbon footprint, whether for transport, industry 
or residential use. The world relies on fossil fuels for 
some 80 per cent of its energy needs. This reliance is set 
to continue. This means that it is necessary to find ways 
to use energy more efficiently and to rapidly roll out 
methods for carbon capture and storage (CCS) so that the 
very large existing reserves of coal, oil and gas can be used 
to generate power with minimal impact on atmospheric 
concentrations of greenhouse gases. As yet, the prospects 
for effective CCS technology look rather distant, with 
commercial use predicted not to begin until at least 2020. 
Finding a means to speed up the process for testing and 
making such technology available should receive far 
higher priority, so that the kit to capture carbon emissions 
can be integrated into the large investments currently 
being made in coal-fired power stations around the world.
The inter-
connected 
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Other opportunities for clean energy investment 
include the many forms of renewables – solar, hydro, 
wind, geothermal, biomass and marine sources of energy 
generation. Each form has a wide range of technical 
options, depending on how it captures and transforms 
the particular source of energy. Solar energy can be 
captured by photovoltaic cells to generate electricity, 
through heating water directly, or by concentrating 
the rays through a set of concave mirrors. Each option 
presents a range of characteristics that will influence 
whether it is the right option for a given country and 
context. Hydropower can be generated from small 
waterfalls as well as from major rivers. If governments 
take the time to think through the multiple dimensions 
associated with different clean energy options, they can 
maximise the side benefits from such investment.
There are five key dimensions to consider. Together, they will help governments best plan for a 
balance of energy provision that both guarantees this 
fundamental service essential for economic growth and 
achieves a range of other goals. First, is the technology 
already available, and at what cost? Or will it require 
still further investment of research and development 
funding to bring it to operation? Are there sources of 
funding available that could bridge transition costs 
and, hence, speed up the spread of this technology?
Second, what are the scale options for this technology 
and how do they affect both the distribution of benefits 
and the levels of resilience in the energy system? For 
example, there is increasing interest in the development 
and spread of decentralised energy generation through 
small-scale and micro generation opportunities where 
these exist. Such a distributed system can offer greater 
resilience against the collapse of large-scale systems 
relying on a few power stations.
Third, can significant local multipliers be established 
with providers of goods and services in the locality 
that bring benefits from this investment to the broader 
community? There is often a range of local enterprises 
that can offer goods and services if these are thought 
about at the start.
Fourth, what are the environmental dimensions of 
this form of energy generation? Some complain that 
wind turbines create an unacceptable cost by blighting 
the landscape. Those opposed to nuclear power cite 
the dangerous effects from waste materials, as well as 
large-scale water requirements for cooling. Hydropower 
requires damming or channelling water in ways that 
significantly alter existing flows, with knock-on 
consequences for fish populations, existing irrigation 
and other forms of water use. Equally, how will 
environmental change – particularly global warming – 
influence the effectiveness of this energy source? For 
example, many parts of Africa will likely see substantial 
changes in rainfall in the next ten to 20 years, with 
consequences for the viability of large- and small-scale 
hydropower.
Fifth, current and future energy options need to 
be analysed in terms of existing and future interest 
groups. In Britain, the main energy suppliers have 
wielded great power in slowing government measures 
to increase micro generation, by arguing for low feed-in 
tariffs (in contrast to Germany). This is now changing. 
Governments must withstand lobbying from vested 
interests and recognise the central responsibility of the 
state in representing the needs of future generations 
whose votes do not currently count.
Governments have the power to construct policy frameworks that encourage cleaner energy 
and generate other positive side effects. Securing 
political commitment to the post-Kyoto agreement is 
key to ensuring a global price for carbon that gives 
the incentive for developing a range of clean energy 
systems. Government regulation sets the standard 
for energy suppliers and pushes them toward greater 
innovation. Procurement by government agencies 
can establish the critical mass needed for new 
energy suppliers to get started. Financial incentives 
can encourage local production of energy services, 
such as by having a high enough level for feed-in 
tariffs to make micro generation financially viable. 
A combination of policy measures thus could be 
enormously helpful in bringing about the transition 
to a low-carbon economy in ways that also promote 
innovation, minimise environmental hazards, 
strengthen local economic multipliers, and establish a 
more resilient energy system. ◆
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Biofuels: 
what path forward? 
The need to confront global warming has never been more urgent. But do biofuels 
provide all the answers? 
B iofuels were hailed in the first half of the decade as a green solution to reliance on imported petroleum and a saviour to farmers seeking higher prices for commodities in surplus. But in the second half, biofuels (especially those using food and feed grain 
as feed stocks) emerged as threats to environmental 
quality and food security and as a costly response to 
energy concerns. The growth and development of the 
biofuels sector has occurred largely in the United States, 
Brazil and the European Union. The conduct of the 
‘big three’ will loom large in determining the future of 
biofuels for other countries.
Three production modes have emerged. First 
are biofuels made from food and feed crops such as 
maize, soybeans, rapeseed, cassava or palm. Second 
are biofuels using non-food crops such as sugarcane, 
which, while a food ingredient, is not a staple. Third 
are cellulosic biofuels from plants such as woodchips, 
switchgrass, miscanthus, jatropha or algae. Early biofuel 
production has been dominated by the first mode in the 
US and EU, and the second in Brazil. The third has yet 
to reach commercial viability.
Between 2001 and 2007, world production of 
ethanol tripled from 18.5 billion litres to almost 
62 billion litres, while biodiesel rose from 1 billion 
litres to 10.2 billion litres. US corn-based ethanol 
production was 26.5 billion litres in 2007, followed 
by Brazil at 19 billion litres of ethanol from sugar cane 
and the EU at 2.2 billion litres. Biodiesel, the other 
major biofuel, is produced mainly in the EU, with  
6.1 billion litres of production in 2007, compared with 
1.6 billion litres in the US. 
By C Ford Runge, 
distinguished 
McKnight university 
professor of applied 
economics and 
law, University of 
Minnesota
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The member countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
have spent substantial sums subsidising the biofuels 
sector. This has encouraged an expansion that now 
consumes a growing share of feedgrains and oilseeds. In 
the US, biofuels were projected to consume more than  
25 per cent of maize harvests in 2007 and as much as 
50 per cent or more by 2015. In the EU, ethanol and 
biodiesel will increase oilseed, maize and wheat usage 
from negligible levels in 2004 to roughly 21, 17 and  
5 million tonnes respectively in 2016, according to  
the OECD.
Until oil prices began rising rapidly after 2004, 
biofuels would have been unprofitable without 
government support, which in 2006 totalled more 
than $11 billion in the OECD. The US led this list 
with $6 billion in annual support, followed by the 
EU with $4.8 billion. OECD biofuel supports have 
expanded since 2005, notwithstanding the rise in oil 
prices, which has enhanced biofuels’ competitiveness. 
Biofuels producers have paid higher and higher prices 
for feedstocks, illustrated by the record 2008 levels of 
maize, soybean and wheat prices.
Where biofuels are made from food and feed crops, 
as in the US and EU, these trends have given rise to 
criticisms over three main issues: the impacts of food price 
increases on food insecurity in poor households, economic 
distortions and unintended consequences of OECD 
subsidies, and environmental and ecological impacts on 
land, air, water and global greenhouse gas emissions.
The rapid increase in grain and oilseed prices 
due to biofuels expansion was a shock to food prices 
worldwide. From 2005 to January 2008, the global price 
of wheat increased 130 per cent, corn (maize) by  
193 per cent, rice by 190 per cent, sugar by 118 per 
cent and oilseeds by 197 per cent. In 2006–07, this rate 
of increase accelerated, according to the US Department 
of Agriculture (USDA), because of continued demand 
for biofuels and drought in major producing countries. 
In poor countries, these price increases directly 
threatened disposable income and food security and led 
to riots in Indonesia, Mexico and elsewhere.
Corn-based ethanol has also turned out to be a high-
cost path to energy security. It consumes fossil fuels in 
its production, processing and distribution, so its net 
oil replacement value is only about 30 per cent. In the 
US, flexible fuel vehicles are exempt from fuel mileage 
standards in order to encourage the use of E85 (85 per 
cent ethanol fuel), which has probably resulted in a net 
increase of 4 billion litres per year in gasoline use; but 
E85, with its lower energy content, drives vehicles fewer 
kilometres. Ethanol is thus actually replacing only about 
one tenth of the gasoline implied in the fuel mandates.
The most salient criticisms of food and feed crop-based biofuels are their local, national and global 
environmental impacts. Growing corn to produce 
ethanol, according to the US National Academy of 
Sciences, consumes 200 times more water than that 
The growth of 
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used to process corn into ethanol, which uses  
4 litres of water per litre of ethanol, compared to 
1.5 litres of water per litre of gasoline. In the upper 
midwest US, maize plantings rose 15 per cent in 2007, 
in response to ethanol demands and required extensive 
fertilisation, adding nitrogen and phosphorus run-off 
into the lakes and streams that enter the Mississippi 
and the Gulf of Mexico – enlarging the hypoxic ‘Dead 
Zone’. In 2007, scientists predicted that the Dead Zone 
would expand in 2007–08 to 22,127 square kilometres 
– 25 per cent higher than the year before and the largest 
since measurements began in 1985.
At the global level, recent studies have noted carbon loadings and greenhouse gas emissions due to land-
use shifts from biofuels. Land converted from rainforests, 
peatland, savannas or grasslands will immediately incur 
a carbon debt. For maize-based ethanol, it takes 93 years 
to repay this debt through reduced emissions (48 years 
if grown on abandoned cropland); for soybean biodiesel 
from a rainforest, it is 319 years; for palm oil biodiesel 
it is 423 years if grown on peatland rainforest. Given 
the urgent need to confront global warming, this long 
payback to biofuels is disappointing.
Finally, heavy applications of nitrogen are needed to 
grow expanded feedstocks of maize and rapeseed for 
biofuels. This releases nitrous oxide into the atmosphere, 
a greenhouse gas 296 times more damaging than carbon 
dioxide, which contributes more to global warming than 
biofuels save through fossil fuel reductions. This makes 
biofuels net greenhouse gas negative. These results do 
not even include the fossil fuels used on farms or for 
fertiliser and pesticide production.
Brazil’s biofuels industry is almost entirely based 
on mode two, the conversion of sugar to ethanol, a 
process considerably less expensive than maize-ethanol 
conversion. The Brazilian government has supported 
the industry through tax reductions at both the federal 
and state levels. Brazil has largely succeeded in pivoting 
between use of cane for sugar production and for 
ethanol, and in regulating the blending of ethanol 
and gasoline, integrating its use with the redesign of 
Brazilian vehicle engines. It has also mandated a  
2 per cent blend of biodiesel and petroleum diesel from 
2008 and a 5 per cent blend by 2013. Finally, it applies 
an import tariff of 20 per cent on imported ethanol. 
Because sugar is not a staple food crop, Brazil has 
avoided many of the distortions and untoward effects of 
biofuels policies in the US and EU. Brazil reports ample 
water supplies for its ethanol industry and enough land 
to allow continued expansion of cane in areas that are 
not tropical rainforest.
In the face of criticism of food and feed-based biofuels, many argue that mode three, cellulosic ethanol 
and biodiesel made from non-food crops, is the future. 
However, despite laboratory and pilot projects, no 
commercially viable production has emerged, and none 
is likely to before 2012. The US budget for research and 
development on cellulosic biofuels was $800 million in 
2008, more than eight times that of any other country. 
The technical challenge is to find low-cost methods to 
break down lignans in cellulose so they can be converted 
to ethanol. It will also be necessary to locate plants 
where the advantages of growing feedstocks such as 
switchgrass are not overwhelmed by the commercial 
attraction of food or feed crops such as maize. 
Thus, biofuels made from food and feed crops, such as 
maize and soybeans, face major challenges on economic, 
technical and policy grounds. Sugar-based ethanol 
production, led by Brazil, appears both more economical 
and less disruptive to world markets and the environment. 
Cellulosic biofuels are still in an incipient phase, and have 
yet to prove commercially viable. ◆
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Meeting the challenge  
of social inclusion 
Collective responsibility must be the way forward in challenging long-term social 
exclusion. Economic booms alone will not suffice 
On the agenda
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In their efforts to reach the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and other social development targets, most developing countries face the following dilemma: given the need for sustainable long-term growth and the cyclicality of export earnings, which type of uncertainty should be imposed on the future level of social spending, bearing in mind the political 
and developmental cost of protracted social under-
spending? On the one hand, predetermined levels of 
socially oriented budgetary expenditures – not linked 
to actual levels of export revenues – may force painful 
trade-offs within the social budget and competition 
with priorities in other sectors if revenues turn out to 
be significantly lower than anticipated. On the other 
hand, pro-cyclical social spending may, in years of 
export bust, expose vulnerable groups to unacceptable 
cut-backs in the provision of health services, sanitation 
or clean water with irremediably dire consequences for 
their very survival.
It is often argued that this dilemma can be tackled 
to a degree if developing countries, most of which 
are primary commodity exporters, use periods of 
export boom to fund unusually high social spending 
programmes that will tide them over through the lean 
years until the next boom. To this end, most social 
infrastructure would be built during the boom years 
and governments would purchase goods and services 
targeted at the social sector in advance for delivery 
over several years. An alternative method is to set up 
a social fund financed by part of the windfall revenues 
of the export boom. But in practice, using commodity 
booms to fund the social sector is difficult. Given that 
the intensity and duration of future export commodity 
booms are impossible to predict, it is unsustainable 
to base the social dimension of a country’s long-term 
development strategy on them. At best, one can debate 
the proper allocation of proceeds from ongoing booms, 
at the risk of overestimating their duration – as is 
evidenced by countless unfinished infrastructural 
projects for which the money ran out before they  
were completed.
If export commodity booms are to help achieve 
social inclusion and pursue long-term development, the 
challenge of social inclusion must, if possible, be met 
by several means. One such means, on the expenditure 
side, is the devolution of part of the management of 
the social sector to the private sector through fiscal and 
other incentives, to make use of its higher efficiency 
wherever this exists. In addition to efficiency, selectivity 
can also help reduce the cost of social inclusion through 
better targeting of needy groups by local governments 
and grass-roots organisations that are often more in 
tune with the seasonal, cultural and demographic 
peculiarities of social spending, and more adept at 
establishing acceptable location-specific, burden-sharing 
formulas. With respect to revenues, developing countries 
could take advantage of the new spirit instilled by the 
Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness to design new 
mechanisms aimed at making aid more counter-cyclical 
than it is currently, without prejudice to the volume and 
predictability of aid. 
In the context of sustainable long-term development, 
proceeds from commodity booms, being irregular 
and fairly volatile in most developing economies, 
By???????????????????????
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should not fund social programmes directly because 
such programmes require continuity and consistent 
levels over time to be effective. Since social inclusion 
policies require significant and regular funding to be 
successful, they must, to a large extent, be shielded from 
competition with other budgetary appropriations and 
the vagaries of the performance of the external sector. 
In this respect, reforming measures in the international 
financial architecture could play a vital role, along 
with developing countries’ own efforts at home. In 
the spirit of the MDGs, which are supported globally, 
the following two measures could be considered steps 
toward globalised responsibility for social inclusion. 
They are particularly relevant to Africa.
Indebted developing countries face the challenge of 
fixed external debt service obligations over very long 
maturities, while their export earnings are characterised 
by uncertainty that increases exponentially over time. 
As a result, they face debt service difficulties and often 
sacrifice spending on priority sectors, including the 
social sector, to avoid default. As a measure of relief, 
all or part of their fixed external debt service payments 
could be replaced by debt service payments that are 
contingent on their export performance. Under this 
arrangement, they would be allowed to pay less than 
the contractual debt service amount during lean 
export years but commit to fund the social sector fully. 
The unpaid portion of the contractual debt service 
could be capitalised, subsidised from a global fund 
or postponed without interest. During export boom 
years, they could pay off their accumulated arrears or 
even buy back their own debt, thus reducing future 
competition between debt service and social spending. 
The potential for moral hazard that could arise from 
this risk-shifting mechanism could be controlled by 
limiting the maximum level of external indebtedness 
of participating countries.
The second solution is a United Nations (UN) 
development aid pool. For the international 
community to assume its global responsibility for 
social inclusion, the unpredictability, excessive 
conditionality, disorganisation and insufficiency of 
official development assistance must be remedied by 
entrusting management of aid to the governance of 
the UN and funding it through pools that support 
development priorities. This collective responsibility 
would promote new thinking and expand finance for 
development from traditional donors to private sector, 
civil society and ‘South-South’ solidarity. In addition 
to voluntary contributions, donor-backed bonds and 
a number of international levies could fund the pools, 
which would be managed by an aid council with broad 
representation. The pools would seek to supplement 
the development efforts of developing countries. In 
keeping with the UN’s mandate to pursue the MDGs, 
these pools would place special emphasis on financing 
social inclusion in the form of grants. ◆
 Reforming measures 
in the international financial 
architecture could play a 
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What is RWSSI?
• ADB's initiative to contribute to the achievement of the MDGs for water and sanitation
• 270 million additional people having improved water supply by 2015 • 300 million additional people having adequate sanitation by 2015
How are the Paris Declaration Principles implemented in RWSSI?
• Assists through Government led national RWSS programmes and SWAps  •  Uses country systems •
• Coordination and shared framework among donors  • Using monitorable indicators and is focused on results •
• Promotes transparency and shared accountability for results 
Country RWSSI Programmes
• Program Approach: increasing number of countries moving from project to programme approach 
and majority of programmes based upon sector wide approaches
• Procurement: use of national country procurement systems is slowly gaining ground
• Implementation: use of national implementation arrangements on the increase; 
common monitoring systems and joint annual sector reviews being applied
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African Development Bank Group
Application of the Paris Principles
The Rural Water Supply
and Sanitation Initiative
RWSSI
African Development Bank
13 Avenue du Ghana, BP 323 – 1002 Tunis Belvédère (Tunisia)
Tel: +216 71 333 511 • Fax: +216 71 351 933 • E-mail: afdb@afdb.org • www.afdb.org
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productive capacity building in developing countries.
A prolonged freeze in the Doha talks, on the other 
hand, would likely enhance the importance of regional 
and bilateral trade negotiations. The inherent risk is 
considerable. Relegating the WTO to a position as the 
T he breakdown of the July 2008 ministerial talks of the World Trade Organization (WTO) was the latest in a series of failed attempts to agree on modalities for negotiations on agricultural and non-agricultural market access. The failure has led to concerns about the demise of the 
entire Doha round. Anxiety has been amplified by the 
looming threat of recession in developed economies 
brought on by turmoil in financial markets and the 
high price of energy and commodities.
While these events bring increasingly diverse 
challenges to the development agenda, the multilateral 
system is still the best platform for remedying long-
standing trade problems and delivering development 
opportunities to the bottom billion. Reducing 
distortions in agricultural trade is crucial for providing 
greater and more secure market access for developing 
countries’ exports, thereby creating the conditions 
needed to promote development, poverty reduction and 
the achievement of the Millennium Development  
Goals (MDGs).
The July ministerial actually achieved significant 
convergence on a number of issues. Since then, WTO 
member countries have expressed their desire to 
resume the talks and conclude the round sooner rather 
than later. In the meantime, it should be possible 
to pursue some of the development deliverables on 
which sufficient consensus was reached. These include 
duty-free, quota-free treatment for the least developed 
countries (LDCs), addressing the development 
dimension of the cotton issue, aid for trade, the 
Enhanced Integrated Framework and support for 
The Doha 
round: food 
crisis on the 
agenda
The global food crisis must be addressed with 
a broad, long-term strategy, underpinned by 
agreements on trade and development policy 
By Supachai 
Panitchpakdi, 
secretary general, 
United Nations 
Conference on Trade 
and Development
 The multilateral 
system is the best platform 
for delivering development 
opportunities to the  
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Moving forward on the development deliverables 
in the WTO is inextricably linked to capacity 
building in agriculture. Investment, innovation and 
the resulting growth in productivity are needed to 
create a sustainable framework for global agricultural 
production and trade. Without productive capacity 
building, the food crisis is likely to recur in one form 
or another – in part because the agricultural sector in 
many developing countries was more productive several 
decades ago than it is today. The annual yield growth 
of cereal crops in many LDCs has shrunk from 3–6 per 
cent in the 1980s to just 1–2 per cent today.
The problem arises in part from the dynamics of 
international trade. Until recently, the availability 
of inexpensive food products in international 
markets, often due to export subsidies in developed 
countries, had caused rapidly increasing food imports 
in developing countries. With domestic farming 
unable to compete with subsidised imports, the 
administrator of increasingly marginal trade rules and 
a dispute settlement mechanism would disappoint 
the development aspirations of many of its members. 
Both the risk and the disappointment are compounded 
by the global interconnectedness of the food, energy 
and financial crises, and the lack of consensus among 
major trading nations on the correct policy response. 
But addressing the global food crisis should not 
deflect attention from the profound failure of trade 
and development policy that underlies the crisis. Calls 
for a co-ordinated global response to speculation in 
food prices are a short-term measure and must be 
accompanied by a broader strategy for the long term.
Regardless of the root causes of the current 
problems, the Doha round was explicitly labelled a 
‘development round’. Even if there is a shift toward 
regional and bilateral trade regimes, it is essential that 
the development dimension remains at the top of  
the agenda.
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agricultural sector shrunk. The current crisis erupted 
when this trend coincided with the rapid economic 
development of numerous large developing countries 
during the past five years. The demand for food 
has risen dramatically, while supply and productive 
capacities have lagged behind. The food crisis has been 
exacerbated by recent droughts, depreciation of the US 
dollar, high energy prices and the increased use of food 
crops for biofuels.
Climate change and the rapid rise in fuel prices are 
frequently discussed in conjunction with agricultural 
policy issues. Reforestation policies aimed at mitigating 
the consequences of climate change are reducing the 
stock of arable land and curtailing food supply. Biofuel 
production has often been cited as a major determinant 
of the current food crisis. While a discussion among 
development stakeholders is necessary, prejudging 
the effects of biofuels should be avoided. It is true 
that, in some cases, increased biofuel production has 
been a driver of food price inflation. But long-term 
factors and inadequate policy responses are probably 
far more responsible for the current crisis. In addition, 
speculation may help explain why a food price index 
compiled by UNCTAD showed a sharp increase of  
84 per cent between April 2007 and April 2008, when a 
much more gradual increase might otherwise have  
been expected.
Another contributing factor to the food crisis is 
donors’ new emphasis on social sector and emergency 
aid. This focus has meant less investment in productive 
sectors such as agriculture. Between 1980 and 2002, 
multilateral institutions slashed official development 
assistance (ODA) on agriculture from $3.4 billion to 
$500 million – an 85 per cent decline. Bilateral donors 
reduced spending by 39 per cent, from $2.8 billion 
to $1.7 billion. Most crucially, donors appear to have 
neglected aid for science, technology and innovation in 
agriculture. While emergency aid measures can address 
the most urgent needs, the food crisis in the longer run 
must be addressed at the national and international 
policy level in order to boost sustainable investment.
An agreement on agriculture in the Doha round 
that would remove distortions in trade in agricultural 
goods is fundamental to the development dimension 
of the multilateral trading system. At the same time, 
developing countries must create the right incentives 
for investment in agriculture, including national trade 
policies that promote agricultural production and 
eliminate tariffs on agricultural inputs. The international 
community should support such efforts through 
increased ODA and investment in infrastructure and 
agricultural research and development. ◆
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With the current challenges in the international economy and financial markets, with the continuing scourge of global poverty and with new problems of 
global energy, environmental and health security 
looming large, the world needs effective global 
institutions. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
and the World Bank have served the global community 
well over the last 60 years, but their governance needs 
to change significantly if they are to remain effective 
in the new world in which they now function.
One of the ironies of the moment is that the IMF, 
the supposed bastion of conservative financial policies, 
is the bow-of-the-boat in the effort to bring about 
international governance reform. The World Bank and 
the United Nations are following far behind in the 
IMF’s wake. But despite the laudable effort to reform 
the IMF, the net results are likely to fall far short of 
what is required to put it back on the map as a truly 
global institution and as the principal focal point for 
the management of the global financial system. The 
core issue is whether the IMF can transform itself from 
what in effect has been a trans-Atlantic institution into 
a genuinely global one in which other countries and, in 
particular, the large emerging market economies, have 
a greater role and responsibility, and in which China 
especially has incentives to engage fully as a leading 
member. Very similar challenges face the World Bank.
Ralph Bryant of the Brookings Institution has 
demonstrated through careful simulations that the 
proposed and ultimately approved reform of voting 
quotas and shares of the IMF would fall woefully short 
of significant reform, shifting at most only 2.7 per 
cent of voting shares from developed to developing 
economies. This shift is insufficient to convince the new 
economic powers that the IMF is an institution where 
they have weight and stakes of sufficient consequence 
to warrant their serious engagement.
Europeans and Americans, dominant in most 
domains of the IMF, are unwilling to make room for the 
important new players in the global economy. That is 
short sighted and not in their own interest. They need 
to choose whether they wish to remain dominant in a 
trans-Atlantic institution that is increasingly ineffective 
and irrelevant or whether they will make real reforms 
to IMF governance that, while lessening their formal 
influence, would transform the IMF into a real and 
effective global financial institution.
Based on discussions organised by the Brookings 
Institution and the Centre for International Governance 
Innovation, it is clear that the reform process can be 
intensified in the IMF by increasing the number of arenas 
for action that would complement the quota reform 
under way. This would enhance and enlarge its impact 
by creating synergies among various reform measures. 
The following list of potential IMF reforms can serve as 
a menu for member governments to select from, in order 
to widen the scope and scale of change in governance of 
the IMF.
First, the next US administration and key governments 
in Europe need to strike a grand bargain on reforming 
the selection process for the leadership of both the IMF 
and the World Bank. The United States should renounce 
its prerogative to name the president of the World Bank 
and the Europeans should renounce their prerogative to 
appoint the head of the IMF. The pathways for doing this 
have been laid out in working papers prepared jointly 
by executive directors of both institutions. Experts and 
Time to modernise 
the global financial 
institutions 
Can the World Bank and IMF transform themselves into genuinely global institutions? 
It is now up to them to lead the charge on global governance reform  
By Colin I Bradford, 
Jr, senior fellow, 
Global Economy and 
Development and 
Johannes F Linn, 
executive director, 
Wolfensohn Center 
for Development, 
Brookings Institution
 The IMF is in  
the bow-of-the-boat in 
the effort to bring about 
governance reform 
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advocates of reform agree that leadership selection reform 
is a sine qua non for reform of these international financial 
institutions. What is required now is political action at the 
highest levels by the US and Europe.
Second, several observers, including an under  
secretary of the US Treasury in the current 
administration, have recommended that the size of 
the board of executive directors of the IMF be reduced 
gradually from the current 24 seats to 20 seats to 
ensure more effective decision making. The burden and 
opportunity of this reform pivots around Europe, which 
holds eight of the current 24 seats on the IMF board. 
Reducing the number of European seats would not only 
allow for more efficient decision making, but would 
also visibly rebalance the board toward a greater share 
of chairs for developing countries. It thus complements 
the reforms of voting shares. At the same time, 
Europeans could act more effectively in representing 
their common interests by speaking with one voice and 
voting as one.
Third, the US currently has a veto since important 
decisions require a super-majority of 85 per cent of the 
membership votes and the US voting share is currently 
17 per cent. Europe, if it were to act together, would 
hold around one third of votes, which means that 
Europe would also hold an effective veto if it votes 
as a block. The US and Europe should thus renounce 
their use of vetoes in board decisions. Is the IMF truly 
a multilateral institution or not? Europe and the US 
need to recognise that keeping exceptional blocking 
rights for themselves undermines the credibility and 
legitimacy of the IMF in the eyes of key players in the 
global financial system.
Fourth, the IMF should begin to employ selectively 
‘double majority’ voting for some strategic and major 
policy decisions that affect the direction and the nature 
of the institution. This would assure that the full 
membership, irrespective of weight, would have voice 
and influence on significant decisions. This option was 
supported by the current managing director of the IMF, 
Dominique Strauss-Kahn, in his statement to the IMF 
Board on 20 September 2007.
Fifth, the IMF’s International Monetary and Finance 
Committee, which is currently an advisory committee of 
ministers of finance that meets twice a year, needs to be 
transformed into a decision-making council that would 
provide direct and specific guidance to the board of 
executive directors on strategic issues.
???????????????????
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Sixth, the IMF managing director should report to the 
board of executive directors and not chair it, as he currently 
does. There is an inherent conflict of interest between 
chairing the board and being accountable to it. This conflict 
needs to be removed so that member governments take 
more responsibility for board actions and the managing 
director is more clearly accountable to it.
These six reforms are synergistic with the already 
concluded voting quota reform. They amplify its impact 
by opening the IMF more to the rest of the world and 
especially to the large emerging market economies. 
The same synergies apply in the World Bank. Here, 
discussion of the reform of the voting structure is also 
beginning and many similar complementary reforms 
need to be pursued. Two key considerations are 
important: first, the traditional parallelism of voting 
shares between the IMF and the World Bank no longer 
makes sense, if it ever did. Second, it will be essential 
not to short circuit the reform process by rushing to a 
conclusion at the annual IMF-World Bank meetings in 
October 2008. This would very likely lead to minimal 
reforms that fall far short of what is needed to ensure 
that the World Bank remains a respected and effective 
development finance institution.
Global governance reform is urgent. The current 
global political and economic turmoil provides an 
opportunity to push forward. The IMF and World Bank 
can lead the reform process if the Europeans and the 
US recognise that it is in their interest to broaden the 
base and enhance the legitimacy of these institutions. 
The next 12 months will tell whether the new US 
administration is willing to meet this challenge and 
opportunity. If it does, others will follow. ◆
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The collapse of the World Trade Organization’s (WTO) Doha round of trade talks in July 2008 did not damage trade or development directly. But it does make them more risky and more complicated. It had been clear at least since the narrowing of the agenda at the Cancún ministerial meeting in 
2003 that this would not be a major innovative round. 
The previous Uruguay round brought agriculture and 
apparel into the trading system, introduced predictable 
enforcement of the rules and, in fact, created the WTO 
to replace the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. 
A successful Doha agreement would have done little 
more than guarantee that countries could not go back 
on their current trade policies. Developing countries 
would have had to reduce the difference between the 
tariff maxima that they notify to the WTO and the 
(much lower) tariffs that they actually apply. Developed 
countries would have had to reduce the difference 
between the subsidies they are allowed to make to 
agriculture and what they are currently paying; to bind 
themselves internationally not to go back on national 
commitments to remove export subsidies; and to reduce 
barriers to imports from least developed countries 
(LDCs). All countries would have had to limit their 
flexibility to alter current rules on trade in services.
Trade and the WTO itself will continue in the 
absence of an agreement, but face increased fears of 
trade protection. Countries were not willing to make 
these very limited commitments. The largest developed 
country and the largest developing country caused 
World trade: 
down, but not out 
Trade and development face an increased threat of trade protection in the wake  
of the failure of the Doha round. What are the prospects now for successful  
trade negotiations? 
By Sheila Page, 
senior research 
associate, Overseas 
Development 
Institute
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the failure by disagreeing over how countries could 
respond to low food prices and a surplus of cheap 
exports at a time of record highs in prices and concern 
over shortages. This suggests that the risks are real. 
There were no expectations of major liberalisation in 
this round, so there should be little real disappointment 
and resentment, and therefore little chance of 
protection as retaliation. There are still national 
interests resisting protection, but they will no longer 
be helped by a reluctance to impose new restrictions 
in the middle of negotiations. Particularly in a global 
recession, countries may use any flexibility they have to 
raise tariffs or subsidies, or to take targeted action such 
as anti-dumping investigations. Exporters and investors 
will face more uncertainties.
Disputes using the WTO legal processes could rise 
for similar reasons, but this is less likely. Disputes had 
already increased; the talks did not constrain them. 
On both sugar and cotton, developing countries used 
disputes and negotiations in parallel.
Bilateral and regional agreements will not be a 
substitute for a WTO round, but neither are they 
likely to obstruct a resumption of multilateral 
negotiations. Countries will certainly try to reach 
agreements in more limited negotiations, with fewer 
participants, but these have not succeeded in the past 
among major countries. To reach significant results, 
the negotiations have to include precisely the same 
significant countries between which an agreement 
was not possible in the WTO. Some depend on WTO 
agreements: for example, the negotiators for a new 
food aid convention were explicitly waiting for a 
new WTO agreement, and the European Union’s 
negotiations with South America assumed that the 
WTO would remove agricultural subsidies.
 Trade and the  
WTO itself will continue  
in the absence of a  
Doha agreement 
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The effects of such restricted agreements are more complex and usually less beneficial than 
from multilateral agreements. The potential for gain 
is smaller because the scope is smaller. There are 
potentially damaging effects both from trade diversion 
and from increasing the costs of trading.
Liberalising to only some trading partners means 
discriminating against the rest, thus diverting trade, so 
trade and production with those will be less efficient 
than before. Different arrangements with different 
trading partners impose additional costs of information 
and administration on traders as well as officials. They 
increase the costs of production: to contain the benefits 
of any regional or bilateral agreement, countries must 
ensure that goods traded are really from the designated 
trading partner and do not contain ‘too much’ material 
from other countries. In a globalised economy, the 
likelihood that any production chain will include inputs 
from more than one country increases the costs of 
restricting the sources of inputs (that is, rules of origin). 
Development can also continue. It depends principally 
on national policies, on public and private sectors that 
can plan and implement technological innovation, 
high and changing investment, and major changes in 
economic and political structures. No trade settlement 
can replace national policies. Trade is not sufficient on 
its own to drive development.
T rade and good international policy can, however, provide additional stimuli or inputs. The potential 
development benefits of a successful Doha round 
were more complex than the rhetoric of a so-called 
development agenda implied, but were important. 
There were some direct conflicts of interest between 
those who wanted to retain special preferences for 
particular products such as sugar, bananas and apparel 
and those who do not have these preferences – 
between efficient agricultural producers and inefficient 
producers who want to protect their farmers. There 
were more issues that were priorities for some, but 
irrelevant to others, including some aspects of services 
and trade rules. But the same elements that would have 
Trade is not 
sufficient on its 
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been good for trade would have been good for most 
developing countries: reduced risk, fewer distortions  
in agriculture and encouragement to liberalise, not  
to protect.
The failure of the Doha round does not prove that WTO trade negotiations cannot work or that they 
cannot benefit developing countries. It was always 
at high risk of failure. It did not start because any 
countries had strong demands for reform, so it never 
had strong political or private sector support. The 
ministerial meetings were held simply because they 
were scheduled; the first Doha meeting, at the end of 
2001, had to show international unity in the face of 
September 11. If there had been a strong desire for the 
negotiations to succeed on the part of any countries 
involved in the 2008 breakdown, the issues could have 
been resolved.
Developing countries substantially increased 
their ability to participate in the negotiations and in 
the WTO system during the round. They achieved 
some remarkable successes in the negotiations: the 
extension of the exemptions from patent rules to 
allow countries without pharmaceutical companies 
to import medicines for serious medical needs from 
other countries; the linking of new obligations 
explicitly to the provision of technical assistance in the 
proposals for trade facilitation; the adoption of special 
modalities for LDCs in services and the provisional 
agreements on duty-free/quota-free access; flexibility 
in investment rules; and aid for trade to help them 
implement and use agreements effectively. Developing 
countries used the dispute settlement mechanism to 
force change in developed country policies on cotton, 
sugar and services. That they found compromises on 
conflicting interests shows that they are better able 
to identify economic interests and more effective in 
promoting them.
Existing WTO commitments, enforced by the disputes mechanism, limit backsliding. 
Particularly in a period of recession, it would have 
been better to have strengthened these commitments, 
but the recession made a successful negotiation less 
likely. A more risky trade environment is particularly 
damaging for weak countries which are vulnerable 
to others’ trade measures, and for countries hoping 
to move into new markets or to sell new exports. 
Trade and development will be more affected by the 
recession than if the Doha round had been successful. 
But when the recession is over, the restrictions 
imposed during it, the failures in regional negotiations 
and the accumulating dispute settlements will make 
the incentives for reform – and therefore the prospects 
for a successful trade negotiation – much greater than 
they were in 2001. ◆
A more 
risky trade 
environment is 
damaging for 
weak countries
???????????????????
?????????????????????
?????????????????????
????????
Tomorrow’s 
   Filling Station 
?? ????????????????????????????????????????
??? ?????????????????????????????
??????????? ??????????????????????????
?????????????????
??????????????????? ????????????????
???????????????????? ???????????????
????? ??????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????
????????? ?????????????????? ??????????
???????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????
???????????????? ??????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????
?????????
??????????????????? ??????????????
????????????
?????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????
??????????????????
????????????
???? ????????????????
Turning Ideas into Reality.
MAN Ferrostaal
Project development   Project management   Integration of partners   Integration of systems
On the agenda
98 ??? ?????????????????? ?????????????
E very day across the globe, 5,000 children under five die from diseases spread by dirty water and inadequate sanitation. Each morning, more than a billion people wake up without clean water to drink. Billions lack the dignity and safety of a proper toilet facility.
These numbers indicate an emerging global risk. 
The scarcity of clean water and sanitation poses a risk 
to our ecosystems, economic growth and security. 
Water shortages threaten the food supply, just when the 
agricultural sector is stepping up production in response 
to riots over food prices, growing hunger and rising 
malnutrition. Unless the world acts, water could become 
the next global crisis, emerging from the shadow of 
climate change and the recent food and fuel crises.
There is an opportunity to act now. Public authorities 
and private companies around the world see strong 
incentives to collaborate to ensure clean water and 
sanitation. Companies, recognising the business risks 
of water shortages, are making water strategies an 
integral part of their risk management. They are asking 
governments how they can be part of the solution. 
Governments no longer ask whether the private sector 
should be involved in water. Instead, the question is: how 
can we work together for fair and practical solutions?
The new mindset provides a significant opportunity 
for private capital and innovative companies, especially 
in poorer countries that are the future sources of global 
economic growth. In emerging markets, governments 
alone cannot provide the estimated $180 billion needed 
to finance infrastructure projects in the next two decades 
or so. As a result, the expansion of projects focused 
on clean water and sanitation services will depend on 
public-private partnerships. The International Finance 
Corporation (IFC) is helping to foster a growing number 
of such partnerships by assisting with project design and 
developing innovative financing solutions.
Water is both a development opportunity and a business opportunity. In 2007, the number of 
public-private water projects that reached financial 
closure in low- and middle-income countries climbed 
to 62, reversing the previous year’s decline, according 
to World Bank Group data. Investment levels are still 
below the $10.1 billion peak reached in 1997 – in 
2007, the amount was $3.2 billion. But the climate 
for project finance is improving in the water sector. A 
growing number of governments are offering targeted 
subsidies and other viability-gap funding to attract 
private investors to such projects. Market incentives also 
are strong: stocks in the water sector have financially 
outperformed the global industrial average.
Water is at risk because people tend to overuse it. 
Water-efficiency practices are still limited in agriculture 
and industry, which represent 90 per cent of total 
freshwater use. Climate change is making water supplies 
more unpredictable, with serious consequences for 
agriculture. Demand is outpacing supply, and competing 
pressures from municipalities, agriculture and industry are 
Averting the 
next water crisis 
Public-private partnerships may be the 
way forward in bringing clean water to all. 
Governments alone cannot answer this challenge
By Lars H Thunell, 
executive vice-
president and 
CEO, International 
Finance Corporation
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raising complex questions about who gets water and how 
it can be used. The world’s population is expected to grow 
to 9 billion by 2050, more than 60 per cent of whom will 
live in mega cities. Because water consumption rises with 
development and improved lifestyles, the world can expect 
even greater demands on fresh water.
The scope for using water more efficiently is vast. In 
emerging markets, between 40 and 70 per cent of water 
distributed by city networks is lost to leakages and theft. 
Reduce the losses by 20 per cent in Jakarta, for example, 
and some 800,000 people can have reliable access to 
drinking water. In Uzbekistan, at least 30 per cent of water 
used in agriculture is wasted because of faulty irrigation.
Technology can play a big role in conservation. For 
example, efficient technologies support between  
55 and 90 per cent of the irrigated farmland in Cyprus, 
Israel and Jordan. By contrast, the use of efficient 
technologies for farming in India and China is less than  
1 per cent. Israel and several countries in Latin America, 
the Caribbean and Africa use treated wastewater for 
irrigation, a practice that should be adopted elsewhere.
IFC, the member of the World Bank Group that focuses on the private sector, is doing its part to avert 
a crisis. It is working with the private sector while other 
entities of the World Bank focus on policy issues and 
the public sector. The goal is to develop a pipeline of 
bankable projects in poor countries and regions that 
are well structured and attractive to private capital. IFC 
has launched a $100 million fund to provide risk capital 
for early-stage development of infrastructure projects 
in the poorest countries, mostly in sub-Saharan Africa. 
It is also working with public and private partners to 
introduce innovative performance-based grants that 
?????????????????????
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address market failures and bring services to people 
who otherwise would have no access.
Manila Water in the Philippines is one example of what 
can be accomplished. The government – relying upon 
IFC’s advisory services – privatised a state-owned water 
and sewage utility. The benefits to neighbourhoods have 
been significant. One million households in Manila now 
enjoy water connections and 98 per cent of them have a 
24-hour water supply. The new set-up has also resulted in 
a significant reduction in water losses, keeping the system 
sustainable for more customers in the future. IFC also 
provided financing to support Manila Water’s growth.
Companies that pursue opportunities in water 
conservation, efficiency and quality reduce costs and 
help the environment. In China, IFC is an equity 
investor in a company that provides turnkey wastewater-
treatment solutions to municipalities and industry. In 
India, it is financing Jain Irrigation, the country’s largest 
provider of micro-irrigation systems. Jain’s clients are 
increasing their water efficiency by as much as 95 per 
cent. The technology can be as simple as a gravity-drip 
system of a 20-litre bucket and irrigation tape designed 
for small-scale farmers.
The opportunities for governments and investors are 
limitless. Water will be a key challenge to well-being, 
economic growth and security over the coming decades, 
along with energy, climate change and food. It will 
require all stakeholders in water – public and private 
– to work together to balance competing demands on 
a finite resource to create opportunities for sustainable 
development. The moment is right. We can find 
solutions by working as partners – starting now. ◆
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Project financing, PPPs 
and the credit crunch
The credit crunch is affecting valuable private finance projects, as lenders’ appetite  
for funding diminishes 
The credit crunch is affecting project finance in infrastructure by bringing capital constraints, higher funding costs, tighter financial covenants, lower leverage, wider spreads and fewer banks in the sector, affecting the syndication risk and leading to more club deals.
Debt markets are constrained and the available 
funding is now at a much higher cost. Many of the 
infrastructure equity investors have been affected by the 
credit crunch, which is placing constraints on private 
By Geoff Haley, 
chair, International 
Project Finance 
Association
sector investments. These difficult circumstances have 
affected value for money and the affordability ceilings 
for the public sector. Initially, Standard & Poor’s stated 
that project financing had escaped the credit crunch 
and growth remained solid in most parts of the world. 
However, the collapse of Lehman Brothers has changed 
that, as Moody’s has affirmed.
Rating agencies are collecting information to 
determine the total extent of Lehman’s exposure as 
either a counterparty or credit provider and to assess 
the impact for rated entities. The obvious consequences 
are downgraded ratings. Bonds issued to pay for 
infrastructure projects built under the United Kingdom’s 
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Private Finance Initiative (PFI) – a form of Public 
Private Partnership (PPP) – have become decreasingly 
attractive to investors because of their lower credit 
ratings. Typically, PFI project bonds benefited from a top 
credit rating as high-rated insurers guaranteed returns 
to investors. Since the start of 2008, however, the bonds’ 
credit ratings have been lowered because of fears about 
the groups that insure them.
Rating agencies have cut insurers’ ratings, amid 
concerns about the financial stability of the monoline 
insurers, such as Ambac and MBIA, who guarantee 
bonds. This has had a knock-on effect on the ratings 
of the PFI bonds that they insure. As a result, bond 
financing for PFI projects has almost disappeared. 
Bank debt in PFI deals is almost 20 basis points  
(0.2 per cent) more expensive since the credit crunch 
hit. According to Ernst & Young, the increase is 
primarily due to banks reassessing their pricing to take 
account of an increase in funding costs.
The credit crunch has made its impact on the project 
finance market. Loan margins have increased 100 basis 
points over the London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) 
in 2008 for most deals, nearly doubling in many cases 
from a year ago.
Project finance lending is split between loan and 
bond finance. The loan markets continued to grow – up 
to $127.8 billion in 2008 from $103.7 billion in 2007 
– but the bond market has plummeted from $9 billion 
to $5.1 billion. Project finance lending activity in the 
first half of 2008 rose 18 per cent over the same period 
in 2007, driven by strong growth in the oil, gas and 
mining sectors. Investment in the power generation 
sector continues its strong growth.
In highly rated countries, debt margins and fees have 
increased from 80 basis points to as much as 150 basis 
points. Other terms, such as cover ratios, tenors and 
security packages have not changed significantly. In 
lower-rated countries, credit margins have widened  
along with underlying country risk premiums.
Borrowers in pre-crunch projects and businesses now 
face the awkward challenge of how forecasted demand 
levels compare with actual demand and how shortfalls 
affect debt covenants. Whether, and to what extent, 
reduced demand causes losses to investors and lenders, 
will depend on the robustness of the financial structures. 
This will be particularly challenging for those borrowers 
who raised short-term finance with a view to refinancing 
once the project had entered operations.
The liquidity constraints have reduced the appetite 
of lenders in infrastructure. Before the credit crunch, 
large banks would enter into sole-underwrite positions 
at a fixed price on large infrastructure deals. Now 
banks want one or more co-underwriters and require 
market flux (a right for lenders to increase interest 
rates) on pricing. Credit committees want much 
higher reassurance that they will be able to sell down 
debt through syndication markets to avoid holding 
significant debt on their balance sheets.
The present problems are seen as short-term 
financing issues that can be corrected when stability 
returns to the market. However, the long-term 
advantages of project finance remain.
The past decade has seen a dramatic expansion of project finance PPPs across the world. With 
ever-increasing populations, greater expectations, 
demands from society on existing infrastructure 
resources and ongoing budgetary constraints, 
governments face increasing pressure to deliver new 
and improved infrastructure projects for transport 
(roads, railways, toll bridges), education (schools 
and universities), healthcare (hospitals, clinics, 
treatment centres), waste management (collection, 
disposal, waste to energy plants), water (collection, 
treatment, distribution), government accommodation 
and defence.
In many countries, the financing requirements of 
the need for current and prospective infrastructure 
far outstrip the resources available. A recent report 
by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development indicated that in the coming decades the 
worldwide need for infrastructure investment (defined 
as public utilities such as telecommunication, power, 
transportation, water and sanitation) will exceed 
$1,800 billion per year. Meeting these needs is critical 
to continued progress, development and economic 
growth. Budgetary constraints and an acknowledgement 
of private sector efficiencies and know-how are two 
principal reasons why governments around the world 
are accelerating the use of private sector finance and 
adopting PPPs to deliver infrastructure projects that 
would previously have been built by the public sector. 
As stated in Going Global: the World of Public Private 
Partnerships, the report published by the Confederation 
of British Industry, PPPs offer value for money, service 
improvements and a better chance of delivering projects 
on time and to budget.
Research conducted by the British government (particularly the National Audit Office) confirms 
the largely positive impact of one such PPP/PFI. 
The key findings from HM Treasury’s research of 
61 projects reveal that 89 per cent of projects were 
delivered on time or early, and that all PFI projects 
in the sample were delivered within public sector 
 The liquidity 
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budgets. Nowhere was the unitary charge changed 
following contract signature, other than where user 
requirements changed. Furthermore, 77 per cent of 
public sector management stated their project met 
initial expectations. There is scope to reduce the 
procurement time, although new incentives to tackle 
this problem are already having an impact.
The PricewaterhouseCoopers report, Delivering the 
PPP Promise: A review of PPP issues and activity, found 
that PPPs make projects affordable, maximise the use 
of private sector skills, have the private sector take 
lifecycle cost risk and allocate risks to the party best able 
to manage or absorb each particular risk. In addition, 
PPPs deliver budgetary certainty, force the public sector 
to focus on outputs and benefits from the start, maintain 
the quality of service for the life of the PPP and let the 
public sector pay only when services are delivered. PPPs 
encourage the development of specialist skills, such as 
lifecycle costing, allow the injection of private sector 
capital and let transactions be put off balance.
A PPP is used only where it can demonstrate 
efficiency, equity, accountability and clear value for 
money. Under these conditions, a PPP delivers several 
important benefits. By requiring the private sector to 
risk its own capital, and to deliver clear and agreed 
levels of service to the public over the long term, PPP 
procurement routes can help government deliver high-
quality public services from essential infrastructure 
on time and on budget. In addition, unitary payments 
usually do not commence until after the infrastructure 
is commissioned and service delivery has begun. This 
arrangement provides a very effective incentive for the 
private sector partner to deliver promptly.
A PPP is likely to generate better value for money where:
there is a major and complex capital investment  l
involved, requiring effective management of risks 
associated with construction and delivery;
the private sector has the expertise to deliver and  l
offers value for money;
the structure of the service is appropriate. This  l
allows the public sector to define its needs as service 
outputs that can be contracted to ensure effective, 
equitable and accountable delivery of public services 
in the long term, and where risk allocation between 
public and private sectors can be clearly made and 
enforced;
the nature of the assets and services identified can be  l
costed on a whole-life, long-term basis;
the value of the project is sufficiently large to ensure  l
that procurement costs are not disproportionate;
the technology and other aspects of the sector are stable; l
planning horizons are long term, with assets  l
intended to be used over long periods; and where
robust incentives on the private sector to perform can  l
be set up and enforced by the public sector partner.
Particularly where private finance is involved, 
PPPs are subject to extensive technical, financial and 
legal due diligence prior to contracting by qualified 
and experienced advisers to the principal financial 
institutions and to the private sector partner. This 
work acts to establish more fully the whole-life costs 
and risks associated with ownership and operation 
of the asset and services than is typically undertaken 
for conventionally procured projects funded from the 
public purse. In the past, this has exposed conventional 
projects to the impact of unforeseen (and unmanaged) 
risks on project delivery timescales and budgets – costs 
that, in time, have to be met by the taxpayer.
The case for project finance and PPP is overwhelming 
and the current 97 countries using this approach are 
reaping the benefits. ◆
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O ne of the world’s leading economic powers, Germany has a strong interest in a stable and well-functioning international financial system. It has repeatedly played an important role in the reform of the international financial 
architecture, be it the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) and the World Bank or the founding of new 
financial institutions such as the Financial Stability 
Forum and the G20. Regardless of the party in power, 
Germany’s international financial policy has always 
followed three dictums: structurally, Germany 
emphasises multilateralism; institutionally, it aims 
to strengthen international organisations; and, 
with regard to the content of international financial 
policies, Germany always highlights the principles of 
a social market economy. Most recently, as president 
of the G8 in 2007, Germany placed the transparency 
of hedge funds at the top of the agenda of the G7 
finance ministers in order to reduce potential systemic 
and operational risks. It also promoted freedom of 
investment. The current financial crisis in the United 
States has once again exposed the vulnerabilities of 
the international financial system. Germany has thus 
redoubled its efforts to increase financial transparency 
and oversight.
Global economic problems need global solutions. 
Most challenges in key economic areas such as trade 
and investment rules, as well as climate change and 
energy, cannot be tackled without the co-operation 
of the big emerging economies. At the 2008 spring 
meeting of the IMF and the World Bank, Peer 
Steinbrück, Germany’s finance minister, welcomed the 
proposed IMF quota and voice reform as a crucial step 
in enhancing its credibility and legitimacy by aligning 
the representation of members with their relative weight 
in the global economy. Bridging the divide between the 
industrialised and developing countries has also been 
a German concern in the G8. As G8 chair, Germany 
launched the Heiligendamm Process, a two-year, 
structured dialogue between the member states of the 
G8 and the emerging economies of Brazil, China, India, 
Mexico and South Africa (the so-called Outreach Five 
Countries). As Caio Koch-Weser, state secretary in the 
Ministry of Finance, emphasised, building consensus 
among industrial and emerging market countries is 
necessary because of the rising economic weight of 
emerging markets as well as the diversity of their 
cultural, institutional and economic systems.
The G20 has offered such an informal forum 
for North-South dialogue since 1999. While the 
German government views the G20 as important in 
international financial and other matters, there is no 
consensus within the grand coalition of the Christian 
Democratic Union (CDU) and the Social Democratic 
Party (SPD) on the future role of the G20, a possible 
enlargement of the G8 or the establishment of a new 
group of leading economies, a leaders 20 (L20). Not 
much has thus changed since the last G20 summit 
in Germany in 2004, when Koch-Weser stated: “At 
one end of the spectrum there are those who would 
like to see the G20 as the essential pillar of future 
global governance, with more frequent meetings and a 
broadening toward a meeting of G20 heads of state and 
government. At the other end, some observers see it as 
not much more than an outreach event for the G7.”
The G20 was initiated under Germany’s G7 
presidency at the Cologne Summit on 18 June 1999 
as a new mechanism to broaden the dialogue on 
key economic and financial policy issues among 
systemically significant economies. The inaugural G20 
ministerial meeting took place in Berlin in December 
1999, hosted by Germany and co-chaired by Canada. 
The role of  
the G20
The G20 has offered a useful informal forum for 
dialogue but it is no substitute for a reformed G8 
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Germany and Canada took the lead in the newly formed institution, proving to be important 
agenda setters as they consecutively held the 
presidency. During Germany’s 2004 G20 presidency, 
one of the focal points was strengthening the 
Framework for Crisis Prevention and Resolution 
through establishing a voluntary code of conduct 
aimed at crisis prevention and facilitating an orderly 
resolution. One of the G20’s greatest advocates, Hans 
Eichel (SPD), former finance minister and a key actor, 
together with Canadian finance minister Paul Martin 
in the establishment of the G20, complimented the 
G20’s performance and stressed its significance in 
2004: “The G20 has proven itself.” And further, in 
2006: “It is not without reason that many observers 
accord the G20 an important role, for some, even 
the most important role in the future – in global 
governance.” He stressed: “If the G20 continues to 
develop along these lines and becomes even more 
effective, I think we could, in theory, expect to see a 
G20 comprising the heads of state and government 
set up at some time in the future.” SPD members have 
lauded the G20 for its significant contribution to 
improved global financial governance, claiming it has 
helped establish a common understanding of today’s 
financial and fiscal policy challenges and has initiated 
an ambitious agenda of policy response.
While the inclusion of the outreach countries 
in the G8 process is largely supported, the 
strengthening of the G20 at the expense of the G8 
or the institutionalisation of an L20 is met with 
scepticism among most German politicians. Thus, 
Steinbrück’s 2006 call for a radical transformation of 
the G8 did not get strong support, among his own 
party or within his own ministry. As Chancellor 
Angela Merkel stated in 2007: “The German G8 
presidency aims to develop procedures that will 
generate a common understanding on the part of 
the G8 states and the major emerging economies in 
terms of how to tackle the major global challenges 
of our times. The objective is not to enlarge the G8 
to make it a G13, but to build new co-operation 
with the emerging economies in the form of a 
topic-oriented dialogue.” Bernd Pfaffenbach, state 
secretary in the Ministry of Economics and Labour, 
and Chancellor Merkel’s sherpa for the G8 Summit, 
likewise emphasised: “It is all about integrating large 
emerging markets. Nobody should be left with the 
feeling of not being welcome in the international 
economic order. This concerns China, India, Brazil, 
Mexico and South Africa in particular. But don’t 
get me wrong: we do not want to enlarge our group 
to a G9 or G13. That is not our aim.” Likewise, in 
Freedom and Security: Principles for Germany, the 
CDU stated that it aims to aid India and China in 
becoming responsible members in the design of 
?????????????????
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the international order. The CDU underlined in its 
Asia strategy that a closer integration of the Asian 
emerging economies into global structures was 
necessary to turn them into responsible stakeholders 
of the international community. One way to achieve 
this was the Heiligendamm Process. While the 
position paper argued that “an alternative [to the 
outreach process] could lie within the political 
strengthening of the G20,” Merkel’s party does not 
view the G20 as a prospective substitute for the 
G8. Accordingly, it offers no proposals for how to 
formalise or strengthen the G20.
The G8’s legitimacy has long been questioned. Even if the G8 countries still hold the world’s top positions 
in economic terms, others are catching up quickly. “As 
the newly industrialising countries are not represented 
in the G7, the mandate of this group is restricted, 
especially in issues that concern developments of the 
international economic and financial system,” the 
German Ministry of Finance acknowledged in 2003. 
Indeed, a solution to these problems could be an 
enlarged G8, further institutionalisation of the G20 – or 
even an L20. The G20 has a comparatively high level 
of legitimacy. “The G20 brings the most important 
actors at one table: discussions about capital transfer 
liberalisation, financial stability, oil prices, exchange 
rates… can no longer be led without countries like 
China, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia or South Korea,” 
said Hans Eichel in 2004.
However, many critics, both SPD and CDU, rightly 
warn that a group as big as the G20 could hardly 
be expected to reach meaningful consensus or even 
agree on binding commitments. Although proponents 
argue that its decisional performance has never been 
any worse than that of the G8 in its initial stages, the 
unwanted consequence of upgrading the G20 could be 
at a standstill in the negotiations. Thus, while emerging 
economies would like to see their role in global 
governance strengthened according to their increased 
economic importance, they are often not willing to 
become involved at any price. G20 proponents counter 
this argument by predicting that emerging economies 
would eventually accept more responsibility, if they 
were provided with the appropriate governance 
framework. The G20’s future decisional abilities thus 
remain uncertain, especially if its competencies are 
increased to those of the G8, or if the G8 will cease to 
coexist as a partner for assimilating positions. It might 
very well be that the G20 will only be successful as long 
as it stays an informal and open forum, contributing to 
the G8 summits, argue sceptics.
In the long run, the G8 will have to adapt to 
the new international power structure by granting 
leading developing countries a stronger voice 
and seat at the table of the G8 (or future L20?) 
permanently – particularly as the outreach countries 
are rather disillusioned with the process. But 
consensus on the future of the G8 and the G20 has 
yet to emerge in Germany. ◆
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Russia: a major player 
The current economic climate gives momentum to the G20 and Russia has a prominent 
role to play in realising its potential 
T he primary reason for the first G20 gathering in 1999 was to counter the major financial crisis that severely hit the Asian economies in 1997 and then, over the next year, spread to Latin America and Russia. Other reasons were the further decline in the relative economic power 
of the G7 countries and a growing awareness that 
the ‘geriatric powers’ could no longer set the global 
economic rules alone. The current G20 holds 65 per 
cent of the global foreign reserves, with the non-G7 
members holding 43 per cent – a figure that has risen 
from 14 per cent in 1991.
Although Russia was part of the G20 from the start, 
it was not very enthusiastic in the beginning. At that 
time, Russia was concentrating mostly on gaining 
a more prominent place within the G7/8, including 
By Victoria V 
Panova, Moscow 
State Institute 
of International 
Relations
participating at the G7 finance ministers’ meetings and 
pushing to become a member of financial and trade 
organisations that were not club-like, notably the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) and the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).
Russia’s relatively reduced attention given to the G20 
was rather short-sighted, for Russia has been a full-
fledged, equal member from the very start of the group, 
with no reservations regarding its status. The G20 also 
provides a representative forum for open discussion 
among most of the major economic players, without 
Russia being put in a defensive position or threatened 
with ostracism at times of discontent, as occasionally 
happens in the G8.
With the worsening relationship between Russia 
and the West and the further strengthening of Russia’s 
political, military and economic role in the international 
arena, Russia has recognised that the G20 plays a 
bigger role  – and specifically the BRIC grouping of 
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Brazil, Russia, India and China within it – as opposed 
to Russia’s previous focus on Western-dominated 
institutions and mechanisms. One case of such 
behaviour was Russia’s total support for the Outreach 
Five – the other BRICs plus South Africa and Mexico 
– on the quota reform at the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF).
Pressuring Russia seems to have placed it in the 
BRIC camp, rather than with the G8, or in fact in both. 
Thus, following the G8 St Petersburg Summit in 2006, 
hosted for the first time by Russia, President Vladimir 
Putin suggested that the BRIC foreign ministers 
meet on the sidelines of the United Nations General 
Assembly (UNGA) the following September. There, the 
four expressed interest in developing comprehensive 
quadrilateral co-operation. A second meeting of the 
four foreign ministers, held on the sidelines of UNGA 
in September 2007, produced a consultative mechanism 
at the level of deputy ministers that met in March 2008 
in Rio de Janeiro.
On 16 May 2008, the BRIC foreign ministers met 
again in Yekaterinburg, where the countries agreed 
to work together on supporting the rule of law in 
international relations, democratising the global 
financial and economic architecture, countering 
new challenges and threats, and finding common 
approaches to arms reduction, non-proliferation, 
climate change, energy security and sustainable 
development. This meeting also saw a Brazilian 
initiative to hold the first meeting of the four ministers 
of economics and finance in November 2008, in the run 
up to the G20 meeting (aimed at the countries coming 
to the G20 meeting with a concerted position).
These developments give more momentum to 
the G20 meeting, since they offer an opportunity to 
move beyond geopolitical concerns and concentrate 
on the purely economic and financial issues that 
require immediate attention and actions in the current 
deteriorating situation. 
Many experts now fear that the global economy is 
on the verge of slipping into the worst crisis since the 
Great Depression. That is why the key issues that will 
remain on the agenda of the G20 finance ministers and 
central bank governors will be the global economic 
slowdown (which is more pertinent to developed 
countries) and rising inflation (which is more pressing 
for the emerging economies). The IMF cut its forecasts 
for world economic growth from 4.1 per cent to  
3.9 per cent for 2008, and from 3.9 per cent to 3.7 per 
cent for 2009. This was due to the general slowdown, 
the mortgage-lending crisis in the United States, the 
rapidly cooling eurozone economy (which has shrunk 
by 0.2 per cent, the first contraction since the euro was 
adopted) and worrisome inflation rates in the emerging 
economies, including Russia.
The slowdown could have a more adverse impact on 
developed countries, for even with the growth forecasts 
revised for China (down to 9 per cent), the gap between 
developing and developed countries will widen to six to 
one. The same is true for India and Russia, with a gap 
of four to one. A more modest performance is expected 
for Latin America. Thus, there is a massive shift of 
wealth from commodity users to commodity producers, 
as has happened in the movement of rule-setting power 
in the energy industry from the old, privately owned 
‘Seven Sisters’ of the oil companies that dominated the 
20th century to the new national energy companies of 
emerging economies.
Inflation is a bigger problem for emerging and 
developing countries. The IMF predicts their consumer 
prices will soar to 9.1 per cent in 2008, and 7.4 per 
cent next year (a 1.5 per cent rise from the previous 
forecast). In Russia, inflation is due to reach 12 per 
cent in 2008, with Sberbank, a major Russian bank, 
estimating figures as high as 14 per cent. Some blame 
high inflationary rates on the overheating economy 
(with an annual growth rate between 6 per cent and  
8 per cent from 2000 to 2007), an inflow of oil revenue 
and heavy budget spending preceding the presidential 
elections in March 2008. Others say that inflation is 
due to a liquidity crisis and a huge inflow of foreign 
currency. Meanwhile inflation is due to drop to 8.5 per 
cent in 2009.
Nevertheless, all the BRICs are part of the global 
economic system. Their financial markets move parallel 
to one another and they are all vulnerable to negative 
global trends. Thus, the events of September 2008 have 
revealed Russia’s extreme dependence on global market 
and oil prices, when it slipped into financial turmoil 
along with other countries. By 17 September, the 
Russian market had lost 52 per cent of its capitalisation 
since the beginning of the year. Although two days 
later it had recovered by almost one quarter as a result 
of urgent government intervention, Russian shares 
remain some of the lowest priced in the world. This 
development led to the flight of as much as $15 billion 
in investments, a trend that could well continue. These 
events could also slow economic growth and soaring 
commodity prices are threatening planned investments 
in infrastructure projects. The banks have their share 
of worries, too, for the central bank announced a 
slight increase of 5.5 per cent in reserve requirements. 
Nevertheless, with the world’s third-largest foreign 
currency reserves and a massive trade surplus, Russia is 
not on the edge of a crisis.
 Experts fear that the 
global economy is slipping 
into the worst crisis since the 
Great Depression 
 Inflation is a bigger 
problem for emerging and 
developing countries 
Players, positions, approaches
109??? ?????????????????? ?????????????
Although some inflationary and financial issues 
might be specific to Russia, the trend is no different 
from the rest of the world, which is witnessing a boom 
in food and commodities prices, which gives more 
objective reasons for an Outreach Five united with 
Russia to operate within the G20.
Clean energy and the role of climate change in 
global markets are also important for Russia and the 
G20 as a whole. Along with fears of rising commodity 
prices and finite hydrocarbon resources, opportunities 
offered by the existing instruments for mitigating 
climate change and for investing in green technologies 
are increasing. All these issues were priorities on the 
table during the Russian G8 presidency in 2006. The 
G20 started its energy-related discussion the same year, 
under the Australian chair. Previous G20 meetings 
have also discussed the effect of oil prices on the world 
economy, transparency in the energy market, improved 
market-related information, energy market opening 
for investment, and access to modern technologies. 
Other energy issues include environmental problems 
and access to energy for all countries, including less 
developed ones.
At the 2008 Hokkaido Toyako Summit, the G8 
leaders agreed to “consider and adopt… the goal of 
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achieving at least a 50 per cent reduction of global 
emissions by 2050” through their “common but 
differentiated responsibilities” and recognised the need 
for clean energy technology and nuclear power. The 
G8 also promised developing countries up to $150 
billion in public and private investments to meet the 
challenges of mitigation, adaptation and access to 
clean energy. It looked as if it was too little for the 
Outreach Five countries, which came to the table 
on the last day of the summit. Calling themselves 
the Group of Five, they issued their own statement, 
stressing the need for more concerted action by the 
developed countries and a stronger commitment to 
cutting greenhouse gas emissions by between 80 per 
cent and 95 per cent below 1990 levels by 2050. The 
G20 presents an excellent opportunity to further 
this discussion on a more consistent basis, with the 
participation of major oil producers such as Saudi 
Arabia and highly dependent energy consumers such 
as South Korea.
Russia is increasingly realising the role and potential 
of the G20. Indeed, there is hope that working in this 
format on economic and financial problems will help 
overcome the new dividing lines that hamper fruitful 
co-operation on the political side. ◆
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Enhancing the  
G20’s efficiency 
The rebuilding of the international financial 
system is now a priority. A reformed G20 may be 
just the mechanism to achieve this A s one of the founders of the G20, China has attended all the G20 ministerial meetings since 1999, and hosted its meeting in 2005. China regards the G20 as an important multilateral platform to listen to and exchange ideas with the G8 
members and other significant countries. 
The G20 contains all the systemically important 
countries from regions around the world, as well as the 
European Union. Its members account for more than 
70 per cent of global population and 90 per cent of the 
world’s gross domestic product. The G20 is also more 
broadly representative and has a stronger legitimacy 
than the G8. 
By Xaiojin Chen, 
International 
Technology and 
Economy Institute, 
China
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The G20’s apparent weakness, however, is having too 
many members with too many different interests, which 
precludes it from reaching any substantial consensus. 
That harms the efficiency and influence of the G20 and 
makes it a loose multilateral forum. This innate weakness 
hinders the G20 from becoming a decisive institution in 
global governance. 
Furthermore, with the G8 dominance of the 
G20, the latter seems like an enlarged version of 
the G8+5 dialogue platform – making it a G8+12. 
Both the G8+5 and the G20 have the function of 
legitimising G8 initiatives to the wider world and 
winning broader support for G8-generated ideas. It is 
thus difficult to imagine that the G20 will have any 
independent influence.
Even though it has become a regular partner in the G8+5, China still needs the G20. As a new 
rising country that aspires to be accepted by the 
international system, China has an open and active 
attitude to participating in diverse multilateral 
economic institutions, including the G20. Moreover, 
while the reforms of International Monetary Fund 
and the World Bank are becoming difficult and the 
present international financial system becomes more 
fragile, the G20, under the strong leadership of the G8 
or ‘Gx’, may be one potential suitable mechanism for 
the leading countries to negotiate and rebuild a new 
international financial system. 
In order to play a robust role, the G20 needs to 
narrow its core decision-making group to improve 
efficiency. Although the G8 initiated this institution, 
the decision-making group of a reformed G20 should 
not necessarily include all G8 members. Not all G8 
countries are as important as they were in 1970s when 
the G8 was founded. There are other countries that 
have grown in systemic importance. Members of the 
decision-making group should be selected according 
to each country’s power and responsibility. The 
number of members should not exceed five. Suitable 
international mechanisms that reflect the real world 
are needed to solve real global problems. Otherwise 
both the G8 and the G20 will increasingly become 
simply a political show.
The G20 also needs to arrange its agenda carefully to fulfil its deliberative function and promote 
successful co-operation among its members. At present, 
new alternative sources of energy may become the most 
likely possibility of a breakthrough in co-operation. 
This is due to three factors.
First, a secure energy supply has become a priority 
for most G20 members in recent years. North America, 
Europe and Asia are all preoccupied by high oil prices 
and the consequent serious threat of inflation. They are 
looking for new energy sources that can substitute for 
oil on a large scale and be relatively inexpensive.
Second, even resource-rich members of the G20, 
such as Russia, Canada and Australia, worry about 
the carbon dioxide emissions caused by fossil fuel 
consumption. They seek new alternative sources of 
energy that can reduce carbon emissions. To develop a 
clean, inexpensive and ample supply of new energies 
is in the interest of all sides. Promoting a consensus on 
clean energy co-operation among the G20 members can 
become the common goal for all.
Third, international mechanisms have yet to be 
developed in many new energy fields. Compared with 
those policy areas that already have international 
mechanisms, it is easier for the G20 to achieve progress 
in the relatively new field of energy.
The 2008 G20 meeting of finance ministers and 
central bankers will address clean energy and biofuel as 
a priority. Building new mechanisms in nuclear energy 
should be added as a key topic. Given the experience 
of France and Japan, nuclear energy – rather than 
renewable sources such as the wind or sun – may 
be the best immediately available substitute to fossil 
energy and would reduce carbon dioxide emissions on 
a large scale. Renewable energy is but a tiny fraction of 
global consumption. It can hardly meet the high global 
demand for energy. 
Many countries are currently formulating or implementing ambitious plans to create nuclear 
power, especially in east and south Asia. According to a 
2007 report, if all the nuclear capacity currently under 
construction or firmly in the development pipeline is 
completed and attached to the grid, capacity would 
grow from 370 GW(e) at the end of 2006 to 447 GW(e) 
in 2030. If additional promising projects and plans are 
added, global nuclear capacity could rise to 679 GW(e) 
in 2030. That would be an average growth rate of about 
2.5 per cent per year.
Co-ordinating the balance between nuclear power 
construction and non-nuclear proliferation is a key 
question. Concrete topics on building international 
mechanisms for nuclear energy could include three 
elements: the development of a global market for 
nuclear fuels; a global management mechanism  
for nuclear fuels (amending plans based on the 
Global Nuclear Energy Partnership initiated by the 
United States); and global barriers and protective 
regulations for building in nuclear power capability 
and controlling nuclear fuel. ◆
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India in the  
global economy 
India’s economic rise has brought it to the world stage. Stability, growth and trade 
reform have been its route to success 
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In the decade before the G20’s creation, India was unnoticed in the world. But then India started growing rapidly and defined its interests as a growing power more concretely and as part of the constituency of growth. Many of its inherited institutions went through the inevitable changes, which conditioned India’s responses in global forums. In the G20 the institutional 
changes came in financing mechanisms, with command 
economy principles giving way to fiscal and monetary 
instruments. In financing, trade, energy and other 
renewable resource areas, India’s domestic development 
experience defined its positions on global issues abroad.
In the earlier non-aligned G77 years, India pushed a 
global anti-colonial agenda and built coalitions for the 
development of the poor. The military option against 
Portugal over Goa in the 1950s was avoided for some 
time in order not to weaken diplomatic initiatives for the 
independence of erstwhile colonies. India participated 
fully in global debates and developed several ideas. 
“Poverty is the biggest pollutant,” said Indira Gandhi 
at the United Nations Conference on the Human 
Environment in Stockholm. By the end of the 1980s, 
however, India’s security and development paradigms 
had changed. Rajiv Gandhi’s vision was that India would 
pursue its goals in “concentric circles of influence”. 
India would grow rapidly as a part of a globalising 
world. There was a refreshing youthful emphasis on 
technology and the newer organisations and social 
institutions in which it would be embedded, as the 
flip side of the problems of low growth, poverty and 
shortage of renewable resources. There was a break 
with the past in putting decentralised growth into 
operation. Indeed, India’s fast growth reinforced the 
new world view at home.
However, the world woke up only in 2003, when 
first a well-known study by the United States Central 
Intelligence Agency, and then later Goldman Sachs, 
declared India to be one of the BRICs – Brazil, Russia, 
India and China. Economists at the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) recognised that growth had 
already begun. They claimed it was due to India’s shift in 
the early 1980s reforms from pro-market to pro-business 
policies. In fact, in the 1980s, India abolished its level 
price and output controls and relaxed its investment and 
foreign exchange controls. Indeed, about two thirds of 
Indian industry was freed from such controls. But since 
these reforms were not designed by the Bretton Woods 
institutions, they were ignored abroad. Yet these broad, 
paradigm-based reforms gave strength to India’s stance at 
institutions such as the G20.
Here, India has pursued three objectives. The first 
is stability for reform. The second is improving the 
global and national architecture for deepening financial 
markets to foster inclusive growth. The third is to link 
these two to trade policy.
On the first objective of stability, India’s phased 
process of reform, ending with the goal of complete 
capital account convertibility, was to be protected from 
the wild swings of global financial markets particularly 
evident after the East Asian meltdown at the end of the 
1990s. India’s central bank governor stated later that at 
the G20 meeting under India’s presidency in 2002, “for 
the first time, the international community through the 
G20 endorsed the idea of the voluntary ‘principles’ for 
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prevention and solution of sovereign crises” to replace the 
IMF’s sovereign debt restructuring mechanism, which  
had failed. 
India’s second objective was to encourage the world to let countries reform at their own pace and in their own 
innovative ways. At times, the G20 or the World Trade 
Organization’s (WTO) review committees admonished 
India for not reforming fast enough. Indeed, the G20 
stated that “in India, the challenge is to reduce the budget 
deficit while raising sufficient resources for infrastructure 
and rural development. Tax reforms and public sector 
reforms are important areas of concern. Employment 
generation and better access to education and health 
remain important.” In response, India wanted the rules to 
be clear but the paths flexible.
A major issue for India has been the harmonisation 
of financial rules with the development process. This 
stance informs India’s interventions at the G20, the 
WTO and the UN’s 2002 International Conference on 
Financing for Development at Monterrey. At the 2002 
preparatory meeting of the World Summit on Sustainable 
Development, one proposal intended to
Improve investment processes in developing countries 
and countries with economies in transition to facilitate 
access to credit lines as well as to preferential terms of 
financing and of providing funds for collateral support 
systems and sharing of investment risk. In this context, 
provide securities for local institutions involved in 
infrastructure development and specific knowledge-
based activities to support sustainable economic 
growth, through, for example, creation of collaterals, 
interest differentials and trading of financial papers. 
These processes should be targeted, amongst others, 
to artisan and producer groups linked with local and 
global markets, local government agencies providing 
social and economic infrastructure, and farming and 
rural communities.
With regard to energy, water and sustainable development, India shows – with its technical work 
and experience – the need to think dynamically, because 
growth produces innovation rather than more of the 
same. India is using maximum flexibility and creativity 
to leverage the international environment for its own 
domestic economic transformation. It is increasingly 
integrating knowledge-based initiatives, science and 
technology, and business in its goals. Given the nature 
of new global challenges, the deployment of soft power 
assets and the involvement of civil society are now as 
important as hard power in order to “win the peace”. As 
Sonia Gandhi said: “India seeks an open and inclusive 
world order.” At the G20, India is constantly reinventing 
the art of following its own interests and championing the 
growth of the poor as two sides of the same coin. ◆
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How effective is the G20? 
The G20 has proved itself a valuable forum for finance ministers from emerging 
markets to meet with colleagues from industrialised nations. But how successful 
has it been? 
The G20 is an informal meeting of the ministers of finance and the central bank governors of major industrial and emerging market countries that account for some 85 per cent of world output. It is a useful response to the shortcomings of the International Monetary and Finance Committee of the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and its unrepresentative nature 
and the rigid format of its meetings. 
The G20 was established by the G7 in response to the 
financial crises experienced by major emerging market 
countries: in Mexico, Brazil and Argentina, and in Asia. 
It was intended to influence the policies of emerging 
markets to enhance financial stability and prevent future 
financial crises or to diminish their intensity.
To this end, the G7 recommended that emerging 
markets adopt policies of transparency, standards 
and codes, and those other policies suggested by the 
Financial Stability Forum. Additionally, in order to 
prevent risks, emerging markets should undertake 
Financial Sector Assessment Programs (FSAP) 
introduced by the IMF. More generally, their policies 
should be designed to foster stability. Thus, emerging 
markets were supposed to follow certain principles 
By Ariel Buira, 
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regarding the management of their financial system, 
their exchange rate and their external debt, and to 
adopt certain principles of debtor-creditor co-operation, 
such as the introduction of collective action clauses to 
facilitate the resolution of external payments crises. The 
G20 also successfully promoted the adoption of best 
practices by countries to prevent financial crisis.
The atmosphere of the G20 has always been friendly. For the financial authorities of the emerging 
markets, it provides a valued opportunity to meet their 
counterparts in industrial countries and informally 
raise their concerns with them.
The G20 policy recommendations, however, did not 
apply equally to the major industrial countries. The 
major problems of the world economy were largely 
left off the G20 agenda. Thus, global imbalances, 
surveillance of exchange-rate policies, intervention 
in foreign-exchange markets and fiscal imbalances in 
major economies were not subjects for discussion by 
the G20.
Indeed, major industrial countries, particularly the 
United States, are not inclined to have global problems 
come under the purview of the G20, the IMF or any 
other international body, presumably because they feel 
able to deal with them on their own.
Five years after its start, as the issue of financial 
stability in emerging markets came to be exhausted, 
the G20 went on to matters that had been raised by 
emerging economies, such as IMF governance and 
reform. But they did not get very far, because the 
industrial countries were not interested in undertaking 
major reforms of the Bretton Woods institutions.
The official history of the G20 makes a point of 
stating that the G20 played a catalytic role in fostering 
the greater participation of emerging market economies 
in decision making. But the major emerging markets 
played no role in the appointments of the last two 
managing directors of the IMF and presidents of the 
World Bank. The old procedures were followed: a few 
European officials decided on the head of the IMF, 
while the United States decided on the head of the 
World Bank.
The results of the recent reform of the IMF quota 
system are trivial. They fail to bring quotas in line 
with the size of the economies. Japan would not allow 
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China’s quota to approach its own; Britain and France 
retain larger quotas than China; while Belgium and 
the Netherlands retain larger quotas than Mexico and 
Brazil, whose economies are significantly larger. In fact, 
if the results were not tampered with, the new quota 
formula would raise the quota shares and voting power 
of industrial countries.
Even with the rise in basic votes, the increase in 
the voting power of developing and emerging market 
countries at the IMF remains very small, at 2.7 per 
cent. Given the US veto and the qualified majority 
requirements for policy decisions, the control of the G7 
over the Bretton Woods institutions remains essentially 
as it was. Therefore, on issues where a disagreement 
may lead to a stand off with the G7, as with US and 
European reluctance to give up power in the Bretton 
Woods institutions, emerging market countries 
have been unwilling to use their political capital for 
something that may be of systemic significance, but of 
little national importance at a time when the role of 
those institutions is fading.
In today’s globalised economy, the economic policies 
of any significant country spill over and affect the 
performance of many other countries. Thus the G20’s 
founders were right to seek a greater dialogue and  
co-operation in the economic sphere with major 
emerging economies. But they were wrong not to 
concern themselves with developments in the major 
industrial economies.
The current US financial crisis, with its various 
components and subprime mortgages, the ensuing 
credit crisis and the industrial slowdown, seriously 
affects the rest of the world. It would thus be within 
the purview of the G20 to look into it and see what can 
be done to diminish the depth of the crisis, to assist 
recovery and to prevent its recurrence. This would 
require an open attitude on the part of the US, however, 
which is not inclined to open its policies to analysis 
and discussion by others. While it encouraged other 
countries to submit to an FSAP, in the years since the 
G20 was established, it has not submitted its banks to 
this analysis. It did, however, agree to have the IMF 
assess the US financial system in 2008, about a year 
after the subprime crisis arose.
For several years, China and the US have run unsustainable imbalances, with the US absorbing 
a large proportion of world saving to sustain 
consumption. This is a global misallocation of 
resources. Although persistent misalignments pose 
risks for the stability of the international economy, the 
exchange-rate policy of these countries has never come 
under scrutiny by the G20. Neither has US financial 
supervision or its fiscal deficits.
The US financial crisis was no accident. The most 
sophisticated financial system in the world was not well 
supervised, as a number of institutions and practices 
remained outside prudential supervision. A lax monetary 
policy financed large fiscal and external deficits, fuelled 
domestic and international inflation, and contributed to 
the problems facing the world today.
The difficulties in US commercial banks and 
investment banks give rise to geographical contagion and 
to contagion between instruments and markets. These 
have hit financial institutions and economic activity in 
many other countries – and have done so more than in 
the case of the emerging country crisis of the 1990s. But 
the G20 has not concentrated on them.
The G20 has been an institution focused on 
emerging markets, largely controlled by the G7 and 
particularly the United States. Is this a case where 
double standards limit effectiveness? ◆
 The economic policies 
of any significant country 
spill over and affect the 
performance of many other 
countries 
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W hen the G20 was created, Argentina’s situation was very different from what it is today, with regard to both economic fundamentals and the policy regime. 
In 1999, the country was running current account and 
fiscal deficits, had no independent monetary policy 
and a highly dollarised financial system. In contrast, 
in the last five years, Argentina has grown around 
8 per cent per year while running twin (fiscal and 
current account) surpluses of more than 3 per cent of 
gross domestic product (GDP). Additionally, financial 
dollarisation has fallen substantially, reducing the 
risks associated with currency mismatches. These 
positive developments, however, have a darker 
side. Although the currency regime is more flexible 
and government solvency is not under scrutiny, 
weak policies have resulted in higher inflation and 
very difficult access to capital markets. This could 
eventually give rise to liquidity squeezes should the 
primary surplus fall. 
Practically all natural resource-rich, financially 
underdeveloped South American countries have been 
going through processes that, in different degrees, 
resemble the Argentine case. These processes combine 
a strengthening of economic fundamentals with 
persistent vulnerabilities.
One reason for the strengthening fundamentals is the loosening of the external constraint 
that occurred hand-in-hand with the increase in 
commodities and energy prices. A second reason is 
the progress of fiscal and monetary policies. Rigid 
currency regimes (such as Argentina’s currency board) 
have been replaced by more flexible ones, which 
have allowed for more monetary policy autonomy. 
In some cases, such as Chile and Brazil, this greater 
autonomy has been instrumental in lowering 
inflation (although this was not always the case in, 
for example, Argentina). Fiscal policies, in turn, 
have become stricter. Many countries run significant 
primary surpluses. Furthermore, some countries have 
implemented fiscal responsibility laws (for example, 
Brazil) or sophisticated counter-cyclical regimes (such 
as Chile). This has greatly helped to prevent fiscal 
dominance and improve public debt management.
South America 
and the G20: 
fostering 
growth 
South American countries’ financial 
vulnerabilities are related to current global 
uncertainties. But their experiences will prove 
valuable to G20 discussions 
By José Maria 
Fanelli, Centro de 
Estudios de Estado 
y Sociedad,  
Buenos Aires
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The new policy framework has, however, created new 
policy dilemmas. The loosening of external constraints 
resulted in downward pressures on the nominal 
exchange rate, which tended to erode competitiveness. 
The most common response to preserving the economy’s 
competitiveness was sterilised intervention, which 
resulted in the accumulation of international reserves.  
In a number of cases, sounder fiscal policies reduced  
the fiscal space for growth. Public investment is, as 
a rule, very low and the tax burden has increased 
substantially (as in Brazil and Argentina), hampering 
private investment.
The enduring vulnerabilities are closely associated 
with the financial uncertainties in the global economy. 
But they are also related to the failure in the 1990s 
of the reforms to modify two key structural features: 
economic dualism and the lack of financial deepening 
(Chile is an exception in this regard). The prevalence of 
dualism means that sectors exist with markedly different 
productivity – and hence income – levels. This is a 
source of vulnerability because income disparity feeds 
distributional conflicts and exacerbates the pressures 
on the fiscal budget. The recent increases in the prices 
of food and energy imply major challenges. The lack of 
financial development is a source of vulnerability to the 
extent that it makes risk management difficult at both 
the micro and macro levels and reduces the supply of 
policy instruments at the disposal of the authorities.
 Rigid currency regimes have 
been replaced by more flexible 
ones, which have allowed for more 
monetary policy autonomy 
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It is market 
creation rather 
than market 
liberalisation 
that matters 
in emerging 
economies
Under these circumstances, policy priorities have 
changed. In Argentina, in 1999, the key issues were 
to avoid the occurrence of a twin-crisis episode and 
preserve the advances in market reform. Today, the 
challenges are to improve the quality of policies to 
sustain the growth momentum, manage distributive 
conflicts, preserve competitiveness and reduce liquidity 
risks. Many of the policies that are relevant to such 
challenges are contemplated in the G20 Work Program 
for 2008: competition in the financial sector, fiscal space 
for growth and social inclusion and risks originating in 
the global economy. It is only natural to expect that the 
current priorities and the lessons learned from the past 
decade of financial and monetary reforms in Argentina 
and other South American countries will play a role in 
the discussions. They could usefully take account of the 
following points.
Stronger competition in the financial sector calls for further reforms. Reforms are exercises in 
institution-building and the experience of the 1990s 
suggests that institution-building is a process, not 
an event. Reform failures are extremely costly: 
ill-designed financial reforms produce both macro-
economic disequilibria and reform fatigue, which 
lead to reversals. Likewise, reforms are intensive in 
co-ordination and prone to co-ordination failures. 
The well-known ‘sequencing’ problem associated with 
the process of liberalisation is just one manifestation 
of the co-ordination problem.
Co-ordination efforts should embrace domestic, 
regional and multilateral levels. Low spreads and 
high commodity prices will not last forever and there 
is no market for contingent securities that pay off 
when negative financial shocks occur. Countries still 
need insurance. In the 1990s, countries relied on the 
international financial institutions for crisis lending; 
today, self-insurance plays a larger role and some 
advances have been made in regional mechanisms for 
risk sharing and reserve pooling. These mechanisms 
are not mutually exclusive and institution-building 
efforts should be co-ordinated. To this end, it is 
essential to identify the comparative advantage of each 
mechanism and the eventual complementarities. It is 
also important to characterise international shocks 
(say, correlations and persistence).
The ultimate goal of financial reform is to foster 
growth. When policy instruments are scarce, it is 
difficult to preserve fiscal space for growth. To avoid 
this, there must be a concerted effort to co-ordinate 
the goals and timing of policies implemented on 
different fronts. A financial reform designed on the 
basis of high-quality standards and codes may fail if 
the overall institutional framework is shaky or the 
economy is too sensitive to shocks. For example, 
deregulation is more likely to be successful if the 
country is self-insured. But the sterilised interventions 
typically associated with reserve accumulation may 
crowd out private credit, offsetting the positive 
effects expected from the reform. It can perpetuate 
the segmentation of financial markets, reinforcing 
economic dualism. If the country does not follow 
a self-insurance strategy because it has access to a 
liquidity facility provided by a multilateral or regional 
institution, this new instrument could contribute to 
strengthening the effects of the financial reform. This 
is why the creation of policy instruments should be 
given high priority. Of course, if the private sector 
offered an equity that paid off under financial stress, it 
would be even better. This is why it is market creation 
rather than market liberalisation that matters in 
emerging economies. But both instrument and market 
creation are intense institution-building activities and 
are thus a process, not an event. ◆
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Argentina
Carlos Fernández
Carlos Fernández became minister 
of the economy and production for 
Argentina in April 2008. He replaced 
Martin Lousteau, who resigned after 
fewer than five months in office. 
Prior to becoming economic minister, 
Fernández was head of the Adminis-
tración Federal de Ingresos Públicos 
(AFIP), the national tax agency. He 
also served as the minister of the econ-
omy for the province of Buenos Aires. 
For the national government, Fernán-
dez held the position of economy sub-
secretary for federal-provincial relations and was national director of 
tax co-ordination with the provinces. He also worked as subsecretary 
of fiscal policy in Buenos Aires. He holds a degree in economics from 
the National University of La Plata and specialised in public finance 
and tax administration. This will be his first G20 meeting.
Martín Redrado
Martín Redrado was appointed gover-
nor of the Central Bank of Argentina 
in September 2004. Between 2002 
and 2004 he served as secretary for 
trade and international economic rela-
tions. Previously, Redrado was chief 
economist of Fundación Capital, an 
institution he founded, and is devoted 
to economic research and public 
policy. In 1991 he was appointed 
president of Argentina’s National Secu-
rities Commission. He has also chaired 
the Emerging Market Committee of 
the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO). In 
1996, he was appointed secretary of state of the Education Ministry’s 
technological education area. Redrado began his professional career 
as a member of Jeffrey Sachs’ team, working on the programme to 
stabilise the Bolivian economy, and later held a number of positions 
for various companies in the United States. He received his Master’s in 
public administration from Harvard University. This will be his fifth 
G20 meeting.
Polity
Political party: Justicialist Party
Most recent election: 28 Oct 2007
Next election: 2011
Government: Lower House – Majority 
 Upper House – Majority
Political system: Presidential
Legislature: Bicameral, elected Chamber of Deputies,   
 elected Senate
Capital: Buenos Aires
Official language: Spanish
Economy
Currency: Peso (P)
GDP (millions): $262,331 (2007) 
 8.7% (growth 2006-2007)
Currency value: 3.08 (Sep 2008), 3.15 (Sep 2007)
Current account balance: $7.9 billion (latest year, Q1 2008) 
 2.9% of GDP (2008)
Trade balance: 11.3 (latest year, Jul 2008)
Trade to GDP ratio: 44.3 (2004–2006)
Unemployment rate: 14.10 (2007 est.)
Inflation: Government 195.196  
 (average consumer price index in units)
Government interest rates: 13.75% (latest 3 months, Sep 2008) 
 
Budget balance: 1.7% of GDP (2008)
Public debt: 59% of GDP (Jun 2007 est.)
Exchange reserves: 46,120,000,000 (Dec 2007 est.)
Structure (% of GDP): Agriculture 9.5 
 Industry 34.0 
 Services 56.5 (2007 est.)
Energy production: 85.4 (m TOE)
Oil production: 801,700 bbl/day (2005 est.)
Natural gas production: 43.76 billion cu m (2005 est.)
Electricity production: 101.1 billion kWh (2005)
Energy consumption: 63.7 (m TOE)
Oil consumption: 480,000 bbl/day (2005 est.)
Natural gas consumption: 38.79 billion cu m (2005 est.)
Electricity consumption: 88.98 billion kWh (2005)
Foreign debt: $114.3 billion 
 73.0% of GDP
Geography and ecology
Size of territory: 2,766,890 sq km (8th in the world)
Coastlines: 4,989 km (South Atlantic Ocean)
Fresh water: 30,200 sq km
Forests: 12.1% (of land area, 2005)
CO
2 
emissions: 127.5 m tonnes (2003)
Demography (2008 est.)
Population: 40,677,348 (30th in the world)
Population growth: 0.917% (average annual % change)
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Australia
Wayne Swan
Wayne Swan was appointed treasurer 
of Australia in December 2007. 
In 1993, he was elected to the 
House of Representatives for Lilley 
in Queensland. Although he was 
defeated in the 1996 general election, 
he was subsequently re-elected four 
consecutive times. He has held a 
number of positions including shadow 
minister for family and community 
services as well as manager of 
opposition business in the House of 
Representatives. Prior to his current 
appointment, he was the shadow treasurer for three years. He was 
a lecturer at the Queensland Institute of Technology between 1976 
and 1988 and a policy analyst at the Office of Youth Affairs in 1978. 
Born in 1954 in Nambour, Queensland, Swan won a Commonwealth 
scholarship to study public administration at the University of 
Queensland. This will be his first G20 meeting as treasurer.
Glenn Stevens
Glenn Stevens was appointed gover-
nor of the Reserve Bank of Australia in 
September 2006 for a seven-year term. 
From 1980 to 2001, he held various 
positions at the bank, including head 
of the Economic Analysis Department, 
head of the International Department 
and assistant governor (econom-
ics), and was a visiting scholar at the 
Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco 
in 1990. He was appointed deputy 
governor in December 2001. Born in 
Sydney in 1958, Stevens completed 
his Bachelor’s in economics with first class honours at the University 
of Sydney in 1979 and attained a Master’s at the University of Western 
Ontario. This will be his third G20 meeting as governor of the Reserve 
Bank of Australia.
Polity
Political party: Labour Party
Most recent election: 24 Nov 2007
Next election: On or by 16 Apr 2011
Government: Lower House – Majority 
 Upper House – Minority
Political system: Parliamentary
Legislature: Bicameral, elected House of Representatives,   
 elected Senate
Capital: Canberra
Official language: English
Economy
Currency: Australian dollar (A$)
GDP (millions): $821,716 (2007) 
 3.9% (growth 2006–2007)
Currency value: 1.24 (Sep 2008), 1.20 (Sep 2007)
Current account balance: -61.6 (latest year, $ billion, Q2 2008) 
 -5.1% of GDP (2008)
Trade balance: -18.6 (latest year, Jul 2008)
Trade to GDP ratio: 62.7 (2004–2006)
Unemployment rate: 4.40 (2007 est.)
Inflation: 123.014 (average consumer price index  
 in units)
Government interest rates: 7.25% (latest 3 months, Sep 2008)
Interest rates: 5.64% (lasted 10-year government bonds)
Budget balance: 1.4% of GDP (2008)
Public debt: 15.40% of GDP (2007 est.)
Exchange reserves: 26,910,000,000 (Dec 2007 est.)
Structure (% of GDP) Agriculture 3.0 
 Industry 26.4 
 Services 70.6 (2007 est.)
Energy production: 261.8 (m TOE)
Oil production: 572,400 bbl/day (2005 est.)
Natural gas production: 38.62 billion cu m (2005)
Electricity production: 236.7 billion kWh (2005)
Energy consumption: 115.8 (m TOE)
Oil consumption: 903,200 bbl/day (2005 est.)
Natural gas consumption: 25.72 billion cu m (2005 est.)
Electricity consumption: 219.8 billion kWh (2005)
Official development aid: $1.68 billion 
 0.25% (share of GDP)
Geography and ecology
Size of territory: 7,686,850 sq km (6th in the world)
Coastlines: 25,760 km (Indian Ocean, Tasman Sea, Coral  
 Sea, Arafura Sea, Timor Sea)
Fresh water: 68,920 sq km
Forests: 21.3% (of land area, 2005)
CO
2 
emissions: 337.0 m tonnes (2005) (increase from  
 255.0 m in 2004)
Demography (2008 est.)
Population: 20,600,856 (53rd in the world)
Population growth: 0.801% (average annual % change)
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Brazil
Guido Mantega
Guido Mantega became Brazil’s 
finance minister in March 2006, 
replacing Antonio Palocci. He was 
introduced into political life along-
side President Luiz Inácio Lula da 
Silva in 2003. He served as minister 
for planning until 2004, when Lula 
appointed him to the position of 
president to the Brazilian Develop-
ment Bank (BNDES). He helped to 
co-ordinate the economic programme 
for the Labour Party in the presi-
dential elections of 1984, 1989 and 
1998. He has been economic adviser to President Lula since 1993. 
Mantega was director of the budget and head of the Office of the 
Municipal Department of Planning of São Paulo from 1982 to 1992. 
He was also director of Petroleo Brasileiro and taught economics in 
the School of Business Administration of Fundacão Getúlio Vargas. 
Born in 1949 in Genoa, Italy, Mantega earned a degree in economics 
from the College of Economics and Business Administration at the 
University of São Paulo. He obtained his PhD in development sociol-
ogy at the University of São Paulo, with a specialisation from Sussex 
University’s Institute of Development Countries, in 1977. This will 
be his third G20 meeting and his first as host.
Henrique de Campos Meirelles
Henrique de Campos Meirelles has 
held the position of central bank gov-
ernor of Brazil since 2003. Previously, 
he served as a member of the board of 
directors of the Council of the Ameri-
cas in New York and a member of the 
advisory board of the Brazilian Mer-
cantile and Futures Exchange in São 
Paulo. He was chair of the American 
Chamber of Commerce in São Paulo. 
Meirelles served as president of vari-
ous companies and banks including 
BankBoston in Brazil and the Brazilian 
Association of International Banks. He has been a member of various 
academic boards and councils including the dean’s Advisory Council 
of the Sloan School of Management at the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology and the advisory board of the Center for Latin American 
Issues at the George Washington University in Washington DC.  
Born in 1945 in Anápolis in the state of Goiás, Mereilles received a 
Bachelor of science in engineering from São Paolo University in 1972 
and a Master’s degree of business administration from the Federal 
University of Rio de Janeiro in 1974. He also attended the advanced 
management programme at the Harvard Business School in 1984. This 
will be his fifth G20 meeting as governor.
Polity
Political party: Workers’ Party (PT)
Most recent election: 29 Oct 2006
Next election: 3 Oct 2010
Government: Lower House – Minority 
 Upper House – Minority
Political system: Presidential
Legislature: Bicameral, elected Chamber of Deputies,   
 elected Senate
Capital: Brasilia
Official language: Portuguese
Economy
Currency: Real (R)
GDP (millions): $1,314,170 (2007) 
 5.4% (growth 2006–2007)
Currency value: 1.80 (Sep 2008), 1.92 (Sep 2007)
Current account balance: -19.5 (latest year, $ billion, Jul 2008)
Current account balance: -1.6% of GDP (2008)
Trade balance: 29.5 (latest year, Aug 2008)
Trade to GDP ratio: 26.4 (2004–2006)
Unemployment rate: 9.30 (2007 est.)
Inflation: 163.589 (average consumer price index  
 in units)
Government interest rates: 12.92% (latest 3 months, Sep 2008) 
 6.16% (latest 10-year government bonds)
Budget balance: -1.6% of GDP (2008)
Public debt: 45.10% of GDP (2007 est.)
Exchange reserves: 180,300,000,000 (Dec 2007 est.)
Structure (% of GDP): Agriculture 5.5 
 Industry 28.7 
 Services 65.8 (2007 est.)
Energy production: 176.3 (m TOE)
Oil production: 1.71 million bbl/day (2006 est.)
Natural gas production: 12.24 billion cu m (2005 est.)
Electricity production: 396.4 billion kWh (2005)
Energy consumption: 204.8 (m TOE)
Oil consumption: 2.1 million bbl/day (2006 est.)
Natural gas consumption: 17.85 billion cu m (2005 est.)
Electricity consumption: 368.5 billion kWh (2005)
Foreign debt: $188 billion 
 34.0% (of GDP)
Geography and ecology
Size of territory: 8,511,965 sq km (5th in the world)
Coastlines: 7,491 km (Atlantic Ocean)
Fresh water: 55,455 sq km
Forests: 57.2% (of land area, 2005)
CO
2 
emissions: 5,298.3 m tonnes (2003)
Demography (2008 est.)
Population: 191,908,598 (12th in the world)
Population growth: 0.98% (average annual % change)
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Canada
James Flaherty
James (Jim) Flaherty was appointed 
minister of finance in February 
2006. He was elected to the House 
of Commons in January 2006 as the 
representative for Whitby-Oshawa in 
Ontario. Prior to serving as a member 
of Parliament, he served in the 
legislature of the province of Ontario 
from 1995 to 2005, during which 
time he held posts including deputy 
minister of finance, attorney general, 
minister responsible for Native 
affairs, minister of labour, solicitor 
general, minister of correctional services and minister of enterprise, 
opportunity and innovation. Before entering into politics, he practised 
law for more than 20 years. Born in 1949 in Lachine, Quebec, 
Flaherty graduated with a Bachelor of Arts from Princeton University 
and, after earning a law degree from Osgoode Hall Law School, was 
called to the bar in 1975. This will be his third G20 meeting.
Mark Carney
Mark Carney was appointed governor 
of the Bank of Canada in February 
2008 for a seven-year term. He served 
as deputy governor of the Bank of 
Canada from 2003 until his ap-
pointment as senior associate deputy 
minister of finance in 2004. During 
his time in the Department of Finance, 
he served as finance deputy at the G7, 
the G20 and the Financial Stabil-
ity Forum. Prior to entering public 
service, he worked for Goldman Sachs 
in many positions, including co-head 
of sovereign risk, executive director for emerging debt capital markets 
and managing director for investment banking. Born in 1965 in Fort 
Smith, Northwest Territories, Carney graduated with a Bachelor’s in 
economics from Harvard University and received his Master’s and 
doctorate in economics from Oxford University. This will be his first 
G20 meeting as Bank of Canada governor.
Polity
Political party: Conservative Party of Canada
Most recent election: 23 Jan 2006
Next election: 14 Oct 2008
Government: Lower House – Minority 
 Upper House – Minority
Political system: Parliamentary
Legislature: Bicameral, elected House of Commons,   
 appointed Senate
Capital: Ottawa
Official languages: English, French
Economy
Currency: Canadian dollar (C$)
GDP (millions): $1,326,376 (2007) 
 2.7% (growth 2006–2007)
Currency value: 1.07 (Sep 2008), 1.04 (Sep 2007)
Current account balance: 13.6 (latest year, $ billion, Q2 2008) 
 0.9% of GDP (2008)
Trade balance: 47.1 (latest year, Jun 2008)
Trade to GDP ratio: 72.3 (2004–2006)
Unemployment rate: 6.00 (2007 est.)
Inflation: 116.853 (average consumer price index  
 in units)
Government interest rates: 2.37% (latest 3 months, Sep 2008) 
 3.51% (latest 10-year government bonds)
Budget balance: 0.2% of GDP (2008)
Public debt: 68.50% of GDP (2007 est.)
Exchange reserves: 39,310,000,000 (2007 est.)
Structure (% of GDP): Agriculture 2.1 
 Industry 28.8 
 Services 69.1 (2007 est.)
Energy production: 397.5 (m TOE)
Oil production: 3.092 million bbl/day (2005)
Natural gas production: 178.1 billion cu m (2005 est.)
Electricity production: 609.6 billion kWh (2005)
Energy consumption: 269.0 (m TOE)
Oil consumption: 2.29 million bbl/day (2005)
Natural gas consumption: 92.76 billion cu m (2005 est.)
Electricity consumption: 540.2 billion kWh (2005)
Official development aid: $3.76 billion 
 0.34% (share of GDP)
Geography and ecology
Size of territory: 9,984,670 sq km (2nd in the world)
Coastlines: 202,080 km (North Atlantic Ocean, North   
 Pacific Ocean, Arctic Ocean)
Fresh water: 891,163 sq km
Forests: 33.6% (of land area, 2005)
CO
2 
emissions: 549.0 m tonnes (2005) (decrease from  
 50.0 m in 2004)
Demography (2008 est.)
Population: 33,212,686 (36th in the world)
Population growth: 0.83% (average annual % change)
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China
Xie Xuren
Xie Xuren was appointed minister 
of finance in August 2007. Earlier 
in his career, he was the director of 
the Investment Office, director of the 
Comprehensive Planning Office and 
deputy commissioner of the Plan-
ning and Economic Commission of 
Zhejiang province. Between 1990 and 
1995, his many positions included 
deputy director general of the Budget 
Department, director general of the 
Comprehensive Planning Department, 
director general of the Policy and 
Reform Department and assistant minister of finance. He became the 
vice-minister of finance in 1995. In 1998 he served as the president of 
the Agriculture Development Bank of China. In 2000 he became the 
deputy commissioner of the State Economic and Trade Commission. 
From March 2003 to 2007, he was the minister of state administration 
of taxation. Born in 1947 in Ningbo, Zhejiang, Xie holds a degree in 
industrial economics from Zhejiang University. This will be his second 
G20 meeting as minister of finance.
Zhou Xiaochuan
Zhou Xiaochuan was appointed 
governor of the People’s Bank of China 
in December 2002. He was appointed 
vice-president of the Bank of China 
from 1991 to 1995, after which he 
became administrator for the State Ad-
ministration of Foreign Exchange. He 
then moved into the position of deputy 
governor of the Bank of China and ad-
ministrator of the State Administration 
of Foreign Exchange from 1996 until 
1998. Prior to his position as governor 
of the China Construction Bank, he 
chaired the China Securities Regulatory Commission. He also chairs 
the Bank of China’s monetary policy committee. Born in 1948, Zhou 
graduated from the Beijing Chemical Engineering Institute in 1975 and 
received his PhD from Tsinghua University in 1985. This will be his 
sixth G20 meeting as governor of the People’s Bank of China.
Polity
Political party: Communist Party of China
Most recent election: 15 Mar 2008
Next election: 2013
Government: Single House – Majority
Political system: One-party rule
Legislature: Unicameral, elected National Congress
Capital: Beijing
Official language: Mandarin
Economy
Currency: Yuan (¥)
GDP (millions): $3,280,053 (2007) 
 11.4% (growth 2006–2007)
Currency value: 6.85 (Sep 2008), 7.53 (Sep 2007)
Current account balance: 371.8 (latest year, $ billion, 2007) 
 8.3% of GDP (2008)
Trade balance: 252.5 (latest year, Aug 2008)
Trade to GDP ratio: 69.0 (2004–2006)
Unemployment rate: 4.00 (2007 est.)
Inflation: 113.679 (average consumer price index  
 in units)
Government interest rates: 4.32% (latest 3 months, Sep 2008) 
 4.32% (latest 10-year government bonds)
Budget balance: 0.6% of GDP (2008)
Public debt: 18.40% of GDP (2007 est.)
Exchange reserves: 1,534,000,000,000
Structure (% of GDP): Agriculture 11.3 
 Industry 48.6 
 Services 40.1 (2007 est.)
Energy production: 1,536.8 (m TOE)
Oil production: 3.73 million bbl/day (2007 est.)
Natural gas production: 58.6 billion cu m (2006 est.)
Electricity production: 3.256 trillion kWh (2007)
Energy consumption: 1,609.3 (m TOE)
Oil consumption: 6.93 million bbl/day (2007 est.)
Natural gas consumption: 55.6 billion cu m (2006 est.)
Electricity consumption: 2.859 trillion kWh (2006)
Foreign debt: $281.6 billion 
 14.0% (share of GDP)
Geography and ecology
Size of territory: 9,596,960 sq km (3rd in the world)
Coastlines: 14,500 km (East China Sea, Korea Bay, Yellow  
 Sea, South China Sea)
Fresh water: 270,550 sq km
Forests: 21.2% (of land area, 2005)
CO
2 
emissions: 4,143.5 m tonnes (2003)
Demography (2008 est.)
Population: 1,330,044,605 (1st in the world)
Population growth: 0.629% (average annual % change)
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France
Christine Lagarde
Christine Lagarde was appointed 
minister of finance in June 2007. She 
was previously minister of trade in the 
government of Dominique de Villepin 
and minister of agriculture and fish-
ing in the government of François 
Fillon. Prior to entering government, 
she joined the law firm of Baker & 
McKenzie and was later appointed 
managing partner of its Paris office. In 
1999 she was elected chair and was 
re-elected to the position in 2002. 
Born in 1956 in Paris, Lagarde gradu-
ated from law school at the University of Paris X-Nanterre. She also 
holds a post-graduate diploma in labour law and a Master’s in English. 
This will be her second G20 meeting as minister of finance.
Christian Noyer
Christian Noyer was appointed 
governor of the Bank of France in 
November 2003. Following his 
military service as a naval officer, he 
was appointed to the Treasury in the 
Ministry of the Economy and Finance 
in 1976. At the Treasury he held a 
range of positions dealing with both 
domestic and international affairs. 
In 1993 he was appointed head of 
the Treasury and held the position of 
chief of staff for two other ministers 
of finance in 1993 and from 1995 
to 1997. He was appointed vice-president of the European Central 
Bank from 1998 to 2002. Born in 1950 near Paris, Noyer studied 
law at the University of Rennes and the University of Paris and 
graduated from the Institut d’Etudes Politiques de Paris, and later 
studied at the École Nationale d’Administration. This will be his fifth 
G20 meeting as governor.
Polity
Political party: Union for a Popular Movement (UMP)
Most recent election: 22 Apr and 6 May 2007
Next election: 2012
Government: Lower House – Majority 
 Upper House – Majority
Political system: Semi-presidential
Legislature: Bicameral, elected National Assembly,  
 elected Senate
Capital: Paris
Official language: French
Economy
Currency: Euro (€ )
GDP (millions): $2,562,288 (2007) 
 1.9% (growth 2006–2007)
Currency value: 0.71 (Sep 2008), 0.72 (Sep 2007)
Current account balance: -46.2 (latest year, $ billion, Jun 2008) 
 -1.7% of GDP (2008)
Trade balance: -71.9 (latest year, Jul 2008)
Trade to GDP ratio: 53.2 (2004–2006)
Unemployment rate: 8.30 (2007 est.)
Inflation: 114.471 (average consumer price index  
 in units)
Government interest rates: 4.96% (latest 3 months, Sep 2008) 
 4.28% (latest 10-year government bonds)
Budget balance: -2.9% of GDP (2008)
Public debt: 64.00% of GDP (2007 est.)
Exchange reserves: 98,240,000,000 (2006 est.)
Structure (% of GDP): Agriculture 2.2 
 Industry 21.0 
 Services 76.7 (2007 est.)
Energy production: 137.4 (m TOE)
Oil production: 73,180 bbl/day (2005 est.)
Natural gas production: 1.4 billion cu m (2004 est.)
Electricity production: 543.8 billion kWh (2005)
Energy consumption: 275.2 (m TOE)
Oil consumption: 1.999 million bbl/day (2005 est.)
Natural gas consumption: 47.26 billion cu m (2005 est.)
Electricity consumption: 451.5 billion kWh (2005)
Official development aid: $10.03 billion 
 0.47% (share of GDP)
Geography and ecology
Size of territory: 547,030 sq km (48th in the world)
Coastlines: 3,427 km (Bay of Biscay, English Channel,   
 Mediterranean Sea)
Fresh water: 1,400 sq km
Forests: 28.3% (land area, 2005)
CO
2 
emissions: 388.0 m tonnes (2005) (increase from   
 587.0 m in 2004)
Demography (2008 est.)
Population: 60,876,136 (metropolitan) (20th in the world)
Population growth: 0.574% (average annual % change)
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Germany
Peer Steinbrück
Peer Steinbrück became minister 
of finance for Germany in Novem-
ber 2005. He served as governor of 
Germany’s most populous state, North 
Rhine-Westphalia, from 2002 to 2005. 
He served as finance minister of that 
state from 2000 to 2002 and minister 
of the economy from 1998 to 2000. 
From 1993 to 1998 he was minister 
of the economy of Schleswig-Holstein. 
Born in 1947 in Hamburg, Steinbrück 
studied economics and social sciences 
at the University of Kiel. Steinbrück 
has participated in two G20 meetings, but he will be represented by 
Jörg Asmussen at the 2008 meeting.
Jörg Asmussen
Jörg Asmussen became state secretary at the Ministry of Finance in 
July 2008. His many previous positions include head of the minister’s 
office and private secretary to the minister of finance, private secretary 
to the state secretary and head of the directorate-general for finance 
market policy. Previous to his time in government he worked as a 
project manager in the field of European economic, social and labour 
market policy. He is chair of the administrative council of Germany’s 
Federal Finance Supervisory Authority, an alternative governor at 
the World Bank and at the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development and a member of the Financial Stability Forum. Born 
in Flensburg in 1966, Asmussen studied economics at the University 
of Gießen and later received his Master’s degree in business admin-
istration from Bocconi University. This will be his first G20 meeting 
representing the German minister of finance.
Axel Weber
Axel Weber was appointed president 
of the Deutsche Bundesbank in April 
2004. In 1994, he began working as 
a professor at the University of Bonn, 
moving to Johann Wolfgang Goethe 
University in Frankfurt in 1998, 
where he remains a member of the 
advisory board. During his time at 
Frankfurt, he became the director of 
the Center for Financial Studies. In 
2001 he taught international econom-
ics at the University of Cologne. He 
served as a member of the German 
Council of Economic Experts from 2002 to 2004 while he was also a 
member of the expert advisory panel to the Deutsche Bundesbank. He 
also currently sits on the board of directors for the Bank for Inter-
national Settlements. Born in 1957 in Kusel, Weber graduated with 
degrees in economics and public administration at the University of 
Konstanz in 1982. This will be his fifth G20 meeting as president of 
the Deutsche Bundesbank.
Polity
Political party: Christian Democratic Union (CDU-CSU)
Most recent election: 18 Sep 2005
Next election: 27 Sep 2009
Government: Lower House – Majority (coalition) 
 Upper House – Majority (coalition)
Political system: Parliamentary
Legislature: Bicameral, elected Federal Assembly, elected   
 Federal Council
Capital: Berlin
Official language: German
Economy
Currency: Euro (€)
GDP (millions): $3,297,233 (2007) 
 2.5% (growth 2006–2007)
Currency value: 0.71 (Sep 2008), 0.72 (Sep 2007)
Current account balance: 271.9 (latest year, $ billion, Jul 2008) 
 6.7% of GDP (2008)
Trade balance: 284.9 (latest year, Jul 2008)
Trade to GDP ratio: 77.0 (2004–2006)
Unemployment rate: 8.40 (2007 est.)
Inflation: 112.695 (average consumer price index  
 in units)
Government interest rates: 4.96% (latest 3 months, Sep 2008) 
 4.04% (latest 10-year government bonds)
Budget balance: 1.1% of GDP (2008)
Public debt: 63.20% of GDP (2007 est.)
Exchange reserves: 136,200,000,000 (Dec 2007)
Structure (% of GDP): Agriculture 0.8 
 Industry 29.0 
 Services 70.1 (2007 est.)
Energy production: 136.0 (m TOE)
Oil production: 141,700 bbl/day (2005 est.)
Natural gas production: 19.9 billion cu m (2005 est.)
Electricity production: 579.4 billion kWh (2005)
Energy consumption: 348.0 (m TOE)
Oil consumption: 2.618 million bbl/day (2005)
Natural gas consumption: 96.84 billion cu m (2005 est.)
Electricity consumption: 545.5 billion kWh (2005)
Official development aid: $10.08 billion 
 0.36% (share of GDP)
Geography and ecology
Size of territory: 357,021 sq km
Coastlines: 2,389 km (Baltic Sea, North Sea)
Fresh water: 7,798 sq km
Forests: 31.7% (land area, 2005)
CO
2 
emissions: 813.0 m tonnes (2005) (decrease from   
 850.0 m in 2004)
Demography (2008 est.)
Population: 82,369,548 (14th in the world)
Population growth: -0.044% (average annual % change)
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India
Shri Palaniappan Chidambaram
Shri Palaniappan Chidambaram was 
appointed minister of finance in 
2004. He also held the position from 
1996 to 1998. He was first elected 
in 1984 to represent Sivaganaga in 
Tamil Nadu in the Lower House of 
the Parliament. He has represented 
the same constituency continuously 
except between 1999 and 2004. He 
was inducted into the Union Council 
of Ministers in 1985 and served 
multiple positions including minister 
of state in the Ministry of Personnel, 
Public Grievances and Pensions, minister of state for internal security 
in the Ministry of Home Affairs and minister of state in the Ministry 
of Commerce. Before entering government he worked as a lawyer, 
focusing primarily on constitutional and corporate law. Born in 1945 
in Kanadukathan, Sivaganga, Chidambaram received his Bachelor 
of law from the Law College at Madras University and completed a 
Master’s in business administration at the Harvard Business School. 
This will be his fifth G20 meeting as the finance minister of India.
Duvvuri Subbarao
Duvvuri Subbarao was appointed 
governor of the Reserve Bank of India 
in September 2008 for a three-year 
term. Prior to this he served as the 
finance secretary in the Ministry of 
Finance. He held the posts of secretary 
to the Prime Minister’s Economic 
Advisory Council, lead economist at 
the World Bank, finance secretary in 
the government of Andhra Pradesh 
and joint secretary in the Department 
of Economic Affairs for the Indian 
Ministry of Finance. Born in 1949 
in Andhra Pradesh, Subbarao earned a Master’s in physics from the 
Indian Institue of Technology in Kanpur, a Master’s in economics from 
Ohio State University in 1978 and a PhD in economics at Andhra 
University. He was a Humphrey Fellow at the Massachusetts Institute 
of Technology from 1982 to 1983. This will be his first G20 meeting 
as governor of the Reserve Bank of India.
Polity
Political party: Indian National Congress
Most recent election: 2004
Next election: By May 2009
Government: Lower House – Majority (coalition) 
 Upper House – Majority
Political system: Parliamentary
Legislature: Bicameral, elected Assembly, indirectly elected  
 Council of States
Capital: Delhi
Official language: Hindi
Economy
Currency: Indian rupee (Rs)
GDP (millions): $1,170,968 (2007) 
 9.2% (growth 2006–2007)
Currency value: 45.7 (Sep 2008), 40.5 (Sep 2007)
Current account balance: -17.5 (latest year, $ billion, Q1 2008) 
 -3.2% of GDP (2008)
Trade balance: -93.3 (latest year, Jul 2008)
Trade to GDP ratio: 42.2 (2004–2006)
Unemployment rate: 7.20 (2007 est.)
Inflation: 137.273 (average consumer price index  
 in units)
Government interest rates: 9.00% (latest 3 months, Sep 2008) 
 9.08% (latest 10-year government bonds)
Budget balance: -3.4% of GDP (2008)
Public debt: 58.00% of GDP (2007 est.)
Exchange reserves: 275,000,000,000 (Dec 2007 est.)
Structure (% of GDP): Agriculture 17.6 
 Industry 29.4 
 Services 52.9 (2007 est.)
Energy production: 466.9 (m TOE)
Oil production: 834,600 bbl/day (2005 est.)
Natural gas production: 28.68 billion cu m (2005 est.)
Electricity production: 661.6 billion kWh (2005)
Energy consumption: 572.9 (m TOE)
Oil consumption: 2.438 million bbl/day (2005 est.)
Natural gas consumption: 34.47 billion cu m (2005 est.)
Electricity consumption: 488.5 billion kWh (2005)
Foreign debt: $123.1 billion 
 16.0% (share of GDP)
Geography and ecology
Size of territory: 3,287,590 sq km (7th in the world)
Coastlines: 7,000 km (Arabian Ocean, Indian Ocean, Bay  
 of Bengal)
Fresh water: 314,400 sq km
Forests: 22.8% (of land area, 2005)
CO
2 
emissions: 1,273.3 m tonnes (2003)
Demography (2008 est.)
Population: 1,147,995,898 (2nd in the world)
Population growth: 1.578% (average annual % change)
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Indonesia
Sri Mulyani Indrawati
Sri Mulyani Indrawati was appointed 
minister of finance in 2005. She is 
the governor for Indonesia in the 
Asian Development Bank, the Islamic 
Development Bank and the World 
Bank. She was executive director of 
the International Monetary Fund for 
the South East Asia constituency from 
2002 to 2004, representing 12 econo-
mies. She was minister of state for 
national development planning and 
chair of the National Development 
Planning Agency from 2004 to 2005. 
In 2001 she served as a consultant with the United States Agency for 
International Development on programmes to strengthen Indonesia’s 
autonomy. She has also lectured at a number of institutions, includ-
ing Georgia University. Born in 1962 in Tanjungkarang in Lampung, 
Mulyani received her doctorate in economics from the University of 
Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. This will be her third G20 meeting.
Boediono
Boediono became governor for Bank 
Indonesia in May 2008, replacing 
Burhanuddin Abdullah. His term will 
last until 2013. He previously served 
as deputy governor in charge of fiscal 
monetary policy, as minister of finance 
from 2001 to 2004 and as state minis-
ter for national planning and develop-
ment. He has lectured at Gadjah Mada 
University. Born in 1943, Boediono 
received his Master of economics 
from Monash University in Australia 
in 1972 and his PhD in business eco-
nomics from the Wharton School at the University of Pennsylvania in 
1979. This will be his first G20 meeting as central bank governor.
Polity
Political party: Democratic Party
Most recent election: 20 Sep 2004
Next election: 2009
Government: Lower House – Minority 
 Upper House – None
Political system: Presidential
Legislature: Bicameral, elected house of people’s represen-  
 tatives, elected house of regional representatives
Capital: Jakarta
Official language: Indonesian
Economy
Currency: Rupiah (Rp)
GDP (millions): $432,817 (2007) 
 6.3% (growth 2006–2007)
Currency value: 9,390 (Sep 2008), 9,371 (Sep 2007)
Current account balance: 6.3 (latest year, $ billion, Q2 2008) 
 2.8% of GDP (2008)
Trade balance: 35.6 (latest year, Jul 2008)
Trade to GDP ratio: 60.3 (2001–2003)
Unemployment rate: 9.60 (2007 est.)
Inflation: 187.666 (average consumer price index  
 in units)
Government interest rates: 10.24% (latest 3 months, Sep 2008) 
 6.98% (latest 10-year government bonds)
Budget balance: -2.0% of GDP (2008)
Public debt: 34.10% of GDP (2007 est.)
Exchange reserves: 94,330,000,000 (Dec 2007 est.)
Structure (% of GDP): Agriculture 13.8 
 Industry 46.7 
 Services 39.4 (2007 est.)
Energy production: 258.0 (m TOE)
Oil production: 1.07 million bbl/day (2006 est.)
Natural gas production: 74.0 billion cu m (2006 est.)
Electricity production: 125.9 billion kWh (2006 est.)
Energy consumption: 174.0 (m TOE)
Oil consumption: 1.1 million bbl/day (2006 est.)
Natural gas consumption: 37.5 billion cu m (2006 est.)
Electricity consumption: 108.0 billion kWh (2006 est.)
Foreign debt: $138.3 billion 
 55.0% (share of GDP)
Geography and ecology
Size of territory: 1,919,440 sq km (16th in the world)
Coastlines: 54,716 km (Indian Ocean, Andaman Sea,   
 Java Sea, South China Sea, Celebes Sea,   
 Banda Sea, Philippine Sea, North Pacific   
 Ocean, Arafura Sea, Timor Sea)
Fresh water: 93,000 sq km
Forests: 48.8% (land area, 2005)
CO
2 
emissions: 295.0 m tonnes (2003)
Demography (2008 est.)
Population: 237,512,355 (4th in the world)
Population growth: 1.175% (average annual % change)
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Italy
Giulio Tremonti
Giulio Tremonti became minister 
of the economy and finance in May 
2008. He has served as minister of the 
economy and finance in the govern-
ments of Silvio Berlusconi from 2001 
to 2004, and from 2005 to 2006 and 
finance minister from 1994 to 1995. 
He entered politics in 1987 and was 
first elected in 1994. He has served as 
vice-president of Forza Italia and vice-
president of the Chamber of Deputies. 
He was vice-chair of the Council of 
Ministers from 2005 to 2006. He has 
also been a professor since 1974 and currently teaches in the Faculty 
of Law at the University of Pavia. He has also been a visiting profes-
sor at the Institute of Comparative Law at Oxford. Born in 1947 in 
Sondrio, Tremonti received his education from the University of Pavia. 
This will be his fifth G20 meeting.
Mario Draghi
Mario Draghi was appointed gover-
nor of the Bank of Italy in 2006 for a 
six-year term. He sits on the governing 
and general councils of the European 
Central Bank and on the board of 
directors of the Bank for International 
Settlements. He represents Italy on the 
board of governors of the International 
Bank for Reconstruction and Devel-
opment and the Asian Development 
Bank. In 2006 he was elected chair of 
the Financial Stability Forum. Prior to 
taking the helm at the Bank of Italy, he 
was vice-chair and managing director of Goldman Sachs International. 
He was director general of the Italian Treasury from 1991 to 2001, chair 
of the European Economic and Financial Committee, a member of the 
G7 deputies and chair of Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development Working Party 3. He was appointed chair of the Italian 
Committee for Privatisation in 1993, and from 1984 to 1990 he was an 
executive director at the World Bank. Born in 1947 in Rome, Draghi 
graduated from the University of Rome and received his PhD in eco-
nomics from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. This will be his 
second G20 meeting as central bank governor.
Polity
Political party: People of Freedom (coalition)
Most recent election: 13–14 April 2008
Next election: Variable
Government: Lower House – Majority (coalition) 
 Upper House – Majority (coalition)
Political system: Parliamentary
Legislature: Bicameral, elected Chamber of Deputies,   
 elected Senate
Capital: Rome
Official language: Italian
Economy
Currency: Euro (€)
GDP (millions): $2,107,481 (2007) 
 1.5% (growth 2006–2007)
Currency value: 0.71 (Sep 2008), 0.72 (Sep 2007)
Current account balance: -67.6 (latest year, $ billion, Jun 2008) 
 -2.6% of GDP (2008)
Trade balance: -13.9 (latest 12 months, Jun 2008)
Trade to GDP ratio: 52.8 (2004–2006)
Unemployment rate: 6.00 (2007 est.)
Inflation: 117.687 (average consumer price index  
 in units)
Government interest rates: 4.96% (latest 3 months, Sep 2008) 
 4.72% (latest 10-year government bonds)
Budget balance: -2.6% of GDP (2008)
Public debt: 104.00% of GDP (2007 est.)
Exchange reserves: 94,330,000,000 (Dec 2007 est.)
Structure (% of GDP): Agriculture 1.9 
 Industry 28.9 
 Services 69.2 (2007 est.)
Energy production: 30.1 (m TOE)
Oil production: 164,800 bbl/day (2005 est.)
Natural gas production: 11.49 billion cu m (2005 est.)
Electricity production: 278.5 billion kWh (2005)
Energy consumption: 184.5 (m TOE)
Oil consumption: 1.732 million bbl/day (2005 est.)
Natural gas consumption: 82.64 billion cu m (2005 est.)
Electricity consumption: 307.1 billion kWh (2005)
Official development aid: $5.09 billion 
 0.29% (share of GDP)
Geography and ecology
Size of territory: 301,230 sq km
Coastlines: 7,600 km (Mediterranean Sea)
Fresh water: 7,210 sq km
Forests: 33.9% (of land area, 2005)
CO
2 
emissions: 454.0 m tonnes (2005) (increase from  
 451.0 in 2004)
Demography (2008 est.)
Population: 58,145,321 (22nd in the world)
Population growth: -0.019% (average annual % change)
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Japan
Shoichi Nakagawa
Shoichi Nakagawa was appointed 
minister of finance in September 2008. 
He also currently serves as state min-
ister for financial services. He was first 
elected to the House of Representatives 
in 1983. During his time in politics, 
he has held a number of distinguished 
portfolios in the Liberal Democratic 
Party and in Cabinet, including min-
ister of economy, trade and industry 
from 2003 to 2005 and minister of 
agriculture, forestry and fisheries from 
1998 to 1999 and again from 2005 to 
2006. He also worked at the Industrial Bank of Japan. Born in 1953 in 
Tokyo, he received a law degree from the University of Tokyo in 1978. 
This will be his first G20 meeting as minister of finance.
Masaaki Shirakawa
Masaaki Shirakawa was appointed 
governor of the Bank of Japan in April 
2008. He first joined the bank in 1972 
and has held a variety of positions, 
including director for the head of 
financial system, director for the head 
of planning division in the policy 
planning office and general manager 
for the Americas. In 1997 he became 
the deputy director general for the 
international department as well as the 
adviser to the governor of credit and 
market management. In 2000 he took 
over the position of adviser to the governor at the policy planning 
office. He became the executive director of the Bank of Japan in 2002. 
He also taught at the Kyoto University School of Government in 2006 
before serving as the deputy governor of the Bank of Japan in March 
2008. Born in 1949, Shirakawa received his Bachelor’s in economics 
from the University of Tokyo in 1972 and his Master’s in econom-
ics from the University of Chicago in 1977. This will be his first G20 
meeting as Bank of Japan governor.
Polity
Political party: Liberal Democratic Party
Most recent election: 11 Sep 2005
Next Election: Oct/Nov 2008
Government: Lower House – Majority (coalition) 
 Upper House – Minority (coalition)
Political system: Parliamentary
Legislature: Bicameral, elected House of Representatives,   
 elected House of Councillors
Capital: Tokyo
Official language: Japanese
Economy
Currency: Yen (¥)
GDP (millions): $4,376,705 (2007) 
 2.1% (growth 2006–2007)
Currency value: 107 (Sep 2008), 114 (Sep 2007)
Current account balance: 206.4 (latest year, $ billion, Jul 2008) 
 3.7% of GDP (2008)
Trade balance: 88.2 (latest year, Jul 2008)
Trade to GDP ratio: 28.8 (2004–2006)
Unemployment rate: 3.90 (2007 est.)
Inflation: 98.141 (average consumer prices index  
 in units)
Government interest rates: 0.75% (latest 3 months, Sep 2008) 
 1.51% (latest 10-year government bonds)
Budget balance: -2.8% of GDP (2008)
Public debt: 195.50% of GDP (2007 est.)
Exchange reserves: 954,100,000,000
Structure (% of GDP): Agriculture 1.4 
 Industry 26.5 
 Services 72.0 (2007 est.)
Energy production: 96.8 (m TOE)
Oil production: 125,000 bbl/day (2006)
Natural gas production: 4.85 billion cu m (2005 est.)
Electricity production: 1.025 trillion kWh (2005)
Energy consumption: 533.2 (m TOE)
Oil consumption: 5.353 million bbl/day (2005)
Natural gas consumption: 83.67 billion cu m (2005 est.)
Electricity consumption: 974.2 billion kWh (2005)
Official development aid: $13.15 billion 
 0.28% (share of GDP)
Geography and ecology
Size of territory: 377,835 sq km
Coastlines: 29,751 km (North Pacific Ocean, Sea of Japan)
Fresh water: 3,091 sq km
Forests: 68.2% (of land area, 2005)
CO
2 
emissions: 1,214.0 m tonnes (2005) (increase from   
 1,201.0 m in 2004)
Demography (2008 est.)
Population: 127,288,419 (10th in the world)
Population growth: -0.139% (average annual % change)
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Korea
Man-Soo Kang
Man-Soo Kang was appointed minister 
of strategy and finance in February 
2008. He joined the senior govern-
ment service in 1970, working for 
financial and fiscal affairs as direc-
tor general of finance and assistant 
minister for trade and customs in 
the Ministry of Finance, while also 
serving as financial attaché to the 
Korean embassy in the United States. 
He later worked for the promotion of 
trade and industrial development as 
commissioner of customs service and 
vice-minister of trade, industry and energy. He also served as execu-
tive vice-chair of the Korea International Trade Association and chair 
of the Digital Economy Institute, as well as president of the Seoul 
Development Institute. Kang received his Master’s in economics from 
New York University. This will be his first G20 meeting as minister of 
strategy and finance.
Lee Seong-Tae
Lee Seong-Tae was appointed gov-
ernor of the Bank of Korea in 2006. 
Since joining the Bank of Korea in 
1968, he has held many positions, 
including deputy director of the 
monetary policy department, director 
of public information, director of 
support services and properties, direc-
tor of the budget and management 
department and director of research. 
He served as assistant governor from 
2000 to 2003 and went on to become 
the deputy governor, while also serv-
ing on the monetary policy committee in 2004. Born in 1945, Lee 
completed his Master’s in economics at the University of Illinois in 
1988. This will be his third G20 meeting as governor.
Polity
Political party: Grand National Party
Most recent election: 19 Dec 2007
Next election: 2012
Government: Single House – Majority
Political system: Presidential
Legislature: Unicameral, elected National Assembly
Capital: Seoul
Official language: Korean
Economy
Currency: Won (W)
GDP (millions): $969,795 (2007) 
 5.0% (growth 2006-2007)
Currency value: 1,110 (Sep 2008), 932 (Sep 2007)
Current account balance: -1.8 (latest year, $ billion, Jul 2008) 
 -2.5% of GDP (2008)
Trade balance: -6.7 (latest year, Aug 2008)
Trade to GDP ratio: 83.5 (2004-2006)
Unemployment rate: 3.30 (2007 est.)
Inflation: 123.014 (average consumer price index  
 in units)
Government interest rates: 5.79% (latest 3 months, Sep 2008) 
 5.79% (latest 10-year government bonds)
Budget balance: 1.5% of GDP (2008)
Public debt: 33.40% of GDP (2007 est.)
Exchange reserves: 262,200,000,000 (Dec 2007 est.)
Structure (% of GDP): Agriculture 3.0 
 Industry 39.4 
 Services 57.6 (2007 est.)
Energy production: 38.0 (m TOE)
Oil production: 17,050 bbl/day (2005)
Natural gas production: 1.66 billion cu m (2006)
Electricity production: 403.2 billion kWh (2007)
Energy consumption: 213.0 (m TOE)
Oil consumption: 2.13 million bbl/day (2006)
Natural gas consumption: 34.2 billion cu m (2006)
Electricity consumption: 368.6 billion kWh (2007)
Foreign debt: $152.8 billion 
 19.0% (share of GDP)
Geography and ecology
Size of territory: 98,480 sq km
Coastlines: 2,413 km (Sea of Japan, Korea Strait,  
 Yellow Sea)
Fresh water: 290 sq km
Forests: 63.5% (of land area, 2005)
CO
2 
emissions: 455.0 m tonnes (2003)
Demography (2008 est.)
Population: 49,232,844 (25th in the world)
Population growth: 0.371% (average annual % change)
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Mexico
Agustín Carstens
Agustín Carstens became secretary 
of finance for Mexico in December 
2006. Previously, he served as deputy 
managing director of the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and Mexico’s 
deputy secretary of finance. From 
1999 to 2000, he was an executive 
director at the IMF, after a career at 
the Central Bank of Mexico, where his 
positions included those of director 
general for economic research and 
chief of staff in the governor’s office. 
In addition, he was an organiser of the 
United Nations Conference on Financing for Development in Monter-
rey and of meetings of the G20 during Mexico’s year as host in 2003. 
He has served as alternate governor for Mexico at the InterAmerican 
Development Bank and the World Bank. Born in 1958 in Mexico City, 
Carstens received his Master’s in economics and PhD in 1983 and 
1985 respectively from the University of Chicago. This will be his 
second G20 meeting as finance minister.
Guillermo Ortiz Martínez
Guillermo Ortiz Martínez assumed the 
position of governor of the Bank of 
Mexico in January 1998. He was re-
elected for a second six-year term in 
2004. In 1999 he became a member 
of the Group of Thirty, a financial 
advisory body based in Washington 
DC. He served as secretary of commu-
nication and transportation for a short 
term under the government of Ernesto 
Zedillo and in 1994 he was appointed 
secretary of finance and public credit. 
He represented Mexico at the Inter-
national Monetary Fund, where he also served as executive director 
and represented seven countries. Born in 1948 in Mexico City, Ortiz 
received his Master’s and PhD in economics from Stanford University. 
This will be his tenth G20 meeting as governor.
Polity
Political party: National Action Party
Most recent election: 2 Jul 2006
Next election: 2012
Government: Lower House – Minority 
 Upper House – Minority
Political system: Presidential
Legislature: Bicameral, elected Federal Chamber of   
 Deputies, elected Senate
Capital: Mexico City
Official language: Spanish
Economy
Currency: Mexican peso (PS)
GDP (millions): $893,364 (2007) 
 3.3% (growth 2006–2007)
Currency value: 10.6 (Sep 2008), 11.1 (Sep 2007)
Current account balance: -5.3 (latest year, $ billion, Q2 2008) 
 -0.8% of GDP (2008)
Trade balance: -8.2 (latest 12 months, Jul 2008)
Trade to GDP ratio: 62.7 (2004–2006)
Unemployment rate: 3.70 (2007 est.)
Inflation: 238.794 (average consumer price index  
 in units)
Government interest rates: 8.17% (latest 3 months, Sep 2008) 
 8.53% (latest 10-year government bonds)
Budget balance: -0.1% of GDP (2008)
Public debt: 22.80% of GDP (2007 est.)
Exchange reserves: 87,190,000,000 (Dec 2007 est.)
Structure (% of GDP): Agriculture 4.0 
 Industry 26.6 
 Services 69.5 (2007 est.)
Energy production: 253.9 (m TOE)
Oil production: 3.784 million bbl/day (2005 est.)
Natural gas production: 41.37 billion cu m (2005 est.)
Electricity production: 222.4 billion kWh (2005)
Energy consumption: 165.5 (m TOE)
Oil consumption: 2.078 million bbl/day (2005 est.)
Natural gas consumption: 47.5 billion cu m (2005 est.)
Electricity consumption: 183.3 billion kWh (2005)
Foreign debt: $167.2 billion 
 26.0% (share of GDP)
Geography and ecology
Size of territory: 1,972,550 sq km (15th in the world)
Coastlines: 9,330 km (Caribbean Sea, Gulf of Mexico,   
 North Pacific Ocean)
Fresh water: 49,510 sq km
Forests: 33.7% (of land area, 2005)
CO
2 
emissions: 415.9 m tonnes (2003)
Demography (2008 est.)
Population: 109,955,400 (11th in the world)
Population growth: 1.142% (average annual % change)
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Russia
Alexei Leonidovich Kudrin
Alexei Leonidovich Kudrin was ap-
pointed minister of finance in May 
2000. He worked as deputy mayor and 
member of city government as well 
as chair of the economy and finances 
committee for the city of St Peters-
burg. He was appointed deputy chief 
of the presidential administration of 
the Russian Federation and, in 1996, 
chief of the administration on trade, 
economic and scientific-technological 
co-operation. He was appointed first 
deputy finance minister of the Russian 
Federation in 1997 and was reappointed in 1999. In September 2007, 
he was appointed deputy prime minister and reappointed to the posi-
tions of both deputy prime minister and finance minister in May 2008. 
Born in 1960 in Dobele, Latvia, Kudrin began graduate studies in 1985 
at the Institute of Economics of the Russian Academy of Sciences. This 
will be his ninth G20 meeting as minister of finance.
Sergey Mikhailovich Ignatiev
Sergey Mikhailovich Ignatiev was 
appointed chair of the Bank of Russia 
in 2002 and reappointed in Novem-
ber 2005. He was appointed deputy 
minister of economics and finance in 
1991, then deputy minister of finance 
one year later. He served as the deputy 
chair of the Bank of Russia in 1992, 
prior to serving three years as the 
deputy minister of economics. He was 
the aide for economic issues to the 
president of Russia in 1996, and held 
the position of first deputy minister of 
finance until 2002. Born in 1948 in Leningrad (now St Petersburg), 
Ignatiev completed his graduate studies in economics at Lomonosov 
Moscow State University in 1978. This will be his seventh G20 meet-
ing as the chair of the Bank of Russia.
Polity
Political party: United Russia
Most recent election: 2 Mar 2008
Next election: 2012
Government: Lower House – Majority 
 Upper House – None
Political system: Semi-presidential
Legislature: Bicameral, elected Duma, appointed   
 Federation Council
Capital: Moscow
Official language: Russian
Economy
Currency: Rouble (Rb)
GDP (millions): $1,291,011 (2007) 
 8.1% (growth 2006–2007)
Currency value: 25.6 (Sep 2008), 25.4 (Sep 2007)
Current account balance: 109.8 (latest year, $ billion, 2008) 
6.2% of GDP (2008)
Trade balance: 182.7 (latest year, Jul 2008)
Trade to GDP ratio: 55.8 (2004–2006)
Unemployment rate: 6.20 (2007 est.)
Inflation: 238.794 (average consumer price index   
 in units)
Government interest rates: 11.00% (latest 3 months, Sep 2008)   
 6.78% (latest 10-year government bonds)
Budget balance: 3.6% of GDP (2008)
Public debt: 5.90% of GDP (2007 est.)
Exchange reserves: 476,400,000,000 (Dec 2007 est.)
Structure (% of GDP): Agriculture 4.7 
 Industry 39.1 
 Services 56.2 (2007 est.)
Energy production: 1,158.5 (m TOE)
Oil production: 9.87 million bbl/day (2007)
Natural gas production: 656.2 billion cu m (2007 est.)
Electricity production: 1.0 trillion kWh (2007 est.)
Energy consumption: 641.5 (m TOE)
Oil consumption: 2.916 million bbl/day (2006)
Natural gas consumption: 610.0 billion cu m (2007 est.)
Electricity consumption: 985.2 billion kWh (2007 est.)
Foreign debt: $229.0 billion 
 40.0% (share of GDP)
Geography and Ecology
Size of territory: 17,075,200 sq km (1st in the world)
Coastlines: 37,653 km (Arctic Ocean, Pacific Ocean, Baltic  
 Sea, Black Sea, Caspian Sea)
Fresh water: 79,400 sq km
Forests: 47.9% (of land area, 2005)
CO
2 
emissions: 1,493.0 m tonnes (2003)
Demography (2008 est.)
Population: 140,702,094 (7th in the world)
Population growth: -0.474% (average annual % change)
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Saudi Arabia
Ibrahim Abulaziz Al-Assaf
Ibrahim Abulaziz Al-Assaf was 
appointed minister of finance and 
national economy in January 1996. 
Previously he served as economic 
adviser for the Saudi Fund for 
Development in Riyadh. He then 
became the alternative executive 
director of International Monetary 
Fund for Saudi Arabia until 1989, 
when he became executive director 
of the World Bank for Saudi Arabia. 
While at the World Bank until 1995 
he took on many other roles on 
various committees. Born in January 1949 in Ayoun Al-Jawa, Qassim, 
Saudi Arabia, Al-Assaf received his Master’s in economics from the 
University of Denver in 1976 and completed his PhD in economics at 
Colorado State University in 1982. This will be his tenth G20 meeting 
as minister of finance and national economy.
Hamad Al-Sayari
Hamad Al-Sayari was appointed 
governor of the Saudi Arabian 
Monetary Agency in April 1983. He is 
also chair of the board of directors of 
the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency 
and a member of the boards of the 
Public Investment Fund, the Gulf 
Investment Corporation and the 
Supreme Economic Council. After 
teaching economics at the Institute 
of Public Administration in Riyadh, 
he became secretary general of the 
Public Investment Fund and director 
general of the Saudi Industrial Development Fund. He later became 
vice-governor of the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency – his current 
appointment. Born in 1941, Al-Sayari completed his Master’s in 
economics at the Univerisity of Maryland. This will be his tenth G20 
meeting as governor.
Polity
Political party: None
Most recent election: None
Next election: None
Government: Absolute monarchy
Political system: Monarchy
Legislature: None
Capital: Riyadh
Official language: Arabic
Economy
Currency: Riyal (SR)
GDP (millions): $381,683 (2007) 
 4.1% (growth 2006–2007)
Currency value: 3.75 (Sep 2008), 3.75 (Sep 2007)
Current account balance: 95.0 (latest year, $ billion, 2007) 
 33.1% of GDP (2008)
Trade balance: 150.8 (latest year, 2007)
Trade to GDP ratio: 75.0 (2003–2005)
Unemployment rate: 13.00 (2004 est.)
Inflation: 107.213 (average consumer price index  
 in units)
Government interest rates: 4.30% (latest 3 months, Sep 2008)
Budget balance: 13.3% of GDP (2008)
Public debt: 23.30% of GDP (2007 est.)
Exchange reserves: 34,010,000,000 (Dec 2007 est.)
Structure (% of GDP): Agriculture 3.0 
 Industry 65.9 
 Services 31.1 (2007 est.)
Energy production: 556.2 (m TOE)
Oil production: 11.0 million bbl/day (2007 est.)
Natural gas production: 68.32 billion cu m (2005 est.)
Electricity production: 165.6 billion kWh (2005)
Energy consumption: 140.4 (m TOE)
Oil consumption: 2.0 million bbl/day (2005)
Natural gas consumption: 68.32 billion cu m (2005 est.)
Electricity consumption: 146.9 billion kWh (2005)
Official development aid: $1.73 billion 
 0.69% (share of GDP)
Geography and ecology
Size of territory: 2,149,690 sq km (13th in the world)
Coastlines: 2,640 km (Persian Gulf, Red Sea)
Fresh water: 0 sq km
Forests: 1.3% (of land area, 2005)
CO
2 
emissions: 302.3 m tonnes (2003)
Demography (2008 est.)
Population: 28,161,417 (46th in the world, includes   
 non-nationals)
Population growth: 1.945% (average annual % change)
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South Africa
Trevor Andrew Manuel
Trevor Andrew Manuel was appointed 
minister of finance of the Republic of 
South Africa in 1996. In 1994 he was 
appointed to the advisory committee 
of the United Nations Initiative for 
Trade Efficiency as well as governor 
of the board of the World Bank for 
the African Development Bank Group 
and Development Bank of Southern 
Africa. He served as the minister of 
trade and industry for two years. From 
2001 to 2005 he served as chair of the 
development committee of the World 
Bank. In 2003 he was appointed commissioner of the International 
Task Force on Global Public Goods. He served as commissioner in the 
Commission for Africa and the Commission on Growth and Develop-
ment. He was appointed special envoy for development finance by 
the United Nations Secretary General. Born in 1956 in Kensington 
in Cape Town, Manuel received his national diploma in civil and 
structural engineering from Peninsula Technikon and completed the 
executive management programme at Stanford National University in 
Singapore. This will be his tenth G20 meeting as minister of finance.
Tito Mboweni
Tito Mboweni was appointed governor 
of the South Africa Reserve Bank in 
August 1999. He was minister of la-
bour from 1994 until 1998 in Nelson 
Mandela’s Cabinet. Prior to this ap-
pointment he was deputy head of the 
department of economic policy in the 
African National Congress (ANC). In 
1995 he was named one of the World 
Economic Forum’s global leaders of 
tomorrow. He was appointed head 
of the ANC’s policy department in 
1997 before joining the Reserve Bank 
as adviser to the governor in 1998. During his tenure he has been 
appointed honorary professor of economics at the University of South 
Africa and awarded an honourary doctorate of economics from the 
University of Natal. Born in 1959 in Tzaneen, Mboweni earned his 
Master’s in development economics from the University of East Anglia 
in 1987. This will be his tenth G20 meeting as governor.
Polity
Political party: African National Congress
Most recent election: 14 Apr 2004
Next election: 2009
Government: Lower House – Majority 
 Upper House – Majority
Political system: Parliamentary
Legislature: Bicameral, elected National Assembly, elected  
 National Council of Provinces
Capital: Pretoria
Official languages: Afrikaans, English 
Economy
Currency: Rand (R)
GDP (millions): $277,581 (2007) 
 5.1% (growth 2006–2007)
Currency value: 8.12 (Sep 2008), 7.17 (Sep 2007)
Current account balance: -22.3 (latest year, $ billion, Q1 2008) 
 -8.0% of GDP (2008)
Trade balance: -11.1 (latest year, July 2008)
Trade to GDP ratio: 57.5 (2001–2003)
Unemployment rate: 24.30 (2007 est.)
Inflation: 143.500 (average consumer price index  
 in units)
Government interest rates: 12.20% (latest 3 months, Sep 2008) 
 9.21% (latest 10-year government bonds)
Budget balance: 0.4% of GDP (2008)
Public debt: 31.30% of GDP (2007 est.)
Exchange reserves: 32,980,000,000 (Dec 2007 est.)
Structure (% of GDP): Agriculture 3.2 
 Industry 31.3 
 Services 65.5 (2007 est.)
Energy production: 156.0 (m TOE)
Oil production: 200,000 bbl/day (2006 est.)
Natural gas production: 2.11 billion cu m (2005 est.)
Electricity production: 264 billion kWh (2007)
Energy consumption: 131.1 (m TOE)
Oil consumption: 519,000 bbl/day (2006 est.)
Natural gas consumption: 2.11 billion cu m (2005 est.)
Electricity consumption: 241.1 billion kWh (2007)
Foreign debt: $30.6 billion 
 14.0% (share of GDP)
Geography and ecology
Size of territory: 1,219,912 sq km (25th in the world)
Coastlines: 2,798 km (South Atlantic Ocean,  
 Indian Ocean)
Fresh water: 0 sq km
Forests: 7.6% (of land area, 2005)
CO
2 
emissions: 285.4 m tonnes (2003)
Demography (2008 est.)
Population: 43,786,115 (26th in the world)
Population growth: -0.501% (average annual % change)
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Turkey
Kemal Unakıtan
Kemal Unakıtan was appointed min-
ister of finance in November 2002. 
Previously, he held a number of execu-
tive positions, such as general director 
and executive board member in the 
private sector for various industrial 
institutions, financial institutions 
and foreign trade companies. From 
1976 to 1978 he served as the general 
director of SEKA, a paper mill. Born in 
1946 in Edirne, Unakıtan completed 
his studies at Ankara Economic and 
Commercial Sciences Academy. This 
will be his sixth G20 meeting as minister of finance.
Durmu Yılmaz
Durmu Yılmaz was appointed gov-
ernor of the Central Bank of Turkey 
in April 2006. He started working in 
the foreign exchange department at 
the central bank in 1980. He became 
deputy director of the foreign exchange 
transactions division in 1993, director 
of the interbank money market division 
in 1995 and director of the balance of 
payments division in 1996. He was 
promoted to deputy executive director 
in the markets department in 1996 and 
served there until 2002, when he be-
came executive director of the workers’ remittances department. In April 
2003 he was elected member of the board in the shareholders ordinary 
general meeting and held this position until becoming governor. Born in 
1947 in Usak in Anatolia, Yılmaz received his Master’s from University 
College at the University of London. This will be his third G20 meeting 
as governor of the central bank.
Polity
Political party: Justice and Development Party (AKP)
Most recent election: 22 Jul 2007
Next election: Variable
Government: Single House – Majority
Political system: Parliamentary
Legislature: Unicameral, elected Grand National Assembly
Capital: Ankara
Official language: Turkish
Economy
Currency: Turkish lira (YTL)
GDP (millions): $657,091 (2007) 
 5.0% (growth 2006–2007)
Currency value: 1.24 (Sep 2008), 1.28 (Sep 2007)
Current account balance: -41.7 (latest year, $ billion, Jul 2008) 
 -6.4% of GDP (2008)
Trade balance: -73.8 (latest year, Jul 2008)
Trade to GDP ratio: 63.0 (2004–2006)
Unemployment rate: 9.90 (2007 est.)
Inflation: 392.904 (average consumer price index  
 in units)
Government interest rates: 18.29% (latest 3 months, Sep 2008) 
 6.61% (latest 10-year government bonds)
Budget balance: -2.7% of GDP (2008)
Public debt: 38.90% of GDP (2007 est.)
Exchange reserves: 76,510,000,000 (Dec 2007 est.)
Structure (% of GDP): Agriculture 8.9 
 Industry 28.3 
 Services 62.8 (2007 est.)
Energy production: 24.1 (m TOE)
Oil production: 45,460 bbl/day (2005 est.)
Natural gas production: 860.3 million cu m (2005 est.)
Electricity production: 154.2 billion kWh (2005)
Energy consumption: 81.9 (m TOE)
Oil consumption: 660,800 bbl/day (2005 est.)
Natural gas consumption: 26.256 billion cu m (2005 est.)
Electricity consumption: 129.0 billion kWh (2005)
Foreign debt: $171.1 billion 
 59.0% (share of GDP)
Geography and ecology
Size of territory: 780,580 sq km (37th in the world)
Coastlines: 7,200 km (Black Sea, Aegean Sea,  
 Mediterranean Sea)
Fresh water: 9,820 sq km
Forests: 13.2% (of land area, 2005)
CO
2 
emissions: 146.2 m tonnes (2003)
Demography (2008 est.)
Population: 71,892,807 (17th in the world)
Population growth: 1.013% (average annual % change)
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United Kingdom
Alistair Darling
Alistair Darling was appointed chan-
cellor of the exchequer in June 2007. 
He was the member of Parliament for 
Edinburgh Central from 1987 until 
2005 and for Edinburgh South West 
since 2005. He was appointed chief 
secretary to the Treasury from 1997 to 
1998, secretary of the state for social 
security from 1998 until 2001 and 
secretary of state for the Department 
of Work and Pensions from 2001 to 
2002. He served as secretary of state 
for transport and secretary of state for 
Scotland from 2002 until 2006, when he was appointed secretary of 
state for the Department of Trade and Industry from 2006 until his 
current position. Born in London, Darling studied law at Aberdeen 
University and worked as a solicitor in Edinburgh before being 
called to the Scottish Bar and accepted into the Faculty of Advocates 
in 1984. This will be his second G20 meeting as chancellor of the 
exchequer.
Mervyn King
Mervyn King was appointed governor 
of the Bank of England in 2003. After 
teaching economics at the universi-
ties of Cambridge, Birmingham 
and Harvard and the Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology, he taught at 
the London School of Economics and 
Political Science from 1984 to 1995, 
where he established the Financial 
Markets Group. He later served as a 
non-executive director of the Bank of 
England until he became chief econo-
mist and executive director in 1991. 
He was deputy governor from 1998 to 2003, when he was elected 
to his current position, and continues to chair the monetary policy 
committee. In 1998 he became a member of the Group of Thirty, the 
financial advisory body based in Washington DC. Born in 1948, King 
attained a first class degree in economics at King’s College, Cambridge, 
and continued to study at Cambridge and Harvard. This will be his 
sixth G20 meeting as governor.
Polity
Political party: Labour Party
Most recent election: 5 May 2005
Next election: By 3 Jun 2010
Government: Lower House – Majority 
 Upper House – Minority
Political system: Parliamentary
Legislature: Bicameral, elected House of Commons,   
 appointed House of Lords
Capital: London
Official language: English
Economy
Currency: British pound (£)
GDP (millions): $2,727,806 (2007) 
 3.1% (growth 2006–2007)
Currency value: 0.57 (Sep 2008), 0.49 (Sep 2007)
Current account balance: -102.4 (latest year, $ billion, Q1 2008) 
 -3.4% of GDP (2008)
Trade balance: -187.4 (latest year, Jul 2008)
Trade to GDP ratio: 57.6 (2004–2006)
Unemployment rate: 5.40 (2007 est.)
Inflation: 112.460 (average consumer price index  
 in units)
Government interest rates: 5.69% (latest 3 months, Sep 2008) 
 4.45% (latest 10-year government bonds)
Budget balance: -3.8% of GDP (2008)
Public debt (% of GDP): 43.00 (2007 est.)
Exchange reserves: 57,300,000,000 (Dec 2007)
Structure (% of GDP): Agriculture 0.9 
 Industry 23.4 
 Services 75.7 (2007 est.)
Energy production: 225.2 (m TOE)
Oil production: 1.861 billion bbl/day (2005 est.)
Natural gas production: 84.16 billion cu m (2005 est.)
Electricity production: 372.6 billion kWh (2005)
Energy consumption: 233.7 (m TOE)
Oil consumption: 1.82 million bbl/day (2005 est.)
Natural gas consumption: 91.16 billion cu m (2005 est.)
Electricity consumption: 348.7 billion kWh (2005)
Official development aid: $10.77 billion 
 0.47% (share of GDP)
Geography and ecology
Size of territory: 244,820 sq km (includes Rockall and  
 Shetland Islands)
Coastlines: 12,429 km (North Sea, English Channel,   
 North Atlantic Ocean)
Fresh water: 3,230 sq km (includes Rockall and  
 Shetland Islands)
Forests: 11.8% (of land area, 2005)
CO
2 
emissions: 530.0 m tonnes (2005) (decrease from   
 540.0 m in 2004)
Demography (2008 est.)
Population: 60,943,912 (21st in the world)
Population growth: 0.276% (average annual % change)
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United States
Henry Paulson
Henry Paulson was appointed secre-
tary of the Treasury in July 2006. He 
is a member of the board of governors 
of the International Monetary Fund. 
Previously he was staff assistant to the 
assistant secretary of defence at the 
Pentagon and a member of the White 
House domestic council, serving as 
staff assistant to the president from 
1972 to 1973. In 1974 he joined the 
Chicago office of Goldman Sachs, 
eventually becoming chair and chief 
executive officer in 1999. Born in 
1946, Paulson received his Master’s in business administration from 
Harvard University in 1970. This will be his third G20 meeting as 
secretary of the Treasury.
Ben Bernanke
Ben Bernanke was appointed chair 
and member of the board of gover-
nors of the Federal Reserve System in 
February 2006. After many years of 
teaching, he held various positions in 
the Federal Reserve System, includ-
ing member of the academic advisory 
panel at the Federal Reserve Bank 
of New York, visiting scholar at the 
Federal Reserve banks of Philadelphia, 
Boston and New York, and member of 
the board of governors of the Federal 
Reserve System. Prior to his current 
appointment he chaired the president’s Council of Economic Advisors. 
He continues to serve as chair of the Federal Open Market Committee. 
Born in 1953 in Augusta, Georgia, Bernanke received his PhD in 1979 
from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. This will be his third 
G20 meeting as chair of the Federal Reserve System.
Polity
Political party: Republican
Most recent election: 2 Nov 2004
Next election: 4 Nov 2008
Government: Lower House – Minority 
 Upper House – Minority
Political system: Presidential
Legislature: Bicameral, elected House of Representatives,   
 electedSenate
Capital: Washington DC
Official language: English
Economy
Currency: US dollar ($)
GDP (millions): $13,811,200 (2007) 
 2.2% (growth 2006–2007)
Currency value: Not available
Current account balance: -740.7 (latest year, $ billion, Q1 2008) 
 -4.8% of GDP (2008)
Trade balance: -836.2 (latest year, Jun 2008)
Trade to GDP ratio: 44.3 (2004–2006)
Unemployment rate: 4.60% (2007 est.)
Inflation: 120.414 (average consumer prices index  
 in units)
Government interest rates: 2.09% (latest 3 months, Sep 2008) 
 3.64% (latest 10-year government bonds)
Budget balance: -2.4% of GDP (2008)
Public debt: 60.80% of GDP (2007 est.)
Exchange reserves: 70,570,000,000 (Dec 2007 est.)
Structure (% of GDP): Agriculture 0.9 
 Industry 20.5 
 Services 78.5 (2007 est.)
Energy production: 1,641.0 (m TOE)
Oil production: 8.322M bbl/day (2005 est.)
Natural gas production: 490.8 billion cu m (2005 est.)
Electricity production: 4.062 trillion kWh (2005)
Energy consumption: 2,325.9 (m TOE)
Oil consumption: 20.8 M bbl/day (2005 est.)
Natural gas consumption: 604 billion cu m (2005 est.)
Electricity consumption: 3.816 trillion kWh (2005)
Official development aid: $27.62 billion 
 0.22% (share of GDP)
Geography and ecology
Size of territory: 9,826,630 sq km (4th in the world)
Coastlines: 19,924 km (Atlantic Ocean, Pacific Ocean,   
 Arctic Ocean, Bering Sea, Arctic Ocean)
Fresh water: 664,707 sq km
Forests: 33.1% (of land area, 2005)
CO
2 
emissions: 5,817.0 m tonnes (2005) (increase from   
 5,792.0 in 2004)
Demography (2008 est.)
Population: 303,824,646 (3rd in the world)
Population growth: 0.883% (average annual % change)
143??? ?????????????????? ?????????????
Member profiles
Photos: xxxxxxxxxxxxxx
European Union
Jean-Claude Trichet
Jean-Claude Trichet was appointed 
president of the European Central 
Bank in 2003. He was assigned to 
France’s Treasury department in 1975 
and held many positions, including 
head of the Development Aid Office, 
deputy director of bilateral affairs, 
head of international affairs and 
director. He also served as alternative 
governor of the International Monetary 
Fund and the World Bank, later 
becoming governor of the World Bank. 
He served as governor of the Bank of 
France for two terms. In 1987 Trichet became a member of the Group 
of Thirty, a financial advisory body based in Washington DC. In 
1998 he became a member of the governing council of the European 
Central Bank before chairing the Group of Ten governors. Born in 
1942 in Lyon, France, Trichet completed his studies at the Institut 
d’Études Politiques de Paris and the École Nationale d’Administration 
in 1971. This will be his sixth G20 meeting as president of the 
European Central Bank.
Council of the European Union
The European Union is represented by 
the rotating presidency of the Council 
of the European Union. France has 
held the presidency of the Council 
since July 2008 and will continue 
to hold the position when the G20 
meets in November 2008. This will be 
France’s second time representing the 
EU at the annual G20 meeting. It  
also held the presidency of the 
Council at the 2000 G20 meeting  
held in Canada. 
Polity
Political party: European People’s Party – European Democrats
Most recent election: 10-13 Jun 2004
Next election: 4-7 Jun 2009
Government: Lower House – Minority 
 Upper House – None
Political system: Parliamentary
Legislature: Bicameral, elected Parliament, indirectly   
 elected council
Official languages:  Bulgarian, Czech, Danish, Dutch, English,   
 Estonian, Finnish, French, German, Greek,  
 Hungarian, Irish, Italian, Latvian, Lithuanian,   
 Maltese, Polish, Portuguese, Romanian, Slovak,   
 Slovene, Spanish, Swedish
Economy
Currency: Euro (€)
GDP (millions): $12,179,250 (2007) 
 3.0% (growth 2006–2007)
Currency value: 0.71 (Sep 2008); 0.72 (Sep 2007)
Current account balance: -31.5 (latest year, $ billion, Jun 2008) 
 -0.3% of GDP (2008)
Trade balance: 3.5 (latest year, Jun 2008)
Trade to GDP ratio: 26.4 (2004–2006)
Unemployment rate: 8.50 (2006 est.)
Government interest rates: 4.96% (latest 3 months, Sep 2008) 
 4.04% (latest 10-year government bonds)
Budget balance: -0.9% of GDP (2008)
Structure (% of GDP): Agriculture 2.0 
 Industry 27.1 
 Services 70.7 (2006 est.)
Energy production: 462.9 (m TOE)
Oil production: 2.868 million bbl/day (2004)
Natural gas production: 215.4 billion cu m (2005 est.)
Electricity production: 3.007 trillion kWh (2004 est.)
Energy consumption: 1,245.1 (m TOE)
Oil consumption: 14.58 million bbl/day (2004)
Natural gas consumption: 496.7 billion cu m (2005 est.)
Electricity consumption: 2.18 trillion kWh (2004 est.)
Official development aid: $39.50 billion (2005) 
 0.41% (share of GDP)
Geography and ecology
Size of territory: 4,324,782 sq km
Coastlines: 65,993 km (Black Sea, Mediterranean Sea,   
 Atlantic Ocean, North Sea)
CO
2 
emissions: 3,976 m tonnes (2005) (decrease from 4,021   
 in 2004)
Demography (2008 est.)
Population: 491,018,677
Population growth: 0.12% (average annual % change)
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G20
Official G20 website:  
www.g20.org 
G20 Information Centre: 
www.g20.utoronto.ca 
Member countries
Argentina
Ministry of Economy and Public Works:  
www.mecon.gov.ar 
Central Bank of Argentina: 
www.bcra.gov.ar/index_i.htm 
Australia
Treasury:  
www.treasury.gov.au 
Reserve Bank of Australia:  
www.rba.gov.au 
Brazil
Ministry of Finance:  
www.fazenda.gov.br 
Central Bank of Brazil:  
www.bcb.gov.br/?english 
Canada
Department of Finance:  
www.fin.gc.ca/fin-eng.html 
Bank of Canada:  
www.bankofcanada.ca 
China
Ministry of Finance:  
http://159.226.208.3/english/english.htmPeople’s Bank 
of China:  
www.pbc.gov.cn/english 
European Union
Council of the European Union:  
www.consilium.europa.eu/showPage.ASP?lang=en
European Central Bank:  
www.ecb.int/ecb/html/index.en.html 
France
Ministry of the Economy, Industry and Employment:   
www.minefi.gouv.fr
Bank of France: 
www.banque-france.fr/home.htm 
Germany
Ministry of Finance:  
www.bundesfinanzministerium.de 
Central Bank of Germany:  
www.bundesbank.de/index.en.php 
India
Ministry of Finance:  
www.finmin.nic.in 
Reserve Bank of India:  
www.rbi.org.in 
Indonesia
Ministry of Finance:  
www.depkeu.go.id/ind 
Bank Indonesia:  
www.bi.go.id/web/en 
Italy
Ministry of Economy and Finance:  
www.finanze.it
Bank of Italy:  
www.bancaditalia.it 
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Inter-America Development Bank:  
www.iadb.org 
International Association of Insurance Supervisors: 
www.iaisweb.org 
International Finance Corporation:  
www.ifc.org 
International Monetary Fund:  
www.imf.org 
International Organization for Securities Commissions: 
www.iosco.org 
International Swaps and Derivatives Association:  
www.isda.org 
Offshore Group of Banking Supervisors:  
www.ogbs.net 
World Bank:  
www.worldbank.org 
International organisations
African Institute for Economic Development and Planning:  
www.unidep.org/homepage.htm 
Economic Commission for Latin America and the 
Caribbean:  
www.eclac.org/default.asp?idioma=IN 
Food and Agriculture Organization:  
www.fao.org 
International Atomic Energy Agency:  
www.iaea.org 
International Energy Agency:  
www.iea.org 
International Fund for Agriculture and Development: 
www.ifad.org 
International Telecommunications Union:  
www.itu.int 
Nuclear Energy Agency:  
www.nea.fr 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development:  
www.oecd.org 
Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries: 
www.opec.org 
United Nations:  
www.un.org/english 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development: 
www.unctad.org 
United Nations Development Programme:  
www.undp.org 
United Nations Environment Programme:  
www.unep.org 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change:  
www.unfccc.int 
World Food Programme:   
www.wfp.org 
World Health Organization:   
www.who.int 
World Trade Organization:  
www.wto.org 
Other resources
Brookings Institution, Global Environment and 
Development Program: 
www.brookings.edu/global.aspx 
G8 Information Centre: www.g8.utoronto.ca 
L20: A Leader’s Forum: www.l20.org 
Japan
Ministry of Finance:  
www.mof.go.jp/english 
Bank of Japan:  
www.boj.or.jp/en 
Korea
Ministry of Strategy and Finance:  
http://english.mofe.go.kr 
Bank of Korea:  
www.bok.or.kr/index.jsp 
Mexico
Secretariat of Finance and Public Credit:  
www.shcp.gob.mx/portada_english/ingles/zyx.html 
Bank of Mexico:  
http://www.banxico.org.mx/sitioingles/index.html
Russia
Ministry of Finance:  
www.minfin.ru/en 
Central Bank of the Russian Federation:  
www.cbr.ru/eng 
Saudi Arabia
Ministry of Finance:  
www.mof.gov.sa/en/default.asp 
Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency:  
www.sama.gov.sa/indexe.htm 
South Africa
National Treasury:  
www.finance.gov.za 
South African Reserve Bank:  
www.reservebank.co.za
Turkey
Ministry of Finance:  
www.maliye.gov.tr 
Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey:  
www.tcmb.gov.tr/yeni/eng 
United Kingdom
HM Treasury:  
www.hm-treasury.gov.uk 
Bank of England:  
www.bankofengland.co.uk
United States
Department of the Treasury:  
www.treas.gov 
Federal Reserve System:  
www.federalreserve.gov 
International financial institutions
African Development Bank:  
www.afdb.org 
Asian Development Bank:  
www.adb.org 
Bank for International Settlements:  
www.bis.org 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development: 
www.ebrd.com 
European Investment Bank:  
www.eib.org 
Financial Action Task Force:  
www.fatf-gafi.org 
Financial Stability Forum:  
www.fsforum.org 
Institute of International Finance:  
www.iif.com 
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The G20 Research Group is a global network of scholars, students and professionals in the 
academic, research,  media, business, non-governmental and governmental communities, who 
follow the work of the G20 finance ministers and central bank governors. Its mission is to serve 
as the world’s leading independent source of information, analysis and research on the G20. 
The G20 Research Group is managed from the Munk Centre for International Studies at Trinity 
College in the  University of Toronto, also the home of the G8 Research Group.
The G20 Information Centre  
(www.g20.utoronto.ca) 
The G20 Information Centre is a comprehensive permanent collection of  information and 
analysis on the G20 available online at no charge. It complements the G8 Information Centre, 
which houses publicly available archives on the G7, G8 and G20, including studies of perform-
ance and compliance.
Books on the G20, G8 and Related Issues, from Ashgate
????????????????????????????????????? 
???????????????????????????????????????????????
The G8 System and the G20, Peter I. Hajnal (Global 
Finance series)
Governing Global Derivatives, Chiara Oldani 
(Global Finance series)
Governing Global Banking, Duncan Wood (Global 
Finance series)
Sustaining Global Growth and Development, 
 Michele Fratianni, Paolo Savona and John Kirton, 
eds. (Global Finance series)
Financing Development, Michele Fratianni, John 
Kirton and Paolo Savona, eds. (Global Finance  
series)
The New Economic Diplomacy (2nd edition), 
Nicholas Bayne and Stephen Woolcock (Global  
Finance series)
Shaping a New International Financial System, 
Karl Kaiser, John J. Kirton and Joseph Daniels, eds. 
(G8 and Global Governance series)
Elements of the Euro Area, Jesper Berg, Mauro 
Grande and Francesco Paolo Mongelli (Global  
Finance series)
Corporate, Public and Global Governance,  Michele 
Fratianni, Paolo Savona and John Kirton, eds. 
(Global Finance series)
Global Financial Crime, Donato Masciandaro 
(Global Finance series) 
New Directions in Global Economic Governance, 
John Kirton and George von Furstenberg, eds.  
(G8 and Global Governance Series)
New Perspectives on Global Governance, Michele 
Fratianni, John Kirton, Alan Rugman and Paolo 
Savona, eds. (Global Finance series)
Guiding Global Order, John Kirton, Joseph 
Daniels and Andreas Freytag, eds. (G8 and Global 
 Governance series)
Governing Agrobiodiversity, Regine Andersen 
(Global Environmental Governance series)
Governing Global Health, Andrew F. Cooper, 
John Kirton and Ted Schrecker, eds. (Global 
 Environmental Governance series) 
Governing Global Trade, Theodore Cohn (G8 and 
Global Governance series)
Participation for Sustainability in Trade, Sophie 
Thoyer and Benoît Martimort-Asso, eds. (Global 
Environmental Governance series)
Staying Together, Nicholas Bayne (G8 and Global 
Governance series)
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